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Abstract 
This thesis examines the literature on local home bias, i.e. investor preference towards 
geographically nearby stocks, and investigates the role of firm’s visibility, profitability, and opacity 
in explaining such behavior. While firm’s visibility is expected to proxy for the behavioral root 
originating such a preference, firm’s profitability and opacity are expected to capture the 
informational one. I find that less visible, and more profitable and opaque firms, conditionally to the 
demand, benefit from being headquartered in regions characterized by a scarcity of listed firms 
(local supply of stocks). Specifically, research estimates suggest that firms headquartered in regions 
with a poor supply of stocks would be worth i) 11 percent more if non-visible, non-profitable and 
non-opaque; ii) 16 percent more if profitable; and iii) 28 percent more if both profitable and opaque. 
Overall, as these features are able to explain most, albeit not all, of the local home bias effect, I 
reasonably argue and then assess that most of the preference for local is determined by a successful 
attempt to exploit local information advantage (60 percent), while the rest is determined by a mere 
(irrational) feeling of familiarity with the local firm (40 percent). Several and significant 
methodological, theoretical, and practical implications come out. 
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1. Introduction 
A huge number of financial studies focuses on the factors able to affect investors’ 
asset allocation process. Although essential drivers of investors choices have already been 
largely detected and investigated by financial literature (see among the first Markowitz 
(1952)), a significant but still partially unexplored element in this sense is represented by 
firms’ location, which indeed is nowadays more and more addressed by academics. Investor 
preference for domestic stocks rather than foreign ones seems in fact to be one of the main 
ambiguities that comes out from a theory-and-practice comparison. Such behavior, known as 
“home bias” (French and Poterba (1991)), is indeed at least curious after considering the 
overall higher risk of the not-well-diversified portfolio implied by the overweighting of 
domestic stocks (see Grubel (1968); Levy and Sarnat (1970); Solnik (1974); De Santis and 
Gerard (1997); Eldor, Pines and Schwartz (1988); Lau, Ng, Zhang (2010)). Financial research 
deeply focused over the topic and produced a wide variety of studies: this phenomenon 
emerges not only in cross-country studies, where domestic stocks are preferred to the foreign 
ones (French and Poterba (1991); Cooper and Kaplanis (1994); Tesar and Werner (1995))
i
, 
but also within the borders of single countries (i.e. local home bias), where securities are 
preferred as a consequence of an investor’s geographical closeness to the firm’s headquarters 
(Coval and Moskowitz (1999)). Over time academics have been invited to provide 
interpretations to the (local) home bias, one of the most convincing of which is linked to 
information asymmetries. In this perspective, both domestic (Brennan and Cao (1997)) and 
geographically nearby firms (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)) are, correctly or not, believed to 
be better known with respect to the foreign/distant ones.
ii
 However, in spite of the 
                                                 
i
 See Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Lewis (1999) for a survey of this literature. 
ii
 Barriers to capital flows created by higher transaction costs concerning foreign securities (Stulz (1981a)), 
withholding taxes (Black (1974)), and political risk (Feldstein and Horioka (1980)), as well as other factors such 
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considerable number of articles that attest the validity of an information-driven explanation of 
(local) home bias, mainly through the documentation of the biased portfolios’ 
outperformance (among the others, see the studies of Shukla and Van Inwegen (1995); Choe, 
Kho and Stulz (2005); and Dvorak (2005) related to investors’ preference for domestic 
stocks; and Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Hau (2001); Feng and Seasholes (2004); Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner (2005); Bodnaruk (2009); Teo (2009); and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) 
focused in a within-country context), a growing strand of literature provides evidence that it 
is determined, at least partly, by behavioral and irrational factors generically referred to the 
concept of familiarity (see for instance Morse and Shive (2011) with reference to the home 
bias, and Huberman (2001) with regard to the local home bias). In this context, among the 
others Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) point out that “recent research suggests that home bias 
may be part of a larger phenomenon in which investors exhibit a preference for familiar 
companies”. As the concept of familiarity may be considered as something which is 
somehow part of investors’ natural environment and/or cultural background, in this sense 
locally biased portfolios should not be able to ineludibly outperform (Kang and Stulz (1997); 
Seasholes and Zhu (2010); Doskeland and Hvide (2011)). Furthermore, in this case only the 
more sophisticated investors, regardless the location of their investments, should have greater 
ability to predict returns (Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (2001); Froot and Ramadorai 
(2008)) and outperform (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); Seasholes (2000)). Thus, although 
recent documented phenomena such as observation learning and/or social interactions among 
investors (Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004)) and neighborhood word-of-mouth (Hong, Kubik 
and Stein (2005); Brown, Ivković, Smith and Weisbenner (2008)) help to explain the 
intensity of the preference for local (see also Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007); Shive (2010)), 
                                                                                                                                                        
as the failure of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Adler and Dumas (1983); Uppal (1993)) are also advocated to 
explain the home bias. 
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researches about the underlying reasons driving the (local) home bias are far from being 
conclusive, and the question of whether, and to what extent, this phenomenon is driven by 
informational advantages rather than irrational behavior is still unsolved. 
At present, even if financial literature seems far from agree about its causes, the 
existence of the local home bias seems indisputable (for most updated evidences see among 
the others Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2011); Jacobs and Weber (2012); Kumar, 
Page and Spalt (2012)). Regardless the underlying reasons of the phenomenon, investors 
preference for local securities is found to generate a segmentation of domestic capital markets 
and to naturally create a clientele of investors from the same region. In this sense, Francis, 
Hasan and Waisman (2008) show that bondholders tend to invest in local firms and that, 
compared to the urban ones, companies headquartered in remote rural areas present an higher 
cost of debt capital generated by a greater difficulty of the activities’ monitoring. Following 
the contributes of Loughran and Schultz ((2004); (2005)), who first realized the relevance of 
geography in asset pricing, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) show that companies headquartered in 
the same area present strong comovement in the stock returns. Going further, Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein (2008) (hereafter HKS2008) have been the first to examine the implications of the 
phenomenon on asset pricing equilibrium. More specifically, the authors observe that 
investors’ preference for local generates a sort of equity-market segmentation based on 
proximity which significantly affects stocks’ market price. In detail, the price (Market-to-
Book Ratio) of a non-financial firm is found to be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate 
book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region 
(proxied by the aggregate disposable income of local households), i.e. RATIO variable, 
according to an effect the authors name "only-game-in-town". 
This Ph.D. thesis is part of this debate. In particular, I draw on recent approaches to 
test the local home bias (see HKS2008), and study the effect of geographical equity-market 
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segmentation on firms’ value in the Italian context. Furthermore, this research contributes to 
the existing literature by discriminating between the possible causes driving the phenomenon, 
trough the analysis about which firms this effect is more relevant for. In other words, I first 
provide evidence of the local home bias in the Italian equity-market (hereafter just market) 
verifying whether an imbalance between the regional supply and demand of ordinary shares, 
proxied by the RATIO variable introduced by HKS2008, creates a local rarity/abundance 
effect which translates into a premium/discount of the corporate market value. In this sense, 
where the local supply of securities is low(high), conditionally related to an equal amount of 
demand by investors (i.e. where RATIO is low), the few(many) listed firms in that given 
region should trade at premium(discount). The same perspective can be used to link the 
demand for stocks to firm market value: where the local demand is high(low), conditionally 
related to an equal amount of supply, listed firms are expected to trade at premium(discount). 
In this framework, the mispricing should be linked solely to investors’ preference for those 
stocks that are headquartered close by. 
Going further, and extending the framework proposed by HKS2008, I get light on the 
causes of local bias by examining whether the pricing of firms that are more likely to be 
perceived as familiar and of those that, at the same time, are more likely to generate an 
information advantage which can be positively exploited by investors, is (in)dependent from 
local-market conditions. In other words, this Ph.D. thesis aims to deepen the knowledge 
about investors’ preference for local securities, by investigating whether, and to what extent, 
the phenomenon is attributable to the successful attempt of local traders to exploit an 
information advantage not widely available to the public, rather than to a mere irrational 
behavioral bias attributable to investors’ familiarity with the issuing firm. Practically, I 
investigate both factors so far addressed as possible main causes of the phenomenon by 
looking at local home bias effects upon firm’s value. In this sense, if a mere behavioral 
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explanation as the feeling of familiarity with the local firm drives investors preference, local 
home bias should affect firms’ value and be widespread independently from a firm’s 
characteristics. On the contrary, information-driven explanations would require not all firms 
to be exposed to the phenomenon, but mainly those where the exploitation of local 
information is more likely. Again, when using this approach to distinguish between 
alternatives, an additional key role should be held by profitability. In fact, the detection of 
local home bias mainly in future profitable firms would suggest that local information is 
exploitable as being potentially profitable. In this case, this evidence would lead to the 
conclusion that, assuming that a local information advantage effect is in place, a local 
inadequate supply for stocks should not able to enhance a firm’s value in case of a poor 
prospect of future profitability. 
Operationally, I first test whether the negative relationship among RATIO and firms’ 
Market-to-Book Ratio highlighted in the US (HKS2008) exists also in the Italian contest. 
Once tested the existence of local bias, in order to examine whether and to what extent the 
local bias is attributable to behavioral rather than rational factors, I estimate the additional 
and the overall local rarity/abundance effect for the subsamples of firms  
(i) that are less likely to be known by the common (non-local) investor (non-visible 
firms);  
(ii) outperforming in the following year (future profitable firms); and  
(iii) within the latter, less likely to disclose information to the public, that I called 
(profitable and) opaque firms.  
Each estimated local rarity/abundance effect verifies whether and to what extent the 
preference for local stocks is identifiable as inclination toward the firm’s (i) visibility, (ii) 
profitability, or (iii) both profitability and opacity respectively. Being widespread, a mere 
irrational behavior would occur irrespectively, at least of the last two firms’ characteristics. In 
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summary, the line of reasoning moves as follow. As long as the home bias relies on the 
simple familiarity with the issuing firm, while firm just locally perceived somehow familiar 
would be, ceteris paribus, picked by local investors, the nationally-known ones would not 
experience the same phenomenon. In other words, if stocks are traded exclusively on the 
basis of their degree of visibility among investors, firms characterized by a regional (national) 
visibility would be traded solely within the regional (Italian) territory. Given the existence of 
local bias, while for regional-visible firms I should observe a significant regional 
rarity/abundance effect, for the national-visible ones the same effect should be zero, as local 
market conditions should not be able to affect their market evaluation. Conversely, if 
visibility doesn’t drive the trading and thus the preference for local, I would observe the same 
rarity/abundance effect for both types of firms (i.e. the additional rarity/abundance effect for 
national-visible firms would be zero). As long as firm’s visibility is not negatively correlated 
with the level of firm’s information asymmetries, if significant, the local rarity/abundance 
effect due to (non-)visibility represents a proxy for the non-informative component of the 
local bias phenomenon. On the other side, whether there was a chance to exploit an 
information gap that drives the preference towards local stocks, not all firms are expected to 
be exposed to the local home bias, but mainly those where a valuable informational 
advantage between local and non-local investors exists and can be exploited i.e. opaque 
companies. Indeed these firms are characterized by higher information asymmetries as a 
consequence of their attempt to mask their true value. Moreover, the finding that the local 
home bias is confineable only to profitable firms would drive to the conclusion that local 
information is really exploitable as potentially profitable, as investors would not exhibit the 
same preference for poorly performing local stocks. Given the existence of local bias, under 
the null that all investors have the same information, profitable firms should be traded 
uniformly over the whole national territory and the rarity/abundance effect for profitable 
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firms should be zero. As long as firm’s visibility and firm’s profitability are not negatively 
correlated, if significant, the local rarity/abundance effect due to profitability implies the 
presence of an information advantage due to proximity owned by local investors, and 
represents a proxy for the informed component of the local bias phenomenon. Going further, 
the local investors’ information advantage should be more pronounced in relation to those 
firms that manipulate earnings to mask their true performance, i.e. opaque firms. Therefore, if 
significant, the (additional) rarity/abundance effect for profitable and opaque firms is a 
further proof that proximity generates an information advantage. Summing up, consistently 
with these arguments, in a behavioral perspective the local equity-market conditions should 
significantly affect corporate market value solely for locally known firms, while the rational 
perspective implies that local equity-market conditions are significantly correlated with 
corporate market value just in those firms for which information asymmetries between local 
and non-local investors are substantial, and especially in institutional contexts in which the 
exploitation of any informational advantage is less penalized than elsewhere. Finally, in order 
to simultaneously capture the rational and the behavioral root of the local home bias, I 
investigate the significance of the relation between the Market-to-Book Ratio and the RATIO 
conditioned to the level of firm’s visibility, future profitability and opacity. This allows also 
to control for the possible correlation that might exist among firm’s visibility, profitability, 
and opacity, thus giving robustness to previous results. To this end, I start by applying 
principal component analysis (i.e. PCA) to visibility and opacity variables separately. PCAs 
permit to reduce the number of proxies involved, implicitly preserving the information 
content in each set of variables. Through PCAs, I identify three significant components: the 
first increasing with firm’s visibility, the second with the firm’s opacity measured on the 
basis of accounting variables, and the third with firm’s opacity measured on the basis of 
market variables. Then, I identify visible, and opaque firms through three further dummy 
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variables assuming value of one for those firms showing an yearly value greater than the 
cross-sectional yearly median of respectively the first, second, and third PCAs’ significant 
component, and zero otherwise. Lastly, I investigate the significance of the relation between 
the Market-to-Book Ratio and the RATIO conditioned to these dummy variables 
simultaneously considered. 
As far as I know, this study is the first to test this conjecture. I run the analysis within 
the Italian context since its peculiar cultural, economic and institutional scene makes the 
country an ideal setting to study the phenomenon investigated
iii
. In fact, on one side, the 
spatial distribution of listed firms in Italy, and its historical and legal context make the 
analysis not only interesting from an academic standpoint but also desirable since very likely 
the local home bias phenomenon (and its implications) may assume relevant proportions. On 
the other side, Italian bank oriented economy as well as other differences among the Italian 
and US frameworks (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), (1998)) allow 
to internationalize the results obtained taking into account, at the same time, single countries’ 
peculiarities. In detail, the spatial distribution of Italian listed firms, highly geographically 
clustered among few different areas, particularly around Rome, the capital, and Milan, which 
is the primary Italian economic and financial center, is different from the geographical 
location of potential demand (investors), more geographically widespread around the country 
(Baschieri, Carosi, Mengoli, (2010)). This feature makes likely to observe local relevant 
unbalances between the demand and supply for stocks, which is the precondition for a 
profitable application of the framework proposed by HKS2008. Second, the average (median) 
surface of the Italian regions corresponds to 4.97 (5.79) percent of the whole Italian territory, 
which is approximately the same critical area (cr. the 5.28 percent of the U.S. surface) that 
                                                 
iii
 See Mengoli, Pazzaglia and Sapienza (2009) for an overview of the Italian institutional and corporate 
governance setting. 
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Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) consider in order to distinguish “local” and (they find) better 
informed investors from the non-local and (they find) worse informed ones. Again, since the 
Italian equity-market is almost entirely dominated by ordinary shares and domestic firms, I 
am able to accurately estimate the overall supply of equity instruments in each considered 
geographical area. More specifically, the entire population of primarily listed firms at Milan 
Stock Exchange over the period investigated (December 31, 1999 - December 31, 2007) 
consists of 428 firms corresponding to 2,977 firm-year observations. Among these, only 6 
firms (corresponding to 24 firm-year observations) quoted solely non-ordinary shares, and 
only 1 firm (corresponding to 1 firm-year observation) is non-domestic. Moreover, although 
well known, dual-class firms are frequent in Italy (Zingales (1994); Nenova (2003)) but the 
weight of non-ordinary shares over the whole Italian equity-market capitalization is 
substantially irrelevant - I estimate the 3.99 percent on average per year over the investigated 
period - and decreasing in time (Bigelli, Mehrotra, and Rau (2012)). Another reason that 
makes Italy an excellent research context to study the local home bias phenomena is that 
Italian economy is widely recognized as one of the most informational opaque (Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002); Mengoli, Pazzaglia and Sapienza (2011)), as well as characterized by a 
very low effectiveness of insider trading law (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)). The 
combination of these elements makes highly realistic the eventual illegal exploitation of the 
informational advantage that might be acquired locally (see among others Meulbroek (1992)), 
and its possible incorporation in market prices (Bajo, Bigelli, Hillier and Petracci (2009)). In 
such a context, advantages related to soft-information should be more valuable and related 
dynamics should emerge stronger (Agarwal and Houswald (2010)). According to the 
hypotheses of this study, when linked to the proximity, this geographical component of firm 
value would therefore represent the informational feature of local bias I estimate. Considering 
another point of view, borrowing the Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)’s argument, the political 
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history of Italy, which before its unification (in 1861) was split for centuries in numerous 
kingdoms and city-states often hostile to each other, makes extremely likely the persistence 
of a cultural geographic segmentation at regional level – actually represented by the cultural 
and economic gap between the northern and southern areas of the country. This aspect could 
eventually deepen the local home bias effect by exacerbating its behavioral component 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). Finally, researches conducted in Italy already provide 
evidences of the role of territoriality on the economic development of the country: Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2004) for instance highlight a positive effect of the regional financial 
development on the economic success of the same geographical area. This further shows how 
the peculiarities of the Italian context and its features locally considered may actually impact 
in its economic and financial environment, and increases the interest in the following 
analysis. 
This study considers a panel of 2,463 firm-year (end) observations over the period 
1999-2007, where each observation is a firm headquartered within the Italian borders and 
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (Italian Stock Exchange). Considering non-financial 
companies only, after controlling for firm’s size, future growth opportunity and equity 
profitability, I find that isolated firms actually benefit from the effect of a regional stock 
supply scarcity which translates into higher market value. As expected, given the distinctive 
characteristics of the Italian equity-market, the magnitude of the local rarity/abundance effect 
is about 44 percent stronger than that documented by HKS2008 for the US, suggesting that 
country features may actually play a crucial role for the local home bias phenomenon. More 
notably, I find that the effect is not indiscriminately widespread among non-financial firms, 
being significantly stronger for the less visible, more profitable and more opaque, in line with 
the hypotheses of this study. In general terms, if a firm moves from a region to another facing 
a decrease in the RATIO equal to 56 basis points (in the remainder of the study I’ll use this 
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hypothetic variation of the RATIO variable since it is the one used by HKS2008 and 
therefore it allows a comparison between the two studies), holding else equal, the implied 
increase in the firm’s stock price is about 11.66 percent. Controlling also for firm’s press 
coverage and age, the magnitude of the effect decreases up to 6.59 percent. Stepping forward, 
the local rarity/abundance effect is found to be on average about the 70 (68.23) percent 
stronger for less visible firms while not significant for the more visible ones; about the 60 
(61.82) percent stronger for profitable firms and not significant for the non-profitable ones, 
and more than twice stronger (135.98 percent) for both profitable and opaque firms while 
only about the 15 (15.69) percent stronger for the profitable but non-opaque ones. Once 
merged the analysis of visibility, profitability and opacity, consistently with my previous 
findings, I find that the local rarity/abundance effect is inversely driven by firm’s visibility 
and that it increases with firm’s profitability and opacity. In other words, all other things 
being equal, the estimates of this study suggest that a firm headquartered in a region where 
the supply for stocks is poor with respect to the demand would be worth, whether compared 
to a company located in a region which does not presents the same imbalance between local 
demand and supply (and is thus characterized by an higher RATIO of 0.56 basis points), i) 11 
percent more if non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque; ii) 16 percent more if non-
visible, but profitable and non-opaque; and iii) 28 percent more if non-visible, but profitable 
and opaque. Overall, as these features are able to explain most, but not all, of the local home 
bias effect, I reasonably argue and then assess that most of the preference for local is 
determined by a successful attempt to exploit a local information advantage (60 percent) 
while the remaining part is determined by a mere (irrational) feeling of familiarity with the 
local firm (40 percent). 
These findings contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of their kind, 
at least with reference to the Italian equity-market, results further confirm the existence of the 
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local home bias (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)) and extend out of sample HKS2008 results, 
thus providing further robustness to their findings. In light of the peculiarities of the research 
context, the greater magnitude of the RATIO’s effect documented with respect to the 
American equity-market is consistent with previous findings suggesting that the local home 
bias phenomenon is significantly influenced by cultural (cf. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), 
and Morse and Shive (2011)) as well as institutional factors (cf. Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002)). In this sense, the relation among insider trading law and investors’ preference for 
local has not been addressed yet by financial literature, but represents a promising field of 
investigation.  
Analyzing the single causes driving the phenomenon, this study’s findings on 
dynamics related to firm’s future profitability are new in literature. Notably, I find that firms 
that will outperform in the following year are more intensively traded within the region they 
are headquartered in than elsewhere. More simply, neighboring investors appear to be more 
skilled in selecting the most profitable firms. Overall these evidences, besides supporting the 
existence of an informational advantage held by local investors, are also strongly consistent 
with that strand of literature showing that the closer are the players (analysts and banks) to 
the issuing firms, the better is their forecasting ability on firm’s profitability (see among the 
others Malloy (2005), Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Agarwal 
and Hauswald (2010)). Again, besides findings related to the role exerted by firm’s 
profitability, also those referred to the influence of opacity on investors’ choices are new in 
financial literature. At this regard, I find that the effect of local equity-markets conditions on 
corporate market value is leveraged by firm’s opacity. These evidences are consistent and 
complement results of Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) and Kumar(2009). In detail, Bae, Stulz and 
Tan (2008) find that local analysts’ informational advantage is closely tied to the quality of 
information disclosure, while Kumar (2009) shows that investors exhibit a positive bias-
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uncertainty relation, i.e. investors exhibit stronger bias when stocks are more difficult to 
evaluate, and that informed trading intensity is higher among stocks where individual 
investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases. Finally, results on visibility are strongly 
consistent with a behavioral origin of the phenomenon, and in particular with previous 
evidences showing that the local home bias is stronger toward stocks issued by companies 
visible to investors (Huberman (2001)), and weaker with reference to the more nationally 
known firms and for the more sophisticated investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)).  
In general terms, the contemporary evidence of the double nature, informational and 
behavioral, of local bias is new and helps to settle the so-called home bias puzzle by 
providing a link between evidences so far conflicting. As both effects are in place, some 
investors trade local stocks because they are somehow familiar, while other traders select 
local securities since better informed. The proportion (of the trading activity) of the latter on 
(the one of) the former becomes essential in determining and interpreting evidences on local 
bias. Obviously, solely in context with the predominance of informed traders with respect to 
the biased ones, locally biased portfolios will generate extra-performances (see among the 
others Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). In the opposite situation, i.e. the predominance of 
non-informed investors, the same result is likely to not hold (see among the others Seasholes 
and Zhu (2010)). Informed traders are likely to be the more sophisticated ones, since the 
preference for local is found strongly increasing with the degree of the firm’s tendency to 
manipulate earnings, (Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008)). Consistently with this interpretation, the 
literature fails to document an extra-performance of locally biased portfolios just in relation 
to non-institutional investors (Døskeland and Hvide (2011); Seasholes and Zhu (2010)). This 
research results show that the general tendency to trade in local stocks, as well the probability 
to get outperformance from this strategy strongly increases with the uncertainty. Future 
research will therefore have the task to understand which factors are able to move the balance 
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between the rational and the behavioral component of local bias. Beyond the central role that 
with respect to the rational component of local home bias is surely played by the enforcement 
of the insider trading law and the practices of corporate information disclosure, I believe that 
the degree of cultural integration is a key-factor. People tend to interact with similar, and to 
share beliefs and perceptions (Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004); Ivković and Weisbenner 
(2007); Brown, Ivković, Smith and Weisbenner (2008)). The greater the cultural 
segmentation, the greater is likely to be the equity-market segmentation and the persistence of 
a bias, and ultimately the profitable exploitation of such market disturbances. In this 
perspective, the fact that the local rarity/abundance effect observed in Italy, is on average the 
50 percent stronger than in the US (almost 2.5 times if restricted to non-visible, profitable and 
opaque firms) could be explained. 
From a practical point of view, once highlighted the over-valuation of non-financial 
securities issued by firms located in geographical areas characterized by an excess of demand 
for local stocks, several subsequent policy implications come to light. These companies could 
in fact gain from their feature of “rarity” together with the preference of a large audience of 
local investors: for instance, the initial public offering of firms headquartered in areas not 
populated by listed firms would face, ceteris paribus, a lower risk of failure, since the issued 
securities are more likely to meet the marginal investor’s preference. The same conclusions 
might be applied for seasonal equity offerings: in both events the cost of capital would shrink. 
Moreover, the local context could for instance represent a sort of poison pill against hostile 
takeovers because of the overestimation of these securities due to their territorial feature. To 
future research the task to make light on these issues.  
Again, this research highlights the so far unexplored role of firms’ location as a 
determinant of firms’ market evaluation giving useful directions in terms of pricing, but also 
helps to discriminate among the firms that may actually exploit the rarity effect and benefit 
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from the evaluation that derives from company’s territoriality. In this sense, in context with 
the predominance of informed traders with respect to the biased ones, the presence of a stock 
supply scarcity would not be sufficient to enhance opaque firms’ market evaluation if these 
companies are not expected to be profitable in the future. In fact, as already stated, firms’ 
could not exploit the territoriality effect just because they are located in areas of the county 
not populated by other companies, but necessarily need to be characterized by specific 
features that may help them to catch the informed (i.e. profitability and opacity features) or 
behavioral (i.e. non-visibility or, better, local-visibility feature) component of local home 
bias. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the state of the 
art and reports the principal findings of the literature over the home bias topic. The roots of 
the phenomena are investigated by distinguishing in particular among investors’ protection 
and corporate governance (Section 2.1.1.), information asymmetries (Section 2.1.2.), and 
behavioral factors (Section 2.1.3.). Moreover, a specific section (Section 2.2.) deepens the 
state of the art about the local home bias phenomenon by analyzing the pertinent literature. 
Section 3 presents the data, with a specific focus on data sources and sample selection 
(Section 3.1.), and on the variables definition (Section 3.2.). Section 4 describes the 
methodology used in the study, i.e. the multivariate regression procedure (Section 4.1.) and 
the PCA – Principal Component Analysis methodology (Section 4.2.). Section 5 presents the 
results, reporting evidences of the Italian equity-market segmentation due to local bias, and 
investigating the role exerted by firms’ visibility, firm’s profitability and firms’ opacity in 
determining such segmentation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Domestic bias 
The advantages of international diversification of equity portfolios are widely 
documented in financial literature. Indeed, the existence of a relatively high degree of 
positive correlation within an economy suggests the possibility that risk reduction can 
actually be facilitated by diversifying portfolios internationally. In this sense, Grubel (1968), 
Levy and Sarnat (1970), Solnik (1974), and Eldor, Pines and Schwartz (1988) have been 
among the first to show how investors can reach an optimal risk-return profile by creating the 
so-called “global market portfolio”, which is obtained by allocating wealth among securities 
issued by firms belonging to different countries, that enter in portfolio with proportion to the 
ratio between domestic and global equity market capitalization. From a theoretical point of 
view, investors’ aim should be the maximization of their expected utility E[U(W1)] (see 
Markowitz (1952)), which is function of the mean and variance of wealth (W1) distribution 
(i.e. E[U(W1)]= E(W1) - ηVar(W1), where η is a positive parameter that considers investors’ 
risk aversion). This implies, ceteris paribus, the optimization of the expected return for a 
given amount of risk or, equivalently, the minimization of portfolio variance for a given level 
of expected return. Under the hypothesis of investors’ mean-variance preference and non-
perfect correlation (i.e. lower than one) among the returns of different countries’ securities, 
the global market portfolio would decrease the variance for all possible theoretical levels of 
performance: through the decrement of assets’ specific risk, the overall risk of the investment 
would be reduced but not at the expense of performance. In this sense, global diversification 
generates a better risk-return profile with respect to the domestic one, such as global capital 
market bears less systematic risk than any country’s internal capital market (Solnik (1974)), 
thanks to the low correlation of foreign investments with the shocks that may affect domestic 
market. For this reason, in a hypothetical word with no artificial barriers to investments, 
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investors – regardless their location – should hold the same efficient portfolio in which any 
country’s securities enter with proportion to their market share of the global economy (i.e. 
global market portfolio). 
In this context, investor preference for domestic stocks rather than foreign ones is one 
of the main ambiguities that comes out from a theory-and-practice comparison. Such 
behavior, known as “home bias” (French and Poterba (1991)), is definitely at least curious 
since costly after considering the overall higher risk of the not-well-diversified portfolio 
implied by the overweighting of domestic stocks (Grubel (1968)). At this regard, De Santis 
and Gerard (1997) quantified the expected extra return from international diversification for a 
US investor on a value on average around the 2.11 percent per year over the period 1970-
1994. Moreover, this return seems not to be affected by the increasing level of integration of 
international markets, but rather seems to be ignored by investors which do not trade 
according to a diversification strategy turned to catch it. In this sense, French and Poterba 
(1991) have been the first to highlight that investors exhibit a strong bias toward national 
stocks, showing that Japanese traders invest more than 98 percent of their wealth in domestic 
assets; the percentage “decreases” to 94 percent for US investors and to 82 percent for the 
English ones: in all cases the weight attributed to domestic stocks is considerably higher than 
the global market share of investors’ home country. The existence of this phenomenon has 
more recently been tested also by Sercu and Vanpée (2007) which illustrate the intensity of 
home bias by measuring the difference between the proportion of domestic equity (% 
domestic in total equity) in a country’s portfolio and the relative market capitalization (% 
domestic market cap in world market) at the end of 2005 in a sample of 42 different nations. 
Results are reported in Table 1 and show that – despite the increasing integration of 
international markets (Amadi (2004)) – more than 20 years after French and Poterba (1991) 
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pioneering contribution all the countries involved in the analysis still persists holding 
significantly biased equity portfolios.  
 
Table 1 – Home bias in equity portfolios based on CPIS data, December 2005 
Portfolio holding data are from the CPIS. Market capitalizations are from the World Federation of Exchanges. 
The home bias in equity portfolios is calculated by subtracting the proportional market capitalization (% Market 
cap in world market) from the proportion of domestic equities (% domestic in total equity) in a country’s 
portfolio. All figures are in USD million.  
 
Source: P. Sercu and R. Vanpée, 2007, Home Bias in international equity portfolios: a review, working paper 
 
As Sercu and Vanpée (2007) results highlight, so far the phenomenon appears to be stronger 
in particular in the emerging markets, while it slightly lowered in the most developed 
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countries. For instance, in 2005 Japanese investors allocated the 91.9 percent of their wealth 
in the Japanese market, a percentage moderately lower than the 98 percent documented by 
French and Poterba (1991). More notably, UK and US wealth invested in domestic assets in 
2005 is considerably lower than previous estimates, being equal to the 65 and 82.2 percent 
respectively.  
At present, the existence of home bias seems indisputable (see among the others 
Lewis (1999); Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a survey of this literature, and Sercu and Vanpée 
(2008) or Morse and Shive (2011) for the most updated evidences on the phenomenon). 
Given the apparent irrationality of investors’ behavior, which seem to refuse the so-called 
“free lunch” (in this case a portfolio risk reduction obtained without a discount in terms of 
return), over time academics have been invited to provide explanations to the phenomenon. 
Initial interpretations – which subsequently proved not to be conclusive – focused on barriers 
to capital flows (Errunza and Losq (1985)) created by higher costs of transactions in foreign 
securities (Stulz (1981a); Martin and Ray (2004)), withholding taxes (Black (1974)), as well 
as other factors such as the currency risk (Fidora, Fratzscher and Thimann (2007)), countries’ 
accounting environment (Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004); Covrig, Defond and Hung 
(2007); Young and Guenther (2003)) and the failure of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Adler 
and Dumas (1983)). In presence of international barriers, in fact, the highest transaction costs 
in foreign securities would make domestic stocks more attractive and the world market 
portfolio inefficient (Stulz (1981a)). In this sense, Martin and Ray (2004) develop a model in 
which foreign assets’ demand decreases non-linearly with transaction costs and show that a 
severe equity home bias can be the result of small transaction costs. In this perspective, the 
turnover rate of portfolios’ foreign component should be lower with respect to the domestic 
one. However, Tesar and Werner (1995) show exactly the opposite by estimating a higher 
turnover rate in portfolio for foreign assets than for the domestic ones for German, Canadian, 
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Japanese, and English investors. This evidence suggests that traders would not be adversely 
affected by the higher costs associated with operations in foreign securities but that they 
would have an active role toward these, reacting to changes in global economic conditions 
through changes in composition and size of the non-national component of portfolio, which 
would in any case be negligible if compared with the total amount of wealth invested in 
domestic securities. More recently Warnock (2002), reexamining Tesar and Werner (1995) 
findings, highlights that foreign turnover rates are much lower than previously estimated and 
similar to the domestic ones. However, this latter result, obtained by considering transaction 
data on 41 markets, confirms Tesar and Werner (1995) intuition and further supports the idea 
that transaction costs do not affect investors’ tendency to trade in foreign securities, failing as 
an explanation for home bias. Table 2 reports a list of the reference papers focused on 
transaction costs as a possible explanation for the phenomenon, along with a brief summary 
of the main findings of each study.  
 
Table 2 – Transaction costs 
The first part of Table 2 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify transaction costs as a cause of the 
home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which question and contest the above 
mentioned theory. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of publication 
(column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), allowing a 
comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
TRANSACTION COSTS Stulz The Journal of 
Finance 
1981 For investors who face barriers to 
international investments the world 
market portfolio is inefficient, as it is 
costly to hold foreign assets. 
 
 Martin and 
Ray  
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
2004 A severe equity home bias can also 
be the results of small transaction 
costs. 
 Criticism       
 Tesar and 
Werner 
Journal of 
International Money 
and Finance 
1995 The high turnover rate on foreign 
equity investments with respect to 
the domestic ones suggests that 
transaction costs are an unlikely 
explanation for home bias. 
  Warnock  Journal of 
International Money 
and Finance 
2001 Foreign turnover rates are similar to 
the domestic ones, therefore 
transaction costs cannot be the cause 
of home bias. 
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A further possible explanation originally provided for the home bias phenomenon 
focuses on the idea that explicit barriers to international investments in the form of an higher 
taxation on non-domestic assets should be able to induce short positions on foreign securities. 
Indeed, this would lead asset prices to deviate from the international CAPM predictions 
unless barriers are ineffective (Black (1974)). However, French and Poterba (1991) highlight 
how domestic investors expect a return from domestic assets higher of several hundreds of 
basis point than would be desirable solely on the basis of fiscal asymmetries; for this reason 
the lack of diversification would be linked to an investors’ conscious choice rather than to 
institutional constraints. On the same line, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) emphasize this aspect 
by estimating the costs consistent with the level of home bias observed in investors’ 
portfolios: for a level of risk aversion coherent with the empirical valuation of domestic 
markets’ risk premium, estimated costs are several percentage points higher than the actual 
ones, thus discarding fiscal barriers as the cause of the home bias. The list of papers on the 
topic is reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Fiscal barriers 
The first part of Table 3 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify fiscal barriers as a cause of the 
home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which question and contest the above 
mentioned explanation for the home bias. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal 
and year of publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 
5), allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
FISCAL BARRIERS Black  
 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
 
1974 
 
Explicit barriers to international 
investments in the form of an high 
taxation on foreign securities generate 
short positions on non-domestic assets.  
 
 Criticism       
 French and 
Poterba 
American Economic 
Review 
1991 Investors hold nearly all wealth in 
domestic assets, and expect a return 
from domestic assets much higher of 
than the one expected on foreign assets. 
  Cooper and 
Kaplanis 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
1994 Home bias cannot be explained by 
inflation hedging or direct costs to 
international investments for a level of 
risk aversion coherent with the 
empirical valuation of domestic 
markets’ risk premium. 
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All the above mentioned explanations for the home bias focus on micro-structural 
and/or fiscal barriers to non-national investments but, as highlighted, proved over time not to 
be conclusive; a further element addressed by academics as cause of the phenomenon 
originates from the evidence that for many investors the trading in non-national securities 
would be restrained because of the difficulty to obtain foreign currency and because of the 
additional risk related to the currency exchange rate. In this context, Fidora, Fratzscher and 
Thimann (2007) focus on the role of real exchange rate volatility as a determinant of 
international portfolio allocation decisions, by distinguishing between stock and bond 
markets. In particular, they show that home bias is stronger for assets with lower local 
currency return volatility, i.e. portfolio underdiversification is higher for bonds than for 
equities, and that a reduction of monthly real exchange rate volatility from its sample mean to 
zero would diminish equity home bias by 20 percentage points on average, and bond home 
bias up to 60 percent.  
The progressive liberalization and the integration process that involved several 
financial markets since the early nineties allowed academics to empirically test whether this 
facilitation to invest in foreign markets actually reduced the home bias phenomenon. At this 
regard, it is worthy of note the fact that this integration process has been particularly intense 
in the European Union, where the monetary unification also removed the currency risk for 
abroad investments. Considering this aspect, Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008) analyze the 
effect of European markets’ integration by testing whether the arrival of Euro effectively 
caused a decline in the home bias. Their empirical findings suggest that the phenomenon 
actually reduced in Europe, and that this decline is not temporary but is mainly related to the 
elimination of the exchange rate risk within the European Union (where the home bias 
declines much more than elsewhere). Similarly, Baele, Pungulescu and Ter Horst (2007), 
investigating to what extent ongoing integration eroded the equity domestic bias on 25 
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different markets, find evidences that regional integration relates significantly to the decrease 
of the home bias, especially in the Euro area. In a different contribution Amadi (2004) 
associates the home bias reduction to the free trade and globalization, the advent of the 
internet and the rise of emerging markets and mutual fund investments, which would 
significantly promote foreign diversification. On the same line, Sercu and Vanpée (2007) 
show the evolution of home bias over time for both European and non-European countries, 
and argue that the phenomenon slightly decreased over the years even for those countries 
non-affected by the currency unification. Figure 1 presents authors’ results, and depicts the 
evolution of the percentage of domestic equities in total equity portfolio for Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, UK and US over the period 1980-2005. Data highlight 
that, for all the countries involved in the analysis, there’s a straightforward trend toward more 
international diversification and that, despite this trend, home bias is a still persistent 
phenomenon which needs other explanations to be found in order to justify its origins. 
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Figure 1 – Home bias over time 
DOM_Country represents the evolution of the percentage of domestic equities in the total equity portfolio and 
HB_Country represents the equity home bias percentage. Portfolio holdings data from 1980 to 1997 are from the 
OECD, data from 2001 to 2005 are from the IMF. Pattern breaks in the chart after 2001 are due to the fact that 
the OECD and the IMF use different data collection methods and reporting standards. 
 
 
Source: P. Sercu and R. Vanpée, 2007, Home Bias in international equity portfolios: a review, working paper 
 
The list of papers which relate the home bias to the exchange rate risk is reported in Table 4, 
along with a brief description of the studies’ main findings. 
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Table 4 – Exchange rate risk 
The first part of Table 4 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in the exchange rate risk a cause of 
the home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which question and contest the 
above mentioned explanation for the home bias. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the 
journal and year of publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings 
(column 5), allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of 
publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
EXCHANGE RATE RISK Amadi Working Paper  2004 Home bias reduced over time for 
free trade and globalization, the 
advent of the internet and the rise of 
emerging markets and mutual fund 
investments. 
 Fidora, 
Fratzscher 
and Thimann  
Journal of 
International Money 
and Finance 
2007 Home bias is stronger for assets with 
lower local currency return 
volatility. 
 Baele, 
Pungulescu 
and Ter Horst  
Journal of 
International Money 
and Finance 
2007 Home bias decreased sharply at the 
end of the 1990s, and this 
development is linked to 
globalization and regional 
integration. 
 Schoenmaker 
and Bosch  
Investment 
Management and 
Financial Innovations 
2008 The arrival of Euro caused a 
permanent decline in home bias. 
 Criticism       
  Sercu and 
Vanpée  
Working Paper  2007 Home bias slightly decreased over 
the years even for countries non-
affected by the currency unification. 
 
A not fully explored strand of literature highlights the role of accounting barriers to 
international investments, by showing how the home bias might actually be interpreted as 
consequence of investors’ choice not to invest in countries characterized by a different 
accounting environment with respect to the domestic one. In this sense, countries where 
financial accounting environments lead to a higher disclosure of relevant accounting 
informations lower foreign investors information costs, and more likely have international 
capital mobility (Young and Guenther (2003)). Consistently with previous findings, 
Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004) show that companies exhibiting higher levels of US 
GAAP (i.e. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) also present a greater US institutional 
ownership. Similarly, Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007) assert that the voluntarily adoption of 
IAS (i.e. International Accounting Standards) improve a firm’s capital allocation efficiency 
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by attracting foreign capitals. The authors interpret these findings supposing that firms adopt 
IAS to provide more information or information in a form more familiar to foreign investors. 
Speculation and inflation hedging are also taken into account when explanations to the 
domestic bias phenomenon are advocated. The failure of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
would in fact induce domestic investors to choose national securities as a more efficient 
coverage against country specific risks. Among the firsts, Adler and Dumas (1983) highlight 
how the failure of purchasing power parity leads groups of investors from different countries 
to perceive differently the performance (in terms of real return and risk) of the same asset. In 
this sense, the authors emphasize how deviations from PPP are ex ante non-predictable but 
significant for both size and length: since consumption is tilted toward domestic goods, the 
desire to hedge against home inflation may increase the demand for domestic securities, thus 
generating biased portfolios. Conversely Uppal (1993), examining the impact of 
imperfections in the physical goods market on portfolio decisions, constructs a model that 
shows that more risk adverse investors would prefer foreign assets for their negative 
correlation with the exchange rate, that reduces the overall portfolio’s risk; the author 
concludes that the empirically observed home bias cannot be explained solely by the high 
proportion of domestic products in traders’ total consumption. On the same line, Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994) argue that the intensity of deviations from PPP would be sufficient to explain 
biased portfolios – even considering fixed costs associated with the investment in foreign 
securities – only conditionally to a level of investors’ risk aversion close to zero, a parameter 
quite far from reality. The list of papers which relate the home bias to the deviations from 
PPP and accounting environment is reported in Table 5, along with a brief description of the 
studies’ main findings. 
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Table 5 – Deviations from PPP and accounting environment 
The first part of Table 5 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in the deviations from purchasing 
power parity a cause of the home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which 
question and contest the above mentioned explanation for the home bias. The last part of Table 5 summarizes 
the studies relating the home bias with a country’s accounting environment. The table summarizes the paper’s 
author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief 
summary of the main findings (column 5), allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each sub-
section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
DEVIATIONS FROM PPP Adler and 
Dumas  
The Journal of 
Finance 
1983 The failure of purchasing power 
parity leads groups of investors from 
different countries to have different 
yardsticks for measuring securities 
real return and their risks, and to 
create different "optimal" portfolios. 
 Criticism       
 Uppal  The Journal of 
Finance 
1993 The more risk adverse investors 
prefer foreign assets for their 
negative correlation with the 
exchange rate, that reduces the 
overall portfolio’s risk. 
  Cooper and 
Kaplanis 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
1994 Home bias cannot be explained by 
inflation hedging or direct costs to 
international investments for a level 
of risk aversion coherent with the 
empirical valuation of domestic 
markets’ risk premium. 
ACCOUNTING 
ENVIRONMENT 
Young and 
Guenther 
Journal of Accounting 
Research 
2003 Countries where financial 
accounting environments lead to a 
higher disclosure of relevant 
accounting informations have more 
likely international capital mobility. 
 Bradshaw, 
Bushee and 
Miller 
Journal of Accounting 
Research 
2004 Firms with higher levels of US 
GAAP conformity have greater US 
institutional ownership. 
 Covrig, 
Defond and 
Hung  
Journal of Accounting 
Research 
2007 Average foreign mutual fund 
ownership is significantly higher 
among IAS adopters. 
 
Other studies focused on the hedging not from inflation but rather from the risk of non-
financial income as an explanation of equity home bias. In this sense Bottazzi, Pesenti and 
Van Wincoop (1996), and Julliard (2003) highlight a negative correlation between domestic 
equity and human capital return, and suggest an explanatory power of the home bias for the 
hedging of human capital risks. On the contrary Baxter and Jermann (1997) find a positive 
correlation between the two factors, which implies that investors are supposed to reduce 
domestic equities in portfolio to hedge human capital risks. 
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To conclude, the presence of political risks on foreign investments (Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980)) has been also advocated as an explanation for the domestic bias 
phenomenon, as it would increase the implicit overall risk of the foreign assets making, 
ceteris paribus, the domestic ones preferable. However Frankel (1989) argues that, at least 
for the most developed countries, political risks are too small to justify a significant 
preference for national securities. In this sense, the author highlights that integration of 
financial markets actually eliminated the country premium but not the currency premium 
among countries. 
The combination of these studies highlights a non insignificant problem of 
interpretation of the phenomenon when explanations based on market imperfections are 
considered alone. For this reason, financial literature tried to identify more comprehensive 
roots of the home bias, without denying the studies cited so far but evolving from them. In 
the remainder of the chapter all the most recent and discussed explanations provided by 
literature on the home bias phenomenon are examined, with a particular focus on the impact 
of the different protection which investors from different countries have from market abuses 
(section 2.1.1.), and the crucial role played by both information asymmetries among foreign 
and domestic investors (section 2.1.2.) and the feeling of familiarity perceived by these latter 
toward national stocks (section 2.1.3.). 
 
2.1.1. Investors’ protection and corporate governance 
Recent studies suggest that corporate governance at firm level and investors’ 
protection at country level can be driver for equity home bias. Considering at first this latter 
element, investors protection may be defined as the set of efforts and activities to observe, 
safeguard and enforce the rights and claims of a person in his role as an investor. According 
to the literature on the topic (see among the others Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
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Williamson (2003); Giannetti and Koskinen (2004); Stulz (2005); Kho, Stulz and Warnock 
(2009); and Giannetti and Koskinen (2010)), firms in countries with low levels of investors 
protection would be more severely underweighted by traders belonging to states 
characterized by higher protection levels. In general terms in fact, insider shareholders in 
unprotective countries will tend to form blocks or to hold large stakes in order to hedge 
against market abuses and/or to extract private benefits, while foreigners will not invest in the 
same companies to avoid the higher risk of expropriation. According to this view, Stulz 
(2005) focuses on firms’ ownership in poorly governed countries where the risk of state 
expropriation is high, and argues that these nations have a smaller fraction of wealth owned 
by foreign investors because insiders find it optimal to hold large stakes, while outsiders 
don’t trade in countries where corporate insiders may pursue their own interests at the 
expense of foreign investors. This evidence has been more recently confirmed by Kho, Stulz 
and Warnock (2009), that show how, in countries with weak governance, concentrated 
ownership is optimal: retail investors, which are not protected from law against market 
abuses and expropriation risk, will form controlling blocks to hedge themselves against these 
abuses. Thus in an ideal world, firms that are able to attract foreigners as large block-holders 
would increase their value because of the signal of a commitment to consume fewer private 
benefits. Consistently with previous findings, Giannetti and Koskinen ((2004); (2010)) show 
that in countries with low investors protection, wealthy investors aim to become controlling 
shareholders in order to extract private benefits. This implies that stocks’ expected return is 
lower when investors’ protection is weak and that non-wealthy individuals from these 
countries will exhibit a good country bias, by investing more in foreign nations which 
provide higher shareholders protection. Considering a different aspect of the same 
phenomenon, Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) justify the home bias 
showing that, as firms in countries with weak investor protection are controlled by large 
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shareholders, only a fraction of the shares issued by these companies can actually be freely 
traded. In this sense, holding the world market portfolio for an investor would be rather 
difficult. To support this last point of view, Table 6 reports the data used by the authors and 
referred to a sample of 51 countries in year 1997. In particular, the table shows for every 
considered country the number of firms covered by the Worldscope database (column 2), the 
number of companies for which ownership data are available (column 3), and the estimate of 
the fraction of closely-held shares (column 4). Finally, column 5 indicates the market value of 
the firms for which the authors have information about closely-held shares, while column 6 
reports the total market value of the country's firms, and column 7 computes the percentage 
of the market capitalization of the country represented by the firms for which the authors 
have information about closely-held shares. As expected, US is the nation with the lowest 
value-weighted controlling ownership (i.e. 7.94%), while UK ranks second (i.e. 9.93%).  
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Table 6 – Closely-held shares 
The second column shows the number of firms in each country for which Worldscope has information for 1997. 
The third column reports the number of firms for which ownership data are available, while the fourth column 
reports the estimate of the fraction of closely-held shares for every country. Fifth column shows the market 
value of the firms for which the authors have information about closely-held shares; the sixth column reports the 
market value of the country's firms, and in the last one is computed the percentage of the market capitalization 
of the country represented by the firms for which the authors have information about closely-held shares. 
 
 
Source: Dahlquist et al, 2003, Corporate Governance and the Home Bias, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol.38,  No. 1, pp. 87-110  
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Except for Ireland, Sri Lanka, US, and UK, no country has a value-weighted controlling 
ownership lower than 20%. Only seven countries have value-weighted controlling ownership 
between 20% and 30%, while twenty-three countries have the value of the variable in excess 
of 50%. Moreover, as emerges from the last column of the table, nineteen nations have 
closely-held shares for more than 80% of the market’s capitalization. In light of the data 
provided, the authors argue that investors cannot invest in the global market portfolio in a 
economy with controlling shareholders, because they would be limited in the fraction of 
shares that they can hold: the prevalence of closely-held firms in most countries would 
therefore help to explain why these countries exhibit a significant home bias and why US 
investors underweight foreign stocks. 
In order to overcome, or at least soften, structural and legal issues of their home 
country market as the low investors’ protection, firms could opt to cross-list in other markets 
that do not present the same features. Indeed, this strategy would naturally lead to an higher 
internationalization of the shareholders base. In this sense, Pagano, Randl, Roell and Zechner 
(2001) highlight how some stock-exchanges have over time attracted a relevant number of 
cross-listings, becoming more international in character. The authors observe that a 
company’s decision to cross-list is related to the characteristics both of the country where the 
market is located, rather to those of the exchange itself, and of the firm’s home country 
exchange. In particular, European firms appear more likely to cross-list in larger and more 
liquid markets where several companies belonging to the same industry already cross-listed 
Specifically, the preference is stronger toward countries with better investor protection and 
more efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent accounting standards. In 
that case, in fact, the benefits of cross listing would be offset by the higher costs of adapting 
to the host market standards. 
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According to a wide literature, the better protection of shareholders would not only 
reduce minorities’ risk of expropriation and increase the international investors’ base, but 
would also enhance firm evaluation (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), (2000), (2002); Chan, Covrig and Ng (2009)). In this sense, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that countries that protect shareholders better, have 
more valuable stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, higher rate of IPO 
activity, and higher Tobin’s Q and market valuation than companies headquartered in 
unprotective countries. In a subsequent contribution, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) highlight how the level of investors’ protection and the regulation of financial 
markets are deeply rooted in the legal structure of each country and in the origin of its laws 
(i.e. common low or civil law). Specifically, the authors find that common law countries have 
the strongest protection of outside investors (both shareholders and creditors) whereas French 
civil law countries have the weakest one. Empirically, strong investor protection is associated 
with effective corporate governance, as reflected in valuable and broad financial markets, 
dispersed ownership of shares and efficient allocation of capital across firms. Again, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002), using a sample of 371 large firms from 
27 wealthy economies, highlight how the better protection of outside shareholders promotes 
financial market development and enhance companies’ market value. This because outside 
investors are willing to pay more to purchase stocks, thanks to the lower risks of controllers 
expropriations. In line with other evidence previously reported, company ownership would 
thus be therefore more internationally dispersed in countries where minority shareholders 
have strong legal protection, and firm evaluation would be higher. On the same line, Chan, 
Covrig and Ng (2009) argue that the riskiness of countries with smaller degrees of home bias 
is more widely distributed between local and foreign investors, enhancing firms’ value. Using 
stockholdings information of about 24,000 mutual funds from 31 countries worldwide, the 
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authors provide evidence that the deviations of equity allocations of domestic investors from 
standard international asset allocation models have substantial impacts on firms’ market 
evaluation. The valuation benefits associated with global risk sharing between foreign and 
domestic investors suggest that companies could improve their market value and hence lower 
their cost of capital through raising money in international markets (i.e. attracting more 
foreign investments in their firms) and through reducing the proportion of shares held by 
domestic investors. The list of papers which relate the home bias to the countries’ weak 
investor protection is reported in Table 6, along with a brief description of the studies’ main 
findings. 
 
Table 7 – Weak investors’ protection 
Table 7 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in the weak investors’ protection a cause of the 
home bias phenomenon. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of 
publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), 
allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. Papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
WEAK INVESTORS' 
PROTECTION 
La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny  
Journal of Financial 
Economics  
2000 Strong investor protection is 
associated with effective corporate 
governance, dispersed ownership of 
shares and efficient allocation of 
capital across firms.  
 Pagano, Randl, 
Roell and 
Zechner  
Working Paper  2001 European firms are more likely to 
cross-list in larger and more liquid 
markets with better investor 
protection. Cross-listing decision is 
related to the characteristic of both 
the destination and home country.  
 La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and 
Shleifer  
Working Paper 2002 Firm in countries where minority 
shareholders have a better protection 
have a higher market evaluation. 
 Dahlquist, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson  
The Journal of 
Financial and 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
2003 The prevalence of closely-held firms 
in most countries helps explain why 
these countries exhibit domestic bias 
and why US investors underweight 
foreign stocks. 
 Giannetti and 
Koskinen 
Working Paper 2005 In countries with low investors 
protection, wealthy investors aim to 
become controlling shareholders in 
order to extract private benefits. 
 Stulz The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 Corporate insiders pursue their own 
interests at the expense of outside 
investors. In countries where this 
problem is significant, diffuse 
ownership is inefficient.  
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Table 7 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main findings 
WEAK INVESTORS' 
PROTECTION 
Kho, Stulz 
and Warnock  
Journal of Accounting 
Research 
2009 Foreign portfolio investors show 
more home bias toward countries 
with poor governance because of 
the limits of the insiders’ 
concentrated ownership. 
 Chan, Covrig 
and Ng  
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
2009 Home bias affects firm evaluation at 
both country and firm level. The 
riskiness of countries with smaller 
degrees of home bias is more widely 
distributed between local and foreign 
investors, increasing firms’ value. 
 Giannetti and 
Koskinen 
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2010 Investors’ participation in the 
domestic stock market and home 
equity bias are positively related to 
investors’ protection. 
 
As well as weak investor protection at country level, policies at firm level and in 
particular the quality of a firm corporate governance may impact on the home bias. Indeed, 
firm’s weak corporate governance increases both the likelihood of expropriation risk for 
outside investors and the ownership concentration for insiders (Giannetti and Simonov 
(2006); Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2009)), reduces information disclosure and transparency 
(Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005); Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009)), and firm value 
(King and Segal (2003)), thus discouraging foreign ownership and increasing portfolio biases 
(see among the others Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001); Ferreira and Matos (2008); Kim, 
Sung, and Wei (2008)). In this sense, Giannetti and Simonov (2006), analyze whether 
investors take into account the quality of corporate governance when selecting stocks, and 
argue that the quality of a company’s corporate governance affects not only the stocks held in 
investors’ portfolios but also the probability that new investors buy securities of a firm. In 
fact, inside investors or individuals connected with them are more likely to invest in weak 
corporate governance companies since can extract private benefits, while foreign investors 
are reluctant to purchase securities of these firms, in order to minimize the expropriation risk. 
Similarly, Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2009) merge corporate finance theories of insider 
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ownership with portfolio theories of home bias, proving that foreign investors exhibit a large 
home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by 
insider’s high optimal ownership and domestic monitoring shareholders in response to the 
governance. The authors show that foreign investors from “good governance” countries have 
a comparative advantage as insider monitors in poorly governed countries, so that the relative 
importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. 
Moreover, US investors are found to increase their holdings of shares in Korean firms which 
improve their corporate governance. Considering the same framework, Kim, Sung, and Wei 
(2008) study investors’ stock level of foreign investment in Korea and test whether the degree 
of control-ownership disparity among investor’s home countries affects portfolio choices. 
Results suggest that the nature of corporate governance affects investment choices, and that 
high-disparity stocks in Korea are disfavored by investors from low-disparity countries, while 
investors from high-disparity countries are neutral. With reference to firm evaluation, King 
and Segal (2003) show that Canadian listed firms trade at discount with respect to the US 
ones and that this discount is tied to their weaker corporate governance. At the same time, 
Canadian firms can enhance their market evaluation and reduce US portfolio bias by cross-
listing on a US exchange. Other studies show that institutional investors have a strong 
preference toward stocks of large firms with strong governance indicators (Ferreira and 
Matos (2008)), and non-dominant owners (Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)).These results 
point to a clear relationship between corporate governance and shareholder base, and show 
that a firm can effectively use corporate governance in order to expand its ownership 
structure.  
Considering the way in which corporate governance impact on firm’s disclosure and 
transparency, Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) examine the relation between US 
mutual fund investment allocation and firm level policies, and highlight how these latter are 
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related to greater transparency and disclosure, being positively associated with US 
investments. Therefore, the authors suggest that disclosure can potentially mitigate a 
country’s other institutional deficiencies that affect foreign institutional investment. Again, 
the high quality of accounting and disclosure policies are found able to create an environment 
conducive to foreign investments. On the same line, Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009), 
analyzing 4,409 firms located in 29 different countries, argue that foreigners invest less in 
firms that reside in countries with poor disclosure and outsider protection, and have 
ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is greater when 
earnings are opaque and this indicates that information asymmetries and monitoring costs 
faced by foreign traders likely drive the results. In fact, firms with suspect governance 
structures require more monitoring than well governed companies, and are more costly for 
foreign investors. This explanation, associating corporate governance and information 
asymmetries, leads to a second macro-group of home bias’ explanations, which is linked to 
the asymmetric information between firms’ insiders and outsiders. To conclude, Table 8 
reports the list of the main studies relating the home bias to firm corporate governance. 
 
Table 8 – Weak corporate governance 
Table 8 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in firms’ corporate governance a cause of the home 
bias phenomenon. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of publication 
(column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), allowing a 
comparative view of the papers’ contents. Papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
WEAK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Dahlquist and 
Robertsson 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2001 Foreigners tend to underweight firms 
with a dominant owner, while prefer 
large firms with high market liquidity 
and presence in international markets. 
 King and 
Segal  
Working Paper 2003 Canadian listed firms trade at discount 
with respect to US listed firms because 
of a weaker corporate governance in 
Canada than in US. This helps to 
explain US portfolio home bias. 
 Aggarwal, 
Klapper, and 
Wysocki  
Journal of Banking 
and Finance 
2005 Firm level policies related to greater 
transparency and disclosure are 
positively associated with US 
investments. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
WEAK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Giannetti and 
Simonov  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2006 Investors who enjoy security benefits 
are reluctant to invest in firms with 
weak corporate governance. 
 Ferreira and 
Matos 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2007 Institutional investors have strong 
preference for stocks with strong 
governance indicators. Foreign 
investors overweight firms cross-listed 
in the US and members of MSCI 
World Index. 
 Kim, Sung, 
and Wei  
Working Paper  2008 Investors from ownership-control low 
disparity in Korea disfavor high-
disparity stocks in Korea. 
 Kho, Stulz, 
and Warnock  
Journal of Accounting 
Research 
2009 Foreign investors exhibit a large home 
bias against countries with poor 
governance because their investment is 
limited by insider’s high optimal 
ownership and domestic monitoring 
shareholders in response to the 
governance. 
 Leuz, Lins 
and Warnock 
Review of Financial 
Studies 
2009 Foreigners invest less in firms that 
reside in countries with poor disclosure 
and outsider protection, and have 
ownership structures that are 
conducive to governance problems. 
 
2.1.2. Information asymmetries 
As emerged so far from the analysis of the literature focused on the home bias, market 
imperfection as well as issues at both country and firm level like weak investor protection 
and corporate governance are far from giving convincing explanations for the phenomenon. 
Over time, a leading role as cause of the domestic bias has been taken by information 
asymmetries, which at present are considered as one of the most plausible driver of the 
phenomenon (see among the others Gehrig (1993), Brennan and Cao (1997); Dvorak (2005); 
Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008); Sercu and Vanpée (2008)). Indeed, information asymmetries give 
rise to an adverse selection problem when investors transact in foreign markets (Akerlof 
(1970); Milgrom (1981)), influencing the investment decisions of non-domestic traders which 
do not expect to receive a fair return based on the prices at which locals negotiate. In fact, as 
domestic traders would hardly find and interpret informations about foreign companies 
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because of legal, regulatory and accounting differences among countries, risk adverse 
investors would prefer to allocate their wealth on assets which they can be better informed 
on, and that are perceived as less risky, i.e. domestic assets. Home bias theory related to 
information immobility would this way replace the one related to capital immobility. This 
strand of literature has been initially explored by Gehrig (1993) that constructs a model that 
shows that home bias emerges quite naturally when domestic investors are on average better 
informed about national securities. In a subsequent contribution, Brennan and Cao (1997) 
study the consequences of the better information within-countries than between-countries, by 
developing a model of international equity portfolio flows that relies on informational 
differences between foreign and domestic investors. The authors find that US purchases of 
equities in developed foreign markets tend to be positively associated with the foreign market 
return, and this is consistent with US investors being worse informed about foreign markets 
than about the local one. On the contrary, foreign purchases of US equities show no relation 
with the American stock-market returns, providing evidence that strangers are as well 
informed about US markets as US residents. In a subsequent contribution, Brennan, Cao, 
Strong and Xu (2005) show that there is a link between information disadvantages and the 
expectations about a market, by developing the implications of the asymmetric information 
theory for changes in a market’s degree of bullishness reported by domestic and foreign 
investors. In particular, the authors find that there is a strong tendency for foreign institutional 
investors to become more bullish about a certain market following a positive return on that 
market. This provides further support for the hypothesis that information asymmetry is an 
important determinant of international capital flows, and that on average foreign investors 
have an information disadvantage with respect to the domestic ones. In line with previous 
contribution, a wide number of empirical studies in literature provide evidence that 
information asymmetry is significant in explaining the observed international portfolio 
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pattern. In this sense, Aeharne, Griever and Warnock (2004) measure the effect of direct 
barriers to international investments and show that information asymmetries, generated by 
both the poor quality and the low credibility of financial information in many countries 
decrease US foreign investments. At this regard, some firms have reduced these costs by 
publicly listing their securities in the United States, and all the non-US countries whose firms 
do not alleviate these costs by opting into the US regulatory environment are found to be 
more severely underweighted in US equity portfolios. Portes and Rey (2005), using 1456 
transaction data over the period 1989-1996, focus on international equity flows and argue that 
capital markets are not frictionless but are segmented by informational asymmetries or 
familiarity effects, which are proxied by the physical distance between two countries. In this 
sense, the geography of information would be the main determinant of the pattern of 
international transactions. Similarly, Faruquee, Li and Yan (2004) observe that investors tend 
to hold more securities in countries closer to them in distance, and estimate that if the 
distance between two countries doubles, the cross-border equity holdings reduces by 68%, 
providing a test on the validity of the theoretical models that are based on information 
asymmetries. Continuing the analysis started by Merton (1987) – who argues that investors 
prefer stocks of bigger and better known companies – Kang and Stulz (1997) analyze the 
causal relationship between information asymmetries and home bias studying foreign 
ownership of Japanese equity over the period 1975-1991. The authors hypothesize that 
information asymmetries do not affect all securities in a similar way; for this reason traders 
investing in non-domestic securities are not supposed to hold the market portfolio of the 
foreign nation, but are expected to select exclusively the better known assets. Analysis’ 
results are consistent with these hypothesis: foreign investors tend to underweight companies 
which are small, leveraged, characterized by low level of export, and whose information are 
less readily available. Moreover, several studies (see Fama and French (1992); Daniel and 
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Titman (1997)) identify these companies as riskier but better performing, confirming that not 
holding their shares is not an efficient allocation strategy. Again, Dahlquist and Robertsson’s 
(2001) analysis over foreign ownership in Swedish firms confirm previous findings: in 
particular, large firms which pay low dividends but with large cash positions, and firms with 
high market liquidity and presence in international markets are preferred by non-Swedish 
investors. 
Following the line of reasoning of the above mentioned studies, whether an actual 
informational advantage owned by domestic investors over their home market drives the 
trading in national stocks, a rational expectation is them both to obtain higher portfolio 
returns than foreign traders, and to face a lower variance in the biased portfolio. In this sense, 
following Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp (2009), information immobility would not solely 
generate the home bias, but would also be desirable, as source of potential portfolio extra-
returns. Indeed, when investors have to choose the securities to focus their attention on, their 
aim is to make their set of information as different as possible from the average information 
widespread in the market, in order to earn the maximum difference between market price and 
expected payoff with the additional information. Thus, it would be rational to focus on what 
is better known since the beginning, i.e. domestic assets. In this sense, informational 
immobility would persist not because investors can’t access to information about foreign 
equity or because they are expensive, but because of the conscious choice not to evaluate 
them. Therefore, specializing on what is already better known would be a better strategy, and 
traders with rational expectations strengthen informational asymmetries as cause of home 
bias. On the same line Gorman and Jorgensen (2002) argue that benefits from international 
diversification are non easily catchable and that it is strategic to focus on those securities over 
which it is easier to have informational advantages. In this sense, Zhou (1998) builds a model 
in which rational investors trade securities strategically according to their perceptions about 
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economic states, and in which a stock’s risk premium is negatively proportional to the 
information precision regarding its return: the more information is transmitted, the smaller 
equity premium is required. Results show that high quality insider information shared only by 
a small number of agents is considerably valuable, and may allow agents with insider 
information to make large extra-profits. 
Empirically, on one hand Shukla and Van Inwegen (1995), controlling for differential 
tax treatment and for fund expenses, show that UK money-managers underperform with 
respect to the US ones when they trade on US securities. Similarly Hau (2001) confirms 
previous results by examining the trading profits of 756 professional traders located in 23 
different cities of eight European countries, where domestic investors are defined as traders 
located in Germany and/or in cities outside Germany but German. Notably, the author 
presents evidence that foreign traders in non-German-speaking financial centers have inferior 
trading profits in their proprietary trading of German stocks. Foreign underperformance is not 
only statistically but also economically significant in magnitude and occurs for large blue-
chip stocks. On the same line, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) – using Korean data –find that 
foreign money managers pay more than the domestic ones when they buy securities, and 
receive less when they sell. More specifically, the sample average daily trade-weighted 
disadvantage of foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and 16 basis points 
for sales. Dvorak (2005), using transaction data from Indonesia, shows that in the medium 
(intramonth) and short (intraday) term clients of local brokerages have higher profits than 
clients of global brokerages. This suggests that the former have a short-lived information 
advantage, and that the latter are better at picking long-term winners, leading to the 
conclusion that their edge is related to their experience and expertise rather than to inside 
information. Moreover, domestic clients of global brokerages are found to earn more than 
foreign clients of global brokerages, suggesting that the combination of local information and 
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global expertise leads to higher profits. Again, Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2008) find 
that the stock trades by households with concentrated portfolios outperform those with 
diversified portfolios. The excess return is stronger for investors with large account balances 
and over securities non-included in the S&P 500 Index, reflecting a successful exploitation of 
informational asymmetries. 
Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) extend the information asymmetries setting with reference 
to financial analysts and analyze whether analysts resident in a country make more precise 
earnings forecasts for domestic firms. Using a sample of 32 countries over the period 2001-
2003, the authors find an economically and statistically significant local analyst advantage 
even after controlling for various determinants of forecast accuracy. In particular, analysts’ 
local advantage is found to be higher in countries where earnings are more smoothed and less 
information is disclosed by firms. Moreover, it is negatively related to whether a firm has 
foreign assets or is participated by foreign investors and by institutions, while it is positively 
related to holdings by insiders. Considering a sample of European analysts earning forecasts, 
Orpurt (2004) reaches the same conclusion. Going further, the author argues that information 
driven forecasting advantages may stem from a better access to information or to a better 
information processing, but may also be motivated by a larger clientele effect of by lower 
costs to gather information. 
On the other hand, a different strand of literature contest the validity of an information 
driven explanation for the home bias, by finding inverse results. In this sense, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000) using daily data for the 16 largest Finnish stocks over a two-year period, 
find that foreign investors tend to be momentum investors, purchasing past winning stocks 
and selling past losers. In particular, the authors find that foreign investors are able to buy 
more stocks that perform well over the next 120 trading days than domestic retail investors, 
thus outperforming the investments of Finnish households. Distinctions in behavior are 
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consistent across a variety of past-return intervals, even after controlling for behavioral 
differences. On the same line, Seasholes (2000) highlights information advantages for foreign 
capital flows into Taiwan and Thailand and provides evidence that foreign investors buy 
(sell) ahead of good (bad) earning announcements in Taiwan, while domestic investors do the 
opposite. Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes (2001), and Froot and Ramadorai (2008) support 
this conclusion, extending the analysis to several different countries. In particular, Froot, 
O'Connell, and Seasholes (2001) use flow data to show that foreign investors trade ahead of 
better returns, though Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2007) find that this effect is mostly due to 
contemporaneous price pressure. Froot and Ramadorai (2008) attempt to distinguish between 
the information advantage and the price pressure hypotheses, using data on institutional 
equity flows from the United States to a cross section of 25 countries. Their results are 
consistent with foreigners having better information than local investors and that information, 
rather than price pressure is responsible for the observed predictability of domestic equity 
returns by cross-border flows. According to these latter studies, foreign investors would have 
an advantage over domestic institutions because of the more experience of their personnel, 
and thanks to the access to more proprietary research.  
Given the studies mentioned so far, whose list and evolution over time is reported in 
Table 9, there seems to be no real consensus on whether domestic investors outperform the 
foreign ones, and the question of whether and, above all, to what extent, local bias is driven 
by informational advantages rather than other factors remains unsolved. 
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Table 9 – Information asymmetries 
The first part of Table 9 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in the information asymmetries a 
cause of the home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which question and 
contest the above mentioned theory. The table summarizes the papers’ author(s) (column 2), journal and year of 
publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), 
allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRIES  
Gehrig Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics  
1993 Home bias emerges naturally when 
investors are better informed about 
domestic stocks. 
 
Shukla and 
Van Inwegen  
Journal of Economics 
and Business 
1995 UK money-managers underperform 
with respect to the US ones when they 
trade on US securities. 
 Kang and 
Stulz  
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
1997 Foreign investors hold more 
disproportionately shares of large 
firms, with good accounting 
performance and low leverage.  
 Brennan and 
Cao 
The Journal of 
Finance 
1997 When foreign and domestic investors 
are differently informed, portfolio 
flows between the two countries will 
be a linear function of the 
contemporaneous returns on all 
national market indices. 
 Zhou  Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 
1998 High quality insider information 
shared only by a small number of 
agents is considerably valuable, and 
may allow agents with insider 
information to make large extra-
profits. 
 Dahlquist and 
Robertsson 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2001 Foreigners tend to underweight firms 
with a dominant owner, while prefer 
large firms with high market liquidity 
and presence in international markets. 
 Hau The Journal of 
Finance 
2001 Foreign traders in non-German-
speaking financial centers have 
inferior trading profits in their 
proprietary trading of German stocks. 
Moreover, there is an information 
advantage due to corporate 
headquarters proximity for high-
frequency trading. 
 Gorman and 
Jorgensen 
Multinational Finance 
Journal 
2002 Benefits from international 
diversification are non easily 
catchable. 
 Ahearne, 
Griever and 
Warnock 
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
2004 Information asymmetries impact on 
international investment and are tied 
to the poor quality and low credibility 
of financial information in many 
countries. Foreign countries whose 
companies opt into the US regulatory 
system alleviate information costs and 
are less underweighted in US 
portfolios. 
 Faruquee, Li 
and Yan  
Working Paper  2004 Investors tend to hold more securities 
in countries close to them in distance. 
 Orpurt  Working Paper 2004 Local analysts forecast earnings more 
accurately than non-local analysts.  
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Table 9 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRIES 
Brennan, 
Cao, Strong 
and Xu  
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2005 There is a strong tendency for foreign 
institutional investors to become more 
bullish about a certain market 
following a positive return on that 
market. This support the hypothesis 
that information asymmetry is an 
important determinant of international 
capital flows. 
 Choe, Kho, 
and Stulz  
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2005 Foreign money managers pay more 
than the domestic ones when they buy 
securities, and receive less when they 
sell. 
 Dvorak The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 In the medium (intramonth) and short 
(intraday) term clients of local 
brokerages have higher profits than 
clients of global brokerages. 
 Portes and 
Rey 
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
2005 Capital markets are not frictionless 
but are segmented by informational 
asymmetries or familiarity effects, 
which are proxied by the physical 
distance between two countries. 
 Bae, Stulz, 
and Tan  
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2008 Analysts make more precise earnings 
forecasts for domestic firms, 
especially in countries where earnings 
are more smoothed and less 
information is disclosed by 
companies. 
 Ivkovic, 
Sialm and 
Weisbenner  
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2008 Stock trades by households with 
concentrated portfolios outperform 
those with diversified portfolios 
 Sercu and 
Vanpée 
Review of Finance 2008 Equity home bias is related to a 
mixture of risks and frictions, as 
information asymmetries and 
institutional factors. 
 Van 
Nieuwerburg 
and 
Veldkamp  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2009 Investors with rational expectations 
reinforce information asymmetries, 
aiming is to make their set of 
information as different as possible 
from the average information 
widespread in the market. 
 Criticism       
 Grinblatt and 
Keloharju  
Journal of Financial 
Economics  
2000 Foreign investors tend to buy past 
winning stocks and to sell past losers, 
while domestic investors behave the 
opposite. Therefore, foreign investors 
portfolio outperforms the households 
ones. 
 Seasholes Working Paper  2000 Foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of 
good (bad) earning announcements in 
Taiwan, while domestic investors do 
the opposite. 
 Froot, 
O'Connell, 
and Seasholes  
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2001 There is some ability for international 
inflows to forecast returns. 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
 INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRIES 
Froot and 
Ramadorai 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2008 Information rather price pressure is 
responsible for the observed 
predictability of domestic equity 
returns by cross-border flows.  
 
2.1.3. Behavioral factors 
All the home bias’ explanations focused on micro-structural, accounting, and fiscal 
barriers, as well as those which consider investors’ protection, firms’ corporate governance 
and information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders to explain international 
underdiversification of portfolios are based on the assumption that individuals are perfectly 
rational. In this sense, home bias would be generated by the deliberate systematic individuals’ 
attempt to exploit an informational advantage or to avoid the trading in securities to which 
are associated higher direct and indirect costs because of their geographic location. However, 
psychologist and economists show how in practice investors systematically deviate from the 
optimal, efficient behavior: among the others, Barber and Odean (1999) state that “People do 
not always behave rationally, and although departures from rationality are sometimes 
random, they are often systematic”. With the development of prospect theory of Kahneman 
and Tversky ((1979), (1992)) behavioral finance emerged and affirmed as an established 
research area which enriches economic knowledge by incorporating the aspects of human 
nature in financial models. Indeed, Shefrin (2002) describe this new field of study as the 
interaction between psychology and finance.  
In general terms, behavioral finance studies highlight how individual biases can 
actually impact on portfolio decision, thus inducing a non-efficient allocation of wealth 
(Heath and Tversky (1991); Odean (1998a); Barber and Odean (2001), (2002), (2008)). In 
this sense, Heath and Tversky (1991) show how people are disposed to pay a significant 
premium to bet on their own judgment when they consider themselves as competent, even 
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over an equiprobable chance. According to their results, the willingness to bet on an uncertain 
event depends not only on the likelihood of the event but also on people’s knowledge of the 
relevant context. The authors call the phenomena “competence hypothesis” and hypothesize 
that it might help to explain why investor are willing to concentrate their portfolios over a 
small number of stocks which are presumably more familiar and over which investors 
perceive themselves as more competent. Similarly, Odean (1998b) highlights how investors 
are excessively active on financial markets because of the overvaluation of both the quality of 
their information and of their knowledge about the value of a financial security. In practice, 
this behavior lowers overconfident investors’ expected utility because of an excessive 
trading, and leads them to hold riskier portfolios than do rational investors with the same 
level of risk aversion. On the same line, Barber and Odean (2001) show that overconfident 
investors trade too much and find that man are more overconfident than women, especially in 
a male dominated realm such as finance. Males are found to overestimate the precision of 
their own informations and, consequently, perform worse than women, which behave more 
rationally. In a subsequent contribution, Barber and Odean (2002) find that those investors 
that during the nineties switched from phone-based to online trading reduced their trading 
profitability. As reduction in market frictions, such as the shrinkage of trading costs, are not 
able to explain these findings, overconfidence and illusion of knowledge and control are 
advocated as drivers of investors’ behavior. Taking into account other biases that may impact 
on portfolio composition, Barber and Odean (2008) show that – as attention is a scarce 
resource – individual traders cannot focus on the knowledge of the thousands of securities 
that they can potentially purchase, and tend to buy exclusively the attention grabbing stocks, 
as those more frequently reported in the news. Moreover, the buying behavior is found to be 
more heavily influenced by attention than the selling one.  
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Applying this last perspective and considering the not conclusive explanations 
provided by literature to the domestic bias phenomenon, Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2009) 
affirm: "However, except for behavioral biases, the reasons for the home bias advanced by 
this literature cannot explain the magnitude of the home bias". Indeed, many researchers 
focused on this new viewpoint in order to find alternative explanations for the domestic bias. 
In this sense, Kilka and Weber (2000), in a cross-cultural study involving students from 
Germany and United States, asked subjects to give probability estimates on future prices of 
stocks belonging to the two countries: results show that individuals feel more optimistic 
about their own country’s stocks, highlighting a superior overconfidence toward domestic 
than foreign markets. On the same line, Strong and Xu (2003), analyzing a survey conducted 
every month by Merrill Lynch on 250 large fund managers around the world (i.e. Merrill 
Lynch Monthly Fund Manager Survey), find that fund managers from the UK, US, Japan, 
and continental Europe show a significant relative optimism towards their home equity 
markets, which leads them to overweight domestic securities with respect to the foreign ones. 
Lutje and Menkhoff (2007) analyzing the result of a questionnaire survey performed over 234 
German equity and bond managers, show that fund managers reveal home bias even in a 
setting without investment restrictions. Indeed, they are found to show overoptimism toward 
domestic stocks, as well as strong risk aversion and wishful thinking, thus behaving in 
accordance with the herd, which insures against negative deviation from the benchmark. 
Moreover, the authors restrict these findings to equity fund managers.  
In contrast with previous findings which relate domestic bias to investors’ 
overconfidence toward their own markets, Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) highlight how 
investors who feel competent trade more often and have more internationally diversified 
portfolios. Coherently with Barber and Odean (2001), male investors with larger portfolios or 
more education are found to perceive themselves as more competent and overconfident. 
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Similarly Dorn and Huberman (2005), combining survey responses and trading records of 
German retail broker’s clients from 1995 to 2000, find no evidence for overconfidence as an 
explanation for portfolio decisions. In particular, self-reported risk aversion is found to be the 
most important determinant of both portfolio diversification and turnover; other things equal, 
investors more risk tolerant hold less diversified portfolios and trade more aggressively. 
Considering a different bias that may affect investors’ behavior, Solnik (2008) 
explains portfolios’ international underdiversification using regret theory (Bell (1982); 
Loomes and Sugden (1982)), which assumes that agents base their decisions not only on 
expected payoffs but also on expected regret. In this sense, investors would rationally add 
foreign stocks to their portfolios for their potential to overperform national equity and for 
their risk-return diversification benefits. Although, when the foreign component of portfolio 
underperforms the domestic one, investors would feel the pain of regret, and would therefore 
take into account aversion to regret and risk simultaneously when allocate their wealth. This 
implies the expected return of foreign equity equals to that dictated by CAPM plus a regret 
premium. In equilibrium, it would be sufficient to have regret in a single country to observe 
home biased portfolio.  
A wide strand of literature identifies in investors’ feeling of familiarity toward 
domestic stocks the cause of portfolio international underdiversification. Familiarity may be 
defined as the perception of being part of the same natural environment, as well as the 
sharing of a common cultural background. In this sense, a common language, the existence of 
bilateral trades (Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005)) as well as firms’ physical presence in foreign 
markets (Ke, Ng and Wang (2010)) may propel international diversification, which is instead 
limited by the presence of a strong country nationalism (Karlsson and McQueen (2007); 
Morse and Shive (2011)). Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) analyze the mutual fund holdings of 
26 countries over the years 1999-2000 and distinguish between domestic bias (i.e. the 
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overweighting of domestic stocks) and foreign bias (i.e. the under- or overweighting of 
foreign securities). The authors find robust evidence that stock market development and 
familiarity variables such as common language, geographical proximity, and bilateral trades 
have significant but asymmetric effects on the domestic bias and foreign bias, and that 
economic development, capital controls, and withholding tax variables have significant 
effects only on foreign bias. In this sense, securities issued by firms headquartered in a 
country more remote from the rest of the world and with a different language, are particularly 
overweighted by domestic investors and underweighted by the foreigners. Ke, Ng and Wang 
(2010), analyzing the equity holdings of more than 3000 mutual funds from 22 different 
countries over the period 2000-2002, show that non-US mutual fund manager prefer to invest 
in foreign stocks whose firms have a physical presence in their home country. This behavior 
is found to be driven by investors’ familiarity with the companies and unrelated to an 
information-based explanation. Moreover differences in the cultural background, country of 
location, and spoken language of the diverse group of mutual fund managers do not affect 
results. The physical presence of the foreign firm in managers’ country seems in fact to be the 
only relevant factor affecting portfolio allocation. Results remain unchanged even after 
controlling for firms’ international presence and worldwide visibility, which the authors 
measure through the firms’ global operations and foreign exchange cross-listings. Karlsson 
and McQueen (2007) analyzing the choices of mutual funds for retirement accounts of the 
Swedish population, document investors’ preference not for domestic assets, but for domestic 
fund managers (i.e. homeboy bias). The authors analyze five possible economic and 
behavioral alternative explanations for the phenomena, specifically focusing on asymmetric 
information, the preference for funds denominated in Swedish currency (in order to eliminate 
exchange rate risk), investors’ attempt to produce benefits for local economy by investing in 
local securities, the preference to invest in assets perceived as familiar, and the need of being 
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part of a distinctive group such as a successful team, tribe, religion or race (Muller-Peters 
(1998); Rydgren (2004)). Results support the last two explanations for the homeboy bias, 
showing that it may be based on behavioral preferences related to familiarity and nationalism. 
On the same line, Morse and Shive (2011) show that more patriotic countries present greater 
levels of home bias, even after controlling for diversification benefits, informational 
advantages, transaction barriers and familiarity. 
The analysis of the studies relating behavioral factors and information asymmetries to 
the domestic bias still highlight a problem if interpretation of the phenomenon, whose roots 
seem far from being successfully detected. Therefore, over time a growing number of studies 
tried to consider the whole set of possible explanations so far provided by literature, relating 
the home bias to both rational and behavioral factors. Indeed, according to this literature, they 
both would impact on the domestic bias, depending on the individual and social features from 
time to time considered. In this sense, Karlsson and Nordén (2007) find significant 
relationships among individual features and the home bias’ likelihood. In particular, 
individuals employed in the public sector and therefore characterized by an high level of job 
security, are found to feel less need for international diversification but more concern for 
hedging domestic purchasing power parity (see also Adler and Dumas (1983)). On the 
contrary, an higher level of education and previous experience with risky investments would 
generate a smaller likelihood of home bias, according with the view that investors 
sophistication decreases the likelihood of biased portfolios (see also Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000)). Finally, men are found to be more biased and overconfident than women, coherently 
with Barber and Odean (2001), while, in contrast with Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009), 
overconfidence and the perception of an informational advantage over the asset class they are 
familiar with (i.e. domestic securities) would lead male traders to overweight national stocks. 
DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) build a model that show that the degree to which an 
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investor is informed affects the impact of familiarity as determinant of investment choices: 
the more the investors are informed, the less they are influenced by familiarity, which results 
to be a substitute for better information. Moreover, when some agents are subject to 
behavioral biases, the rational ones adopt the bias and amplify its effect. Empirically Kumar 
(2009) support previous findings, showing that investors present stronger behavioral biases 
when securities are hard to evaluate and when market uncertainty is high; at the same time 
informed traders are found to exploit these biases by trading more in these stocks. 
Concluding, the list of the main studies relating the home bias to behavioral factors is 
reported in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 – Behavioral factors 
The first part of Table 10 summarizes the most relevant papers which identify in behavioral factors the origin of 
the home bias phenomenon. The second part of the table presents the studies which question and contest the 
above mentioned theory. The table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of 
publication (column 3 and 4 respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), 
allowing a comparative view of the papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
BEHAVIORAL 
FACTORS 
Kilka and 
Weber  
Journal of Psychology 
and Financial Markets 
2000 Individuals feel more optimistic about 
their own country's stocks.  
 Strong and 
Xu  
The Review of 
Economics and 
Statistics 
2003 Fund managers from the UK, US, 
Japan, and continental Europe show 
optimism towards their home equity 
markets, which leads them to 
overweight domestic securities with 
respect to the foreign ones. 
 DeMarzo, 
Kaniel and 
Kremer  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2004 If some agents are subject to behavioral 
biases, rational investors adopt these 
biases and amplify their effects. 
 Chan, Covrig 
and  Ng 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 Stock market development and 
familiarity variables have significant 
impact on mutual fund domestic bias. 
 Karlsson and 
McQueen  
Working Paper  2007 Investors have a preference for 
domestic fund managers, and this is 
related to familiarity and nationalism. 
 Lutje and 
Menkhoff  
International Journal 
of Finance and 
Economics 
2007 Even in a setting without investment 
restrictions, equity fund managers 
reveal home bias, which seem related 
to overoptimism and risk aversion. 
 Karlsson and 
Nordén  
Journal of Banking 
and Finance  
2007 Home bias is related to both rational 
and irrational factors, as the desire to 
hedge against inflation, sophistication 
and overconfidence. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
BEHAVIORAL 
FACTORS 
Solnik  Working Paper  2008 Individuals take into account aversion 
to regret and risk simultaneously when 
allocate their wealth: the expected 
return of foreign equity equals to that 
dictated by CAPM plus a regret 
premium. 
 Kumar  Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2009 Investors present stronger behavioral 
biases when securities are hard to 
evaluate and when market uncertainty 
is high. 
 Ke, Ng and 
Wang  
Journal of 
International Business 
Studies 
2010 Familiarity drives fund managers to 
prefer foreign firms with a local 
presence in their own country.  
 Morse and 
Shive  
Journal of Financial 
Markets 
2011 More patriotic countries present greater 
levels of home bias. 
 Criticism       
 Dorn and 
Huberman  
Review of Finance 2005 Self reported risk aversion is the most 
important determinant of portfolio 
diversification. 
 Graham, 
Harvey and 
Huang 
Management Science 2009 Investors who feel competent trade 
more often and have more 
internationally diversified portfolios. 
 
The combination of the studies examined in Section 2.1. which show often conflicting 
and non-conclusive results highlights a problem of interpretation of the causes driving the 
home bias phenomena. The difficulties in interpreting the preference for domestic 
investments, raised over time the question on whether such behavior emerges also restricting 
the analysis within the borders of a single country (i.e. local home bias). In this case, indeed, 
the preference would be related solely to spatial proximity rather than to cultural, fiscal, 
legislative or informational barriers between countries. The following section focuses on the 
growing literature related to the local home bias phenomenon, whose analysis allowed to 
more properly address the research question investigated in the rest of the study. 
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2.2. Local home bias 
From the analysis of the studies mentioned so far, significant difficulties in the 
interpretation of the phenomena emerge quite clearly. This led, in recent years, to a change in 
the methodological approach which brought researchers to focus on the phenomena not only 
in a cross-country but also in a within-country context. At this regard, several recent papers 
provided ample evidences that both individual and professional investors tend to tilt their 
portfolios towards local securities. This phenomenon, known as local home bias, appears 
substantial within the border of a single country, where stocks headquartered in 
geographically nearby locations are preferred to those headquartered in the more distant ones 
(see among the others Coval and Moskowitz (1999); Huberman (2001)). Being the analysis 
restricted to the domestic context, investors’ preference would therefore be related solely to 
spatial proximity rather than to cultural, fiscal, legislative, or informative barriers between 
countries. Spatial proximity would in fact allow investors to exploit an informational 
advantage generated by proximity, allowing to earn substantial abnormal returns (among the 
others Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)), or would make traders 
feel more comfortable in investing in nearby firms because of the feeling of familiarity 
toward companies they can see and hear about every day (among the others Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001); Huberman (2001)). In this sense, both rational and behavioral explanations 
are so far addressed by academics for the local home bias.  
From this new perspective, Coval and Moskowitz (1999), find evidence that US 
professional fund managers tilt their portfolios toward securities of domestic firms whose 
headquarters are geographically proximate to them. In particular, US institutional investors’ 
typical portfolio is on average composed of stocks of companies located 100 miles closer to 
the manager’s office than the average US firm. Extrapolating these findings over an 
international scale, such a trend would be responsible for about one third of the home bias 
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observed in equity portfolios. Local equity preference is found to be stronger for small and 
highly levered companies that produce non-internationally traded goods. As these companies 
are those commonly perceived as more opaque and over which local traders could possess a 
possible informational advantage, the authors suggest an information based explanation for 
local preferences. In a subsequent contribution Coval and Moskowitz (2001) go further by 
highlighting how the physical distance between companies’ headquarter and funds’ location 
is important in determining funds managers’ performance. Indeed, as the distance between 
investors and investments is considered a measure of information flow, nearby traders can be 
identified as those possessing significant informational advantages in evaluating nearby 
securities. This leads active managers, overweighting proximate firms, to systematically earn 
substantial abnormal returns. Empirically, the average manager holds stocks on average 14 
percent closer than the average investments, and realizes additional 250 basis points per 
annum which, adjusted for size, book-to-market equity and momentum reduce to 1.3 percent 
yearly. These results are strongest for funds based in remote locations, with low asset values 
and concentrated holdings, and for funds focused on small and growth stocks. On the same 
line, considering a dataset about the investments of 78,000 retail investors over the period 
1991-1996, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), confirm previous findings, supporting the 
hypothesis that locally available information is value relevant. In particular, the authors show 
that the subsample of investors (17 per cent of the entire sample) who invest only locally (i.e. 
in firms located at less than 250 miles from traders’ home), make ceteris paribus an annual 
extra return of 3.2 percent on average. This performance is higher for the stocks not included 
in the S&P500 and therefore less visible (see among the others Shleifer (1986)). Again, 
Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan (2008) studying the acquisition decision of US public firms 
show how the acquirer returns in non-local transaction (i.e. transactions where the target 
company and the acquirer are more distant than 100 km to each other) are less than an half 
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than returns in local transactions. Examining the informational role of geographically 
proximate institutions, Baik, Kang and Kim (2010) highlight how both the level and the 
variation in local institutional ownership is able to predict stock returns. This effect is 
stronger particularly for companies characterized by an high levels of information 
asymmetries, i.e. small young stocks, with high return volatility and R&D intensity. Further 
supporting the local home bias explanation related to the informational advantage due to 
proximity, Feng and Seasholes (2004) show that traders living close to a company’s 
headquarter react similarly to a public information release, and this is coherent with the 
assumption that nearby investors receive more precise informations about future dividends. 
Following the same line of reasoning, Bodnaruk (2009) show that when investors move, thus 
changing the proximity to investment opportunities, they adjust their portfolio composition 
by increasing their ownership of stocks of companies close to their new location, which allow 
them to generate higher risk-adjusted returns portfolios. Massa and Simonov (2006), 
considering a dataset collecting informations about wealth and portfolio composition of the 
Swedish population, show that investors do not hedge but invest in stocks geographically or 
professionally close and related to their non-financial income. This strategy would be 
information driven, allowing traders to earn higher return that they would have with an 
hedging strategy. On the same line Teo (2009), considering Asia-focused hedge funds, finds 
that those funds with a physical presence in their investment region outperform other hedge 
funds by over the 3.7 percent per year. Becher, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2011) document 
that individual shareholders hold blocks in firms that are headquartered close where they live. 
Moreover, blocks appear not to be randomly allocated but systematically allocated based on 
where the benefits to additional monitoring are more significant. In this context, 
geographically proximate analysts are found to be more accurate than others because of the 
possess of an informational advantage that translates into better performance (Malloy 
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(2005)). According to these studies, local home bias would thus be dictated by the desire to 
exploit informational advantages linked to proximity.  
However, in spite of the considerable number of recent articles that attest the validity 
of this latter explanation of local bias mainly documenting the significant portfolio abnormal 
return generated by proximity (see among the others Feng and Seasholes (2004); Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005); Massa and Simonov (2006); Goetzmann and Kumar (2008); Bodnaruk 
(2009); Teo (2009); Baik, Kang and Kim (2010)), a growing strand of literature provides 
evidences that investors’ preference for local is determined, at least partly, by behavioral and 
therefore irrational factors (see among the others Huberman (2001); Karlsson and Norden 
(2007); Zhu (2003)) that can be assimilated to the generic concept of familiarity with the 
issuing firm (Doskeland and Hvide (2011); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). For instance 
Huberman (2001) , documenting local equity preferences at the households level, finds that 
the shareholders of the major providers of U.S. local telephone services, i.e. the seven U.S. 
Regional Bell Operating Companies tend to live in the area that the company serves. This 
concentration does not exist for the other “baby bell” even if listed on the same segment of 
the securities market, and suggests that investors’ behavior is driven by their tendency to 
invest in the familiar, by allocating their wealth in a business that is visible to them. This 
basically adds a non pecuniary dimension to the traditional risk-return trade-off, which is 
therefore not optimized. Again, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that investors in 
various municipalities in Finland prefer to hold and trade stocks of Finnish companies 
geographically proximate to them, that publish their annual reports in Finnish, and whose 
CEOs has the same cultural background. Indeed, these firm would be perceived as the more 
familiar. Moreover, the distance effect is found to be particularly strong for those firms 
whose geographic proximity to traders is lower than 100 kilometers, and is weaker for the 
more nationally known companies and for the more sophisticated investors with diversified 
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portfolios. Frieder and Subrahmanyan (2005) find evidences supporting that individual 
investors prefer to invest in stocks issued by high brand visibility firms. Similarly, Zhu 
(2003), using data from a large U.S. discount brokerage, highlights that individual investors 
are biased toward nearby company especially if these are remote and with heavily expenses 
in advertising. Familiarity with local companies and ready reaction to local information are 
found to be more plausible explanations to investors’ behavior, as they are found not to 
change their portfolios to take advantage of potentially advantageous information before 
earnings announcements, but only subsequently.  
In this perspective, the preference for local is not, at least totally, attributable to an 
informational advantage owned by local investors, and local portfolios do not automatically 
generate outperformance (Kang and Stulz (1997); Zhu (2003); Seasholes and Zhu (2010); 
Doskeland and Hvide (2011)). In this sense, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) show that purchases 
of local stocks significantly underperform the sales of the same stocks and conclude that 
individual traders do not help to incorporate informations into stock prices. On the same line, 
Doskeland and Hvide (2011) highlight that Norwegian investors’ tendency to overweight 
professionally close stocks leads to statistically negative abnormal returns. In light of the poor 
hedging property of this investment strategy, overconfidence generated by work experience 
seems indeed the most plausible explanation.  
Recently documented phenomena such as local social interactions (Hong, Kubik and 
Stein (2004); Shive (2010)) and neighborhood word-of-mouth (Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2005); Brown, Ivkovic, Smith and Weisbenner (2008)) help to explain investment decisions 
and therefore the intensity of the preference for local (see also Ivković and Weisbenner 
(2007)). In this sense, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) show that social interactions affect stock 
market participation: households attending church or, more generally, interacting with 
neighbors are indeed more likely to invest in the market. On the same line Shive (2010) 
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shows that in Finland investors’ trading and stock returns are affected by social influence. 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) highlight a similar pattern also in the context of professional 
investors. Indeed, a mutual fund manager in US is more likely (not) to hold a securities if 
other managers in the same city are (not) holding the same asset. This evidence is consistent 
with a word-of-mouth information spread, and is different from a local preference effect, 
since it emerges even for non-local securities. Again, Brown, Ivkovic, Smith and Weisbenner 
(2008) demonstrate that a ten percent increase in the stock ownership of a given community 
increases the likelihood of individual participation to the market by four percent. This implies 
that investors are found to perceive the local market as more attractive when more of their 
peers participate. Applying the same reasoning with a specific focus on local stocks, Ivković 
and Weisbenner (2007) present evidence that when neighbors purchases of a stock from a 
given industry increase by ten percent, the households’ purchase of securities from the same 
industry increases by two percent. Moreover, this effect appears consistent with a word-of-
mouth communication, and is stronger both in the more social states and for local stocks.  
At present, even if the debate about its causes is still an open issue, the existence of 
the local home bias seems indisputable (for the most updated evidences see among the others 
Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2011); Jacobs and Weber (2012); Kumar, Page and Spalt 
(2012)). Regardless the underlying reasons of the phenomenon, investors’ local preference is 
found to generate a segmentation of domestic capital markets and to naturally create a 
clientele of investors from the same region. In this sense, Francis, Hasan and Waisman 
(2008) show that bondholders tend to invest in local firms and that, compared to urban firms, 
companies headquartered in remote rural areas present an higher cost of debt capital 
generated by a greater difficulty of the activities’ monitoring. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) evidence the positive effect of regional financial development on the economic 
success of the same geographical area within Italy. On the same line, Gao, Ng and Wang 
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(2011) show that firms tend to have financing policies similar to those of geographically 
proximate companies. Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) show that geographically dispersed 
firms are less employee friendly and that companies tend to divest out of state entities before 
the in state ones. Loughran and Schultz ((2004), (2005)) have been the first to realize the 
relevance of geography in asset pricing. In his sense, in a first contribution Loughran and 
Schultz (2004) document that the trading in Nasdaq stocks is localized. Indeed, a firm’s 
intraday trading is affected by the time zone of the company’s headquarter, or by Jewish 
festivities is the company is located in areas with a high density of Jewish population. Again, 
being local for fewer people, rural stocks are less liquid and have less turnover than urban 
stocks (Loughran and Schultz (2005)). Shive (2012) presents similar evidences by showing 
that stocks headquartered in an outage area with 0.5 percent of US electrical customers, 
experience turnover drops by 3-7 percent on the first full day of the outage and a lower price 
volatility of 2.3 percent, suggesting that local investors contribute substantially to asset 
pricing and price discovery. Moreover, coherently with the existing literature (Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999)), the effect is stronger for smaller and less known stocks. Similarly, Jacobs 
and Weber (2012) further give empirical proofs that local home bias at individual level 
impacts on stocks’ turnover. Indeed, the authors find that firms headquartered in holiday 
regions in Germany, especially if less visible to non-local investors, experience a negative 
turnover shock. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) show that companies headquartered in the same 
area present strong comovement in the stock returns. This evidence still holds even when a 
firm change location: securities returns’ comovement decrease with the stocks from the old 
location and increase with the new location ones. Local comovement of a stock is further 
related to local economic and demographic characteristics, being stronger for less visible and 
smaller companies headquartered in regions with more individuals and less financially 
sophisticated investors. On the same line, Barker and Loughran (2007) find an inverse 
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relation between the distance among two firms and their correlation: indeed, considering a 
sample of S&P500 firms over the period 2000-2004, the authors find that for every 100 miles 
reduction in finance, the correlation coefficient between two stocks increases by 12 basis 
points. Korniotis and Kumar (2010) show that local stock returns vary with local business 
cycles. Indeed, US-state portfolios are found to earn high future returns when state-level 
unemployment rates are high and housing collateral ratios are low. Again, Anderson and 
Beracha (2008) and Kumar, Page and Spalt (2012) provide similar evidences, giving 
robustness to these arguments. HKS2008 have been the first to study the impact of the 
fragmentation of domestic capital markets generated by investors’ preference for local on 
firm evaluation. More specifically, the authors show that the imbalance between the local 
demand (proxied by the households’ aggregate disposable income in a given area) and the 
local supply for stocks (proxied by the aggregate book value of the equity of all listed firms 
in the same area), affects firms’ market value. In fact, according to a sort of local 
rarity/abundance effect that HKS2008 name “only-game-in-town effect”, ceteris paribus, 
non-financial companies located in areas characterized by low ratio between local supply and 
local demand (synthesized in a variable the authors call RATIO) show higher market-to-book 
ratios. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect is found to decrease in firm visibility. 
Considering another point of view, Gao, Ng and Wang (2008) show that geographically 
dispersed companies (i.e. with subsidiaries located in different regions within the US) have a 
market discount around the 6.2 percent, consistent with an agency cost-based explanation. 
The study of the literature about local home bias, whose evolution over time is reported in 
Table 11, show that – although the phenomenon has been thoroughly analyzed – little 
evidence has been provided regarding its impact on asset-pricing equilibrium (among the 
others HKS2008). More surprisingly, the question of whether and, above all, to what extent, 
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local bias is driven by informational advantages rather than irrational behavioral factors is 
still unsolved. 
 
Table 11 – Local home bias 
Table 11 summarizes the most relevant papers which define and discuss the local home bias phenomenon. The 
table summarizes the paper’s author(s) (column 2), the journal and year of publication (column 3 and 4 
respectively), and reports a brief summary of the main findings (column 5), allowing a comparative view of the 
papers’ contents. In each section papers are sorted by year of publication. 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
LOCAL HOME BIAS Coval and 
Moskowitz 
The Journal of 
Finance 
1999 US investment managers exhibit a 
strong preference toward 
geographically proximate firms, 
especially s small, highly levered and 
producing non-traded goods.  
 Coval and 
Moskowitz  
Journal of Political 
Economy 
2001 Active managers, overweighting 
geographically proximate firms, earn 
substantial abnormal returns. 
 Grinblatt and 
Keloharju  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2001 Investors in various municipalities in 
Finland prefer to hold nearby stocks, 
issued by companies communicating in 
investors’ native tongue, and whose 
CEO has the same cultural 
background. 
 Hubermann  The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2001 Shareholders the major providers of 
U.S. local telephone services tend to 
live in the area which they serve. 
 Zhu Working Paper  2003 Individual investors are biased towards 
nearby companies, especially if 
remote, and spending heavily on 
advertising. Moreover, investors do not 
change their portfolios to exploit 
informational advantages before 
earning announcements. 
 Feng and 
Seasholes 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2004 Investors living near a firm’ 
headquarters similarly react to the 
release of information, and this is 
consistent with a model of 
heterogeneously informed investors.  
 Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
2004 Local financial development is an 
important determinant of the economic 
success of the same area. 
 Hong, Kubik 
and Stein  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2004  Stock market participation of 
individual investors is influenced by 
social interactions. 
 Loughran and 
Schultz 
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2004 Trading in Nasdaq stocks is localized, 
being a firm’s intraday trading affected 
by the time zone of the company’s 
headquarter, or by Jewish festivities is 
the firm is located in areas with a high 
density of Jewish population. 
 Frieder and 
Subrahmanyam 
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2005 Individual investors prefer to invest in 
stocks with easily recognized and 
visible brands products. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
LOCAL HOME BIAS Hong, Kubik 
and Stein 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 Mutual fund managers spread 
information about stocks to one 
another by word of mouth: they are 
more likely (not) to hold a stock if 
other managers in the same city are 
(not) holding the same stock. 
 Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 Locally available information is value 
relevant: the average household 
generates an additional return of 3.2% 
from its local holdings with respect to 
its non-local holdings. 
 Loughran and 
Schultz 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2005 Rural stocks are less liquid and have 
less turnover than urban stocks, being 
local for fewer people. 
 Malloy The Journal of 
Finance 
2005 Local analysts make more accurate 
analysis and impact on stock prices 
more than other analysts. Moreover, 
local analysts recommendations are 
unbiased. 
 Massa and 
Simonov 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2006 Investors hold geographically nearby 
and professionally close stocks as a 
rational response to information 
constraints as opposed to a behavioral 
heuristic. 
 Pirinsky and 
Wang 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2006 Companies headquartered in the same 
area present strong comovements in 
the stock returns. 
 Barker and 
Loughran 
Journal of 
Behavioral Finance 
2007 For every 100 miles reduction in 
distance, the correlation coefficient 
increases by 12 basis points.  
 Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2007 When neighbors purchases of a stock 
from a given industry increase by ten 
percent, the households’ purchase of 
securities from the same industry 
increases by two percent. 
 Anderson and 
Beracha 
The Journal of 
Financial Research 
2008 A firm’s return comovement with a 
portfolio of stocks headquartered in 
other cities diminishes with the 
distance from the firm’s own 
headquarters city. 
 Brown, 
Ivkovic, Smith 
and Weisbenner  
The Journal of 
Finance 
2008 Individuals participation in the stock 
market is linked to the average stock 
market participation of their 
community and is driven by a word-of-
mouth effect. 
 Francis, Hasan 
and Waisman  
Working Paper 2008 Companies headquartered in remote 
rural areas present a higher cost of debt 
capital generated by a greater difficulty 
of the activities’ monitoring with 
respect to urban firms. 
 Gao, Ng and 
Wang 
Journal of Corporate 
Finance 
2008 Geographic location of corporate 
activities affect firm evaluation: firms 
with subsidiaries in different US 
regions present a discount in their 
evaluation of about 6.2%. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
LOCAL HOME BIAS Goetzmann and 
Kumar 
Review of Finance 2008 US individual investors, especially if 
young, low-income, less educated and 
less sophisticated, hold under-
diversified portfolios. 
 Hong, Kubik 
and Stein  
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2008 The price of a stock is decreasing in the 
ratio of the aggregate book value of 
firms in its region to the aggregate 
investors’ risk tolerance in its region, 
according to a "only-game-in-town" 
effect. 
 Uysal, Kedia 
and 
Panchapagesan 
Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 
2008 In the context of US public firms 
acquisition decisions, the acquirer 
returns in non-local transaction (i.e. 
where the target and the acquirer are 
more distant than 100 km to each other) 
are less than an half than returns in local 
transactions. 
 Bodnaruk Review of Finance 2009 When proximity to investment 
opportunities changes (i.e. investors 
move), investors adjust their portfolio 
composition. 
 Landier, Nair 
and Wulf 
The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2009 Firms are more likely to protect 
proximate employees in soft information 
industries, but employees protection 
holds only when firm headquarter is 
located in less populated countries. 
 Teo The Review of 
Financial Studies 
2009 Hedge funds with a physical presence in 
their investment region outperform other 
hedge funds by 3.72% per year. 
 Baik, Kang and 
Kim 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2010 Especially for firms with high 
information asymmetries, both the level 
and change in local institutional 
ownership predict future stock returns. 
 Korniotis and 
Kumar 
Working Paper 2010 US state portfolios earn high future 
returns when state-level unemployment 
rates are high and housing collateral 
ratios are low. 
 Seasholes and 
Zhu 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2010 Portfolios of local holdings do not 
generate abnormal performance. 
 Shive Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2010 There are significant social effects on 
individual investors’ trading. 
 Becker, 
Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach  
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis 
2011 Nonmanagerial individual shareholders 
tend to hold blocks in public firms 
located close to where they reside. 
Blocks are not randomly allocated but 
systematically allocated based on where 
the benefits to additional monitoring are 
more significant. 
 Doskeland and 
Hvide 
The Journal of 
Finance 
2011 There's no evidence that professional 
proximity is associated with abnormally 
high investment returns. Overconfidence 
seems instead the most likely 
explanation for the excessive trading in 
professionally close stocks. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Factor driving home bias Authors Journal Year Main Findings 
LOCAL HOME BIAS Gao, Ng and 
Wang 
Financial 
Management 
2011 Corporate headquarters location affect 
capital structure for large US firms: 
companies tend to conform their 
financing policies to those of nearby 
firms. 
 Jacobs and 
Weber 
Review of Finance 2011 Stocks of German companies 
headquartered in holiday regions are 
temporarily less traded than similar 
stocks in non-holiday regions. This 
effect is more pronounced for 
securities less visible to non-local 
investors and for smaller stocks driven 
by retail investors. 
 Kumar, Page 
and Spalt 
Working Paper 2012 Retail investors generate excess 
comovements in stock returns. Excess 
return comovements among low priced 
stocks are amplified when retail traders 
are more correlated. 
 Shive Journal of Financial 
Economics 
2012 Stocks headquartered in an outage area 
with 0.5% of US electrical customers, 
experience turnover drops by 3-7% on 
the first full day of the outage, and a 
lower price volatility of 2.3%. 
 
In light of the literature on the topic, and extending the framework proposed by 
HKS2008 with reference to the Italian equity-market, this work’s aim is to get light on the 
causes of local bias by examining whether the pricing of firms that are more likely to be 
perceived as familiar by investors and that, at the same time, are more likely to generate an 
information advantage which can be positively exploited by investors, is (in)dependent from 
local-market conditions. More specifically, I first provide evidence of the local bias in the 
Italian equity-market (hereafter just market) verifying that an imbalance between the regional 
supply and demand of ordinary shares, proxied by the RATIO variable introduced by 
HKS2008, creates a local rarity/abundance effect (that HKS2008 called “only game in town 
effect”), which translates into a premium/discount of the corporate market value. Secondly, in 
order to examine whether and to what extent the local bias is attributable a mere irrational 
behavioral factor rather than to an informational advantage owned by local investors, I 
estimate the additional and the overall local rarity/abundance effect for the subsamples of 
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firms (i) that are more likely to be known by the non-local investors, that I called “visible 
firms”, (ii) that in the forthcoming year will experience extra-performance, that I called 
“profitable firms”, and (iii) within the latter, those that are more likely to manipulate 
accounting results, and therefore to be characterized by substantial informational 
asymmetries, that I called (profitable and) “opaque firms”. Given the existence of local bias, 
each estimated local rarity/abundance effect verifies whether and to what extent the 
preference for local stocks is in fact identifiable as a “preference” for the firm’s (i) visibility, 
(ii) profitability, or (iii) profitability and opacity respectively. Thus, this research results’ 
should essentially contribute to financial literature by helping to discriminate among the 
causes driving the phenomenon under investigation. Again, this study is expected to highlight 
the so far unexplored role of firms’ location as a determinant of firms’ market evaluation 
giving useful directions in terms of pricing, and helping to discriminate among the firms that 
may actually exploit the rarity effect and benefit from the evaluation that derives from 
company’s territoriality. According to the research hypothesis, the geographic component of 
firms market price is not expected to be constant for the wholeness of Italian listed firms. 
Indeed, in a context of informed investors, the presence of a stock supply scarcity would 
appear not to be sufficient to enhance opaque firms market value if these companies are not 
expected to be profitable in the future. This study considers a sample made by all firms 
issuing ordinary shares traded at Milan Stock Exchange over the period December 31, 1999 – 
December 31, 2007, and headquartered within the Italian territory. The correspondent dataset 
consists of 2,463 firm-year observations. As already mentioned in Section 1, I run the 
analysis within the Italian context since its peculiar cultural, economic and institutional scene 
makes the country an ideal setting to study the phenomenon investigated. Indeed, on one side, 
the spatial distribution of listed firms in Italy, and its historical and legal context make the 
analysis not only interesting from an academic standpoint but also desirable since very likely 
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the local home bias (and its implications) may assume relevant proportions. This aspect 
should allow to better identify the causes of the phenomenon since the impact of local home 
bias on firms’ market price is expected to be stronger. On the other side, Italian bank oriented 
economy as well as other differences among the Italian and US frameworks (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998), where most of the studies on the topic 
have been conducted, allow to internationalize the results obtained taking into account, at the 
same time, single countries’ peculiarities. 
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3. Data  
3.1. Data sources and sample selection 
The analysis requires the matching of two different sources of information: on one 
hand, the spatial and wealth distribution of Italian population, on the other hand, accounting, 
financial variables and the headquarters’ location for the firms listed at the Milan Stock 
Exchange. Data on spatial distribution of Italian population and data about the households’ 
wealth at regional level come from the database provided by the European Commission 
(EuroStat), available on the European Union’s website, www.ec.europa.eu, going back to 
1996. Indeed, European Commission database provides detailed regional statistics about the 
geographical distribution of European population and its wealth, considering age, sex, 
population density for different territorial levels (i.e. number of inhabitants/area), births and 
deaths, population structure, educational level, and life expectancy. Data about wealth at the 
province level come from the Rapporto Unioncamere
iv
, which every year analyses local 
economies through researches, conferences and publications over subject of interest for the 
chambers of commerce. Although the analysis is run at regional level, as mentioned in 
Section 1, I need to gather data at province level because of the two autonomous provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano-Bozen which, under the European Parliament Rule No 1059/2003 are 
awarded with the legislative rank of region. Indeed, data about region Trentino Alto Adige 
have been obtained through the aggregation of the data referred to the two above mentioned 
provinces.
v
 The analysis is limited to the time period from 1999 to 2007, since 1999 is the 
year of the introduction of the euro, which determined a structural break in the market 
valuation of Italian listed firms (see for instance Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009)), while 
2007 is the most recent year in which all data on Italian population are available. 
                                                          
iv
 Data available at the Url www.unioncamere.it, section Health Centre. 
v
 To know more about NUTS, see the url:  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/management/g24218_en.htm 
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Data at firm level come from several different sources: 
-  the database provided by Consob (i.e. the Italian equivalent of US SEC) available on 
its website, www.consob.it;  
- Osiris, Bureau Van Dijk’s database, which has a worldwide coverage and contains 
balance sheet data of listed firms, banks and insurance companies for a total of 38,000 
firms in 120 different countries;  
- firms’ Annual Reports; 
- the archives provided by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. – which is the company that manages 
Milan Stock Exchange – available at www.borsaitaliana.it;  
- the electronic archive of “Il Sole 24Ore”, which is the most prominent financial daily 
newspaper in Italy;  
- Mediobanca’s publication “Indici e Dati”;  
- the yearly investment guide “Il Calepino dell’Azionista”, which provides a brief 
history of each Italian listed firm, and  
- Datastream (Thompson Financial).  
Specifically, from Consob’s database I obtained the list of all firms issuing securities listed at 
Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1999-2007. This represented the initial sample of 
analysis, which accounted for a total of 2,537 firm-year observations. From Osiris and firms’ 
Annual Reports I collected the location – i.e. Address, City, Province, and ZIP code – of the 
headquarter of each sampled firm. This information is particularly of interest since allows to 
locate the companies belonging to the final sample within the different Italian macro-areas, 
regions and provinces.  
From the archives of Borsa Italiana S.p.A., I obtained the lists, updated at the last working 
day of each year over the period 1999-2007, of the securities listed at the Milan Stock 
Exchange but not actively traded, and of those included in the FTSE MIB Index, S&P MIB 
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Index and MIB30 Index. Specifically, FTSE MIB Index is currently the primary benchmark 
index for the Italian equity-market, and is composed by the 40 most liquid and capitalized 
Italian shares traded at Milan Stock Exchange. FTSE MIB Index substituted the June 1, 2009 
the S&P MIB Index which was composed by the 40 most liquid and capitalized shares of 
Italian and foreign firms listed on the markets managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. The index 
represented about the 80 percent of the capitalization of the Italian stock exchange, and 
replaced the June 2, 2003 the MIB30 Index, which consisted of the 30 most liquid and 
capitalized Italian shares traded at Milan Stock Exchange. Operationally, the information 
about the firms included in the indexes above defined allowed to build the FTSE dummy 
variable, which will be defined and discuss later. From the initial sample, have been extracted 
the observations i) whose ordinary shares were actively traded at the end of each year in the 
period 1999-2007 and ii) headquartered in Italy. The resulting dataset, identified as the final 
sample, consists of 2,463 firm-year observations issuing ordinary shares (hereafter just stocks 
or shares) actively traded at the Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1999-2007. From Il 
Sole 24Ore’s archive I obtained data on firms’ press coverage, while from Mediobanca’s 
“Indici e Dati”, and “Il Calepino dell’Azionista” I gathered data on firms’ IPOs, and age 
respectively. Finally, from Datastream I collected all others relevant accounting and financial 
information.  
Following HKS2008, in order to estimate the local supply of stocks in a given area, I 
initially considered also the financial firms included in the sample and defined as those 
companies whose SIC code first digit is equal to 6. Subsequently, I took away these 
companies from the final sample in order to study non-financial firms only. Indeed, for 
financial firms, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the local preference and therefore the 
postulated subsequent market segmentation, even when linked to the territory, is not 
associated to the mere headquarters’ location, and ultimately to the RATIO variable that I 
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consider to evaluate the local market conditions in terms of demand and supply for stocks. 
More likely, financial firms are perceived as local by those investors geographically 
proximate to one of their branches rather than to their headquarters (see for instance results of 
Teo (2009)). In this sense, the pertinent literature well documented the limited advantages 
produced by the geographical diversification of loan portfolios (Acharya, Hasan, and 
Saunders (2006)), as well as the crucial role played by branches’ localization in determining 
banks’ profitability (Hansen and Weinberg (1979); Boufounou (1995)). To future empirical 
researches the task to investigate this aspect. Table 12 summarizes the data sources 
considered in the present analysis. 
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Table 12 – Databases used in the analysis 
The table reports the list of the databases used in the analysis, along with their Url and a brief description of the 
data collected for each data source. 
Data Source Url Data Collected 
Households' level 
  
EuroStat www.ec.europa.eu Data about spatial distribution of Italian population and 
about households' wealth at the region level. 
Rapporto Unioncamere www.unioncamere.it Data about households' wealth at the province level. 
Firm's level 
  
Consob www.consob.it List of all firms issuing securities listed at Milan Stock 
Exchange over the period 1999 - 2007. 
Borsa Italiana S.p.A. www.borsaitaliana.it List of the securities not actively traded at the end of 
the last working day of each year considered in the 
sample (1999-2007), and of those included in the 
FTSE MIB Index, S&P MIB Index and MIB30 Index. 
Osiris https://osiris.bvdep.com Data about the location (Address, City, Province, ZIP 
code) of the headquarter of each firm included in the 
sample. 
Il Sole 24 Ore www.ilsole24ore.com Data about firms' press coverage. 
Mediobanca www.mediobanca.it Data about firms' Initial Public Offerings. 
Il Calepino dell'Azionista - Data about firms' age. 
Datastream www.thomsonone.com Financial and accounting information about the firms 
included in the sample. 
 
In order to define a territorial segmentation of the country, Italy has been split in sub-
areas with reference to the Nomenclature for the Statistics Territorial Units (NUTS). NUTS 
codes identify homogeneous territorial statistical units within the European Union on the 
basis of the area and the resident population. More specifically, the territory of any country 
member (NUTS0) is divided by NUTS codes in three nested sub-levels. Geographical macro-
areas are identified as NUTS1, Italian regions or the European equivalent are defined as 
NUTS2, and Italian provinces or the European equivalent are labeled as NUTS3.  
Table 4 specifically reports Italian NUTS at NUTS2 level, i.e. Italian regions, which 
represent the territorial dimension of major interest of the analysis for multiple reasons. 
Indeed, Italian regional sub-division is the one that closely represents its historical and 
cultural pre-unification divisions. This implies that analysis performed regionally are more 
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likely to highlight the possible cultural segmentations that could eventually intensify the 
behavioral component of the local home bias phenomenon (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). 
Moreover, empirically Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) evidence the positive effect of 
financial development at regional level on the economic success of the same geographical 
area within Italy. This allows to reasonably hypothesize that also a possible economic and 
credit-market segmentation in Italy is eventually defined regionally. Finally, the average 
(median) surface of Italian regions corresponds to the 4.97 (5.79) percent of the whole Italian 
territory, which is approximately the same critical area (cf. the 5.28 percent of the U.S. 
surface) that Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find significant in distinguishing locally biased 
(and, they find, better informed) investors from the non-local (and, they find, worse 
informed) ones. Italian regional division may therefore be the more appropriate also to 
capture the local and informed investors, thus taking into account the eventual rational root of 
local home bias. Given the address obtained for each sampled firm through the Osiris 
database and the firms’ Annual Reports, I have been able to identify for each company the 
correspondent region and geographical macro-area. Finally, through the internet application 
Google Maps, I collected the geographical coordinates (i.e. latitude and longitude) of each 
sampled firms’ headquarter and of each capital city of region and province.   
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Table 13 – Italian NUTS 
The table reports Italian NUTS from level NUTS0 to level NUTS2, which represents the territorial level of 
major interest in the analysis. The two autonomous provinces of Bolzano-Bozen and Trento under the European 
Parliament Rule No 1059/2003 are awarded with the legislative rank of region, but in the analysis are merged 
and considered as region Trentino Alto Adige. 
NUTS0 Code NUTS1 Code NUTS2 Code 
  
North West ITC Piedmont ITC1 
    
Aosta Valley ITC2 
    
Liguria ITC3 
  
    Lombardy ITC4 
  
North East ITD Bolzano/Bozen ITD1 
    
Trento ITD2 
    
Veneto ITD3 
    
Friuli-Venezia Giulia ITD4 
  
    Emilia-Romagna ITD5 
Italy IT Centre ITE Tuscany ITE1 
    
Umbria ITE2 
    
Marche ITE3 
  
    Lazio ITE4 
  
South ITF Abruzzo ITF1 
    
Molise ITF2 
    
Campania ITF3 
    
Apulia ITF4 
    
Basilicata ITF5 
  
    Calabria ITF6 
  
Islands ITG Sicily ITG1 
        Sardinia ITG2 
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3.2. Variables definition  
As already mentioned, the present study aims to test whether in Italy actually exists 
the local home bias phenomenon as highlighted among the others by HKS2008, and Coval 
and Moskowitz ((1999), (2001)) in the US context, and to study the factors which the 
phenomenon depends from, trough the analysis of its impact on listed firms’ market value. 
Indeed, following HKS2008, it is possible to state that if effectively traders tend to invest 
mainly in local securities, in regions with both a scarcity of supply and a high demand for 
local stocks, the excess of demand over the few securities locally available should push their 
price up. In this sense, regardless of the causes driving investors’ preference for local, a 
higher evaluation of securities in areas characterized by an unbalance between (low) local 
supply and (high) local demand would confirm the existence of locally segmented markets. 
Furthermore, the analysis of which stocks this effect is more relevant for, by considering 
firms’ visibility, profitability and opacity, should allow to understand and discriminate among 
the causes driving the phenomenon. As already mentioned, while firm’s visibility is 
reasonably expected to capture dynamics related to the familiarity with the issuing firm, and 
thus the behavioral origin of investors’ preference for local, firm’s future profitability and 
firm’s opacity are expected to capture dynamics related to the informational root of the local 
home bias. 
In order to conduct this analysis and to construct a base model able to properly investigate the 
research question(s), it is first of all fundamental to identify variables able to: 
- represent the under- or overvaluation of the stocks from time to time considered; 
- express the local market conditions (i.e. the unbalance between local demand and 
supply of stocks) which would impact on stock prices; and 
- define firms’ visibility, and both firms’ profitability and opacity.  
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In this sense, following HKS2008, in order to define a company’s market appreciation and 
the local economic conditions, this study identifies respectively firms’ Market-to-Book Ratio 
and RATIO, whose detailed description is provided in Section 3.2.1. and 3.2.2.  
Moreover, Section 3.2.3. and Section 3.2.4. define a series of visibility and both profitability 
and opacity variables respectively, along with a detailed description of the other variables 
employed in the analysis (Section 3.2.5.), in order to help the reader to fully understand the 
methodological choices that will follow.  
 
3.2.1. Market-to-Book Ratio 
In line with HKS2008, as endogenous variable to proxy for the market appreciation of 
a particular stock, I compute the log of the firm’s market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book 
Ratio). Though results are not significantly affected by this choice (not reported for 
shortness), I take logs because of the high skewness that characterizes the raw variable. 
The firms’ market-to-book ratio is a variable widely accepted by financial literature in order 
to study the over- or underperformance of a particular security (see among the others Baker 
and Wurgler (2002); Adam and Goyal (2008); Liu (2009)). The numerator is the firm’s 
equity market value, which defines the total market value of a company’s outstanding shares, 
being calculated by multiplying the current stock price by the number of outstanding shares. 
In other words, market value of equity is a synonym for market capitalization, and reflects the 
firm’s market appreciation. The denominator of the Market-to-Book Ratio variable is the 
firm’s equity book value, which identifies the value at which a firm’s stocks are carried on a 
balance sheet, equal to total assets minus liabilities, preferred stock, and intangible assets 
such as goodwill. This also represents how much the company would have left over in assets 
if it went out of business immediately. Indeed, it basically represents an assessment of the 
minimum value of a company’s equity, and does not consider whether a stock is over- or 
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undervalued by the market. Since companies are usually expected to grow and generate more 
profits in the future, market capitalization is higher than book value for most companies. As 
book value is a more accurate measure of valuation for companies which aren’t growing 
quickly, it is of more interest to value investors than growth investors. Indeed, by definition a 
firm’s equity book value does not take into account the company's growth potential, which is 
instead incorporated in the equity market value. Therefore, the market-to-book value 
compares two different expressions of equity value, one related to accounting values and the 
other referred to its market appreciation, and defines how many times a firm’s market value is 
greater (or lower) than the firm’s book value. Thus, the variable represents a measure of the 
company’s performance, and has the additional merit to allow comparison among firms with 
different dimensions because of its normalization through the denominator.  
 
3.2.2. RATIO 
In order to identify whether the local market conditions are able to affect firms’ 
market prices (i.e. in order to check the existence of the local home bias) and to test the way 
in which companies’ visibility, profitability and opacity impact on investors’ preference for 
local, the main exogenous variable employed in the analysis is represented by the 
disproportion between the local supply and the local demand of stocks. The variable, named 
RATIO, is computed as the ratio of the former to the latter (see HKS2008) and is, indeed, the 
variable of main interest in the analysis as summarizes the market conditions in a specific 
region/area. Specifically, as proxy for the local supply of stocks, this work considers the 
aggregated equity book value (Equity Book Value) of all firms headquartered in any 
particular sub-area of the country. This assumption seems reasonable given that – under the 
hypotheses of locally segmented markets – the securities issued by local companies would 
represent the main component of local traders’ portfolio. As proxy for the local demand of 
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stocks, following HKS2008, I consider the aggregate disposable income (Disposable Income) 
of the households living in the same sub-area, which represents both the local wealth and a 
proxy for households’ risk tolerance. Indeed, a key variable often used to represent the 
possible outcome of a decision made by expected utility maximizing decision makers is 
wealth of consumption. In this sense it is widely accepted by financial and econometric 
literature the assumption that the richest, the more risk tolerant will be an household (see 
among the others Menezes and Hanson (1970); Bosh-Domenech and Silvestre (1999).  
Following the definition adopted by EuroStat and Unioncamere, Disposable Income is 
computed as follow: 
 
Disposable Income = Primary Income – Current Taxes – Social Contributions + 
Social Benefits + Other Net Transfers 
where 
Primary Income = Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income + Income from 
Employment + Financials Income (Equity Income + Non-Equity Income). 
 
In light of what stated so far, in order to check the existence of the local home bias by 
testing whether the local market conditions affect firms’ market prices, in Section 4 will be 
defined a series of multivariate regressions (whose results are presented in Section 5) which 
consider as dependent the Market-to-Book Ratio and as main exogenous the RATIO variable. 
Considering the base-regression  
 
Ln(market-to-book ratio)=α + β1*RATIO + control variables + ε, 
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with  
         
         
         
 
and  
market-to-book ratio =
       
       
 
where  
BVi,j,t is the Equity Book Value of the listed firm i headquartered in the region j in the year t;  
DIk,j,t is the Disposable Income of the household k living in the region j in the year t; and  
MVi,j,t is the Equity Market Value of the listed firm i located in the region j in the year t,  
it is evident how the same value of Equity Book Value both at the numerator of the 
exogenous variable and at the denominator of the dependent one, could artificially affect the 
(negative) relation between the two variables. Thus, according to the methodology used by 
HKS2008, RATIO has been re-calculated by excluding from the numerator the Equity Book 
Value of the company from time to time considered. This arrangement is necessary in order 
to avoid spurious effects artificially deriving not from the consistency of the dynamics 
analyzed but from the contemporary presence of the considered firm’s equity book value both 
in the denominator of the dependent variable, i.e. Market-to-Book Ratio, and in the 
numerator of the associated explanatory variable, i.e. RATIO. Furthermore, similarly to 
HKS2008, I drop Equity Income from Disposable Income. However, analysis’ results seem 
not to be significantly affected by these adjustments. 
In light of the relevance that RATIO assumes in the analysis, it is reasonable to verify 
what drives its variability. Assuming the localization process as exogenous, i.e. the number of 
listed firms headquartered in a specific geographical area, and taking logs, RATIO may be re-
written as the natural logarithm of the Equity Book Value (per capita) in a considered area 
minus the natural logarithm of the Disposable Income (per capita) of the households living in 
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the same area. Using this decomposition, it is possible to check how much of RATIO’s 
variability is coming from these two terms, and whether it depends mainly by the demand for 
stocks that, as defined, increases ceteris paribus with the growth of the area considered 
and/or of the population there resident, or by the supply for securities. Table 15 sheds light on 
this issue. More specifically, I run regressions where the natural logarithm of RATIO and 
both the supply per capita (Natural Logarithm of Regional Book Value Per Capita) and the 
demand per capita (Natural Logarithm of Regional Disposable Income Per Capita) 
components are regressed on the (natural logarithm of) population density on a regional basis. 
Specifically population density, whose data by region are reported in Table 14, is defined as 
the number of inhabitants residing in a given geographic area for square kilometer. The 
analysis of the table, and in particular of the values of the time series mean and standard 
deviation for every region and macro-area, allows to state that population density does not 
have a (strong) monotonic and increasing pattern over time but tends to remain constant over 
the considered period. This supports the evidence that results presented on Table 15 do not 
depend from the time period considered in the analysis.  
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Table 14 – Population density  
Table 14 reports the yearly values of population density per region (i.e. inhabitants per square kilometer) 
calculated at region (NUTS2), macro-area (NUTS1), and country (NUTS0) levels over the period 1999-2007, as 
wells as both the time-series and cross-sectional means and standard deviations. 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1999-2007 
          
Time-series Mean S.D. 
NUTS0 - Country                       
Italy 178.3 178.3 178.4 178.8 180.2 181.8 183.1 184.1 185.3 180.9 2.8 
            NUTS1 - Macro-Area                       
Centre 189.9 190.1 190.3 190.8 192.7 195.0 196.7 199.3 202.4 194.1 4.5 
Islands 134.7 134.4 134.0 133.9 134.4 135.0 135.3 135.4 135.6 134.7 0.6 
North East 174.8 175.6 176.5 177.8 179.8 182.1 184.1 185.5 187.3 180.4 4.6 
North West 265.0 265.2 265.5 266.5 269.0 272.6 275.6 277.3 279.3 270.7 5.7 
South 193.9 193.5 193.1 193.3 194.0 195.0 195.5 195.4 195.7 194.4 1.0 
Cross-Sectional Mean 191.7 191.8 191.9 192.5 194.0 195.9 197.4 198.6 200.1 
  Cross-Sectional S.D. 47.2 47.3 47.5 47.8 48.4 49.5 50.4 50.9 51.5 
  
            NUTS2 - Region                       
Campania 427.0 426.5 426.0 426.6 428.8 431.2 432.3 432.4 433.3 429.3 3.0 
Lombardy 392.9 394.2 395.6 397.9 402.5 408.8 413.8 417.1 420.8 404.8 10.6 
Lazio 303.7 303.5 303.4 303.7 306.3 310.0 312.9 319.5 327.1 310.0 8.4 
Liguria 298.9 297.2 295.5 294.7 295.5 297.4 300.4 301.9 301.1 298.1 2.6 
Veneto 254.8 256.0 257.3 259.2 262.4 265.9 268.6 270.7 273.3 263.1 6.8 
Apulia 210.4 209.9 209.6 209.6 210.1 211.3 212.1 212.1 212.2 210.8 1.1 
Sicily 196.8 196.3 195.8 195.6 196.3 197.1 197.4 197.5 197.7 196.7 0.8 
Emilia-Romagna 182.8 183.7 184.7 186.2 188.4 191.2 193.7 195.4 197.4 189.3 5.4 
Piedmont 170.1 169.9 169.6 169.9 171.0 173.0 174.4 174.9 176.1 172.1 2.5 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 155.9 156.2 156.5 157.2 158.1 159.0 159.7 160.2 161.1 158.2 1.9 
Tuscany 154.1 154.2 154.3 154.8 156.3 158.1 159.3 160.2 161.4 157.0 2.8 
Marche 152.3 152.9 153.6 154.7 156.4 158.2 159.5 160.4 161.7 156.6 3.5 
Calabria 137.9 137.2 136.5 136.1 136.2 136.3 136.0 135.6 135.8 136.4 0.7 
Abruzzo 118.2 118.2 118.3 119.2 120.3 121.5 122.5 122.9 123.8 120.5 2.2 
Umbria 99.3 99.7 100.0 100.6 101.9 103.4 104.6 105.5 106.5 102.4 2.7 
Molise 74.0 73.7 73.4 73.3 73.5 73.6 73.5 73.3 73.3 73.5 0.2 
Trentino Alto Adige 69.2 69.7 70.1 70.7 71.5 72.5 73.3 74.0 74.9 71.7 2.0 
Sardinia 68.8 68.5 68.3 68.4 68.7 68.9 69.2 69.4 69.6 68.9 0.5 
Basilicata 62.0 61.8 61.6 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.3 61.0 60.8 61.4 0.4 
Aosta Valley 36.7 36.8 36.9 37.1 37.5 37.8 38.1 38.4 38.7 37.6 0.7 
Cross-Sectional Mean 178.3 178.3 178.4 178.8 180.2 181.8 183.1 184.1 185.3 
  Cross-Sectional S.D. 109.3 109.3 109.3 109.6 110.5 111.7 112.7 113.5 114.4 
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Table 15 – The variable RATIO and population density  
The dependent variables are: (1) the natural logarithm of RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total 
disposable income in a given Italian region; (2) the natural logarithm of total Book Equity per capita in a given 
Italian region; and (3) the natural logarithm of Disposable Income per capita in a given Italian region. The 
independent variable is the natural logarithm of the regional population density. The natural logarithm of 
Regional Book Value Per Capita and of Regional Disposable Income Per Capita are obtained by applying the 
natural logarithm respectively to the numerator (Aggregate BV (/000,000 €)) and to the denominator (Aggregate 
Disposable Income (/000,000 €)) of the RATIO variable previously divided by the resident population in the 
considered region (source: ISTAT). Density is the number of inhabitants in a given geographical area for one 
square kilometer (source: ISTAT). Data refer to the period 1999-2007. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level indicated by *, **, *** respectively. White standard errors 
reported in parenthesis. 
Natural Logarithm  
 
RATIO 
 Regional Book Value 
Per Capita 
 Regional Disposable Income 
Per Capita 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Ln(Population's Density)  0.165***  0.004***  0.000 
  (7.65)  (7.13)  (0.65) 
Constant  -0.678***  -0.017***  0.014*** 
  (-6.90)     (-6.54)  (6.71) 
Observations  180  180  180 
Adj. R-squared  0.237  0.223  -0.003 
 
Model 1 of Table 15 shows that the natural logarithm of RATIO is positively and 
significantly determined (t-stat = 7.65) by the natural logarithm of population density. This 
result is consistent with the fact that for the six regions with the highest frequency of listed 
companies (i.e. Lombardy, Piedmont, Lazio, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Tuscany) over the 
period 1999-2007, there is an average of 248 inhabitants per square kilometer, roughly three 
times more than that of the corresponding six less populated regions (77 inhabitants per 
square kilometer). The most densely populated areas are therefore characterized by greater 
excess of securities’ supply. However, this evidence does not clarify the direction of such 
causation. Results of models 2 and 3 shed light on this issue. While RATIO’s supply 
component continues to be positively and significantly influenced by the population density 
(t-stat = 7.13), RATIO’s demand component appears to be not significantly determined by 
the same exogenous variable. Therefore, it seems possible to argue that for an increase of 
population density, RATIO tends to became bigger mainly not as a mere consequence of 
geographical characteristics dynamics. In fact, as population density goes up, book value per 
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capita also rise, generating the increase of the RATIO variable. Thus, firms appear to be 
affected by a sort of agglomeration effect for which they opt to locate their headquarters not 
in the “richest” but in the most densely populated areas. In this sense, it is well known that a 
firms’ cluster is driven by higher facilities such as high quality infrastructure, increased 
breadth of labor market, and interchange with the credit system (see among the others Porter, 
1998), which more likely are present in the areas more densely populated. 
 
3.2.3. Visibility variables 
At present, the reason for which investors tend to invest in local companies is not yet 
univocally detected and accepted by financial literature (see the review of literature – Section 
2.2.). Indeed, while many academics argue that the outperformance of locally biased 
portfolios would highlight that the preference for local stocks is to be attributed to the 
informational advantage that traders have on territorial securities (Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001); Feng and Seasholes (2004); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) among the first), many 
others claim that a mere feeling of familiarity toward local stocks is the driver of portfolio’s 
choices (among the others Huberman (2001); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). In this sense, 
the analysis of which companies the local home bias is more relevant for, by testing its effect 
on firms’ market prices conditionally to firms’ visibility, profitability and opacity, should 
help to discriminate among the causes driving the phenomenon.  
Theoretically, well-known firms are expected to show a lower local home bias effect 
when compared to the rest of the sample, given that their characteristic of visibility outside 
the local markets should make them lose their territorial feature. Indeed, as long as the local 
home bias relies on the simple familiarity with the issuing firm, while companies just locally 
perceived as familiar would be, ceteris paribus, more intensively picked by local investors, 
the nationally-known ones would not experience the same phenomenon. In order to provide a 
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more intuitive example, let’s consider the case of FIAT S.p.A., whose headquarter is in Turin, 
Piedmont. As the company is worldwide and nationally known, it is not reasonable to expect 
that its stocks are traded only by investors living close to its headquarter. Therefore, given the 
high and widespread demand for FIAT’s securities, local investors should not be able to 
generate a price pressure on the stocks, pushing their market price up. In other words, this 
means that the equity-market segmentation induced by investors’ preference for local is 
expected to be less (more) pronounced for widely (locally) known and visible firms. Until 
visibility is not correlated with firms’ opacity, the local preference for non-visible firms, 
being widespread irrespectively of firms’ characteristics, can be interpreted as preference for 
familiar companies, thus representing the non-informative component of the local home bias 
phenomenon. 
Consistently with the pertinent literature, which highlights that visibility is induced 
among investors through several dimensions, I identify visible firms using different 
definitions, and specifically:  
- FTSE_D, a dummy variable which takes value one if the firm is included in the Italian 
equity market’s primary index (S&P MIB Index, MIB30 Index), and zero otherwise 
(Source: BorsaItaliana S.p.A.). In this sense, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), in 
contrast with extant explanations, document an asymmetric price response to changes 
to the S&P 500 index, i.e. a permanent increase in the price of firms added to the S&P 
500 Index but no permanent decline for deleted firms, which is at least partly 
explained by the asymmetric changes in the investors’ awareness and by the 
consequent effect on investor behavior. Although the analyzed sample does not cover 
the period after which FTSE MIB index replaced the S&P MIB index, I 
conventionally name FTSE_D the dummy variable indicating the inclusion of the firm 
on the primary equity-market index. Indeed, FTSE MIB index is currently the primary 
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benchmark index for the Italian equity-market and is composed by the 40 most traded 
and capitalized stocks. FTSE MIB substituted in June 1, 2009 the S&P MIB index 
which, in turn, replaced in June 2, 2003, the MIB30 index.; 
- No of Employees_D, a dummy which takes value one if the firm’s number of 
employees is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. This 
is consistent with Døskeland & Hvide (2011), who find that, allegedly because of 
overconfidence, individual investors disproportionately trade in professionally close 
stocks even obtaining in many cases statistically negative extra performances; 
- Press Coverage_D, a dummy which equals one if the firm’s yearly number of articles 
citations in the most prominent Italian financial newspaper (cf. Il Sole 24 Ore) is 
greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise (Source: Il Sole 24 
Ore) (see Tetlock (2007)); 
- Press Coverage Lag_D, which takes value one if the firm’s yearly number of articles 
in the previous year is greater than the correspondent yearly cross-sectional median, 
and zero otherwise (Source: Il Sole 24 Ore) (see Tetlock (2007)); 
- Press Coverage Star_D, which equals one if the firm’s yearly number of articles both 
in the previous and in the current year is greater than the correspondent yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise (Source: Il Sole 24 Ore) (see Tetlock (2007)). In 
this case, the consistency of these proxies (i.e. Press Coverage_D, Press Coverage 
Lag_D and Press Coverage Star_D) is supported by findings of Barber and Odean 
(2008), who show among others things, that individual investors are not-
outperforming stocks’ net buyers but tend to purchase those stocks more frequently 
reported in the news; 
- IPO_D, a dummy which takes value one if a firm listed in the stock market within the 
two previous year, and zero otherwise (Source: Mediobanca's "Indici e Dati"). This is 
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consistent with Demers and Lewellen (2003), who provide evidences supporting the 
role exerted by advertising and marketing benefits in the company’s product markets 
as a valid IPO motivation.  
Although well recognized by financial literature, even intuitively all the above mentioned 
variables may be defined as visibility variables. For instance, an increase either of the 
company’s number of employees, or of the number (current and/or in the previous year) of 
articles concerning the firm, make the company itself as better known among the general 
public of investors, enlarging its social base. Similarly, an initial public offering is a not 
frequent event in the Italian equity market and attributes therefore extra-visibility to the 
issuing firm. 
 
3.2.4. Profitability and opacity variables 
Considering the role played by informational asymmetries in determining investors’ 
portfolio decision, if an informational advantage generated by proximity actually drives 
investors’ choices, the preference for local will be detected not irrespectively of firm 
characteristics, but only toward those stocks issued by companies that in the future will 
perform goodly, i.e. future profitable firms. Indeed, assuming that a local information 
advantage effect is in place, a local inadequate supply for stocks would not be able to 
enhance a firm’s value if there is a poor prospect of future profitability. Thus, the detection of 
local home bias mainly in future profitable firms would suggest that local information is 
exploitable as being potentially profitable. Moreover, the firms less likely to disclose 
information to the public (i.e. “opaque” firms) should be the ones toward with informed 
traders could better and more profitably exploit the informational advantage. In fact, stocks 
issued by (even profitable but) non-opaque firms characterized by a complete information 
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disclosure to the general public of investor should be purchased indiscriminately in the whole 
country, and they would not experience the local home bias effect.  
In order to distinguish profitable firms from the non profitable ones, as a measure of a 
firm’s performance I use Jensen’s alpha (Jensen (1968)) measured from an augmented model. 
Indeed, Jensen's alpha is a measure of the marginal return associated to a firm/portfolio that is 
not explained by existing risk factors. Thus, future profitable firms are defined as those with a 
positive alpha in the following year (Alphat+1 Good_D).  
The yearly 1-factor Jensen’s alpha is computed as the αi,w,t of the following model 
(augmented market model): 
 
Ri,w,t = αi,w,t + β1*Rm,w,t + β2*Rm,w-1,t + ɛi,w,t 
where: 
Ri,w,t is the stock return of the firm i at week w in year t; 
Rm,w,t is the market index return at week w in year t; 
Rm,w-1,t is the market index return at week w-1 in year t; and 
ɛi,w,t is the error term for Ri,w,t.  
For each firm i in a given year t, the model is estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly 
observations (Source: Datastream - datatype: RI). From the yearly 1-factor Jensen’s alpha is 
derived a dummy variable Alphat+1 Good_D, which  equals to one if αi,w,t in the forthcoming 
year is bigger than zero, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable this way considered allows 
to distinguish non-profitable companies from the profitable ones, that in the forthcoming year 
will have a return higher than expected considering existing risk factors. 
Relying on the evidences provided by the extant literature on the topic, several 
variables of opacity are used in the study to define firms that conveniently manipulate the 
information disclosure to the market. In detail, I consider: 
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-  Return Skewness_D, a dummy variable which equals one if the yearly skewness of 
weekly stock returns’ distribution (estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly 
observations) is lower than the yearly cross-sectional median (signaling left tail 
asymmetry returns), and zero otherwise. In this sense, Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) 
find among others things that negative skewness is greater in stocks that have 
experienced an increase in trading volume (relative to trend over the prior six 
months), which in turn strongly supports the presence on the market of differently 
informed investors (Hong and Stein (2003)). Even if it’s well-known that the trading 
volume directly proxies for the intensity of disagreement among investors (see for 
instance also Harris and Raviv (1993); Kandel and Pearson (1995); and Odean 
(1998b) for others  models implementing this feature), it is worthy of note to briefly 
make it clear how investors’ disagreement determines negative skewness in stock 
returns distribution. When differences of opinion (and hence trading volume) are 
large, the more investors are bearish, the more in advance they will be forced to a so-
called corner solution, in which they sell all of their shares and just sit out of the 
market with their information incompletely revealed in prices. In subsequent rounds 
of trade, while previously more-bullish investors may change their mind and promptly 
leave the declining market, the originally more-bearish group of investors may 
become the marginal ‘‘support buyers’’ jumping in the market, thus fully revealing 
the (piece of) information they own. Thus, accumulated hidden information tends to 
come out during market declines, which is another way of saying that returns are 
negatively skewed; 
- Return Kurtosis_D, a dummy variable which takes value one if the yearly kurtosis of 
weekly stock returns’ distribution (estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly 
observations) is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, signaling high 
Giulia Baschieri – Ph.D. Thesis 
Local Home Bias: Theory and New Empirical Evidence from Italy 
 
 
93 
• Data • 
frequency of extremely high/low returns compared to the bell-curve, and zero 
otherwise. In this sense, Jin and Myers (2006), investigate firm’s opacity as a 
determinant of synchronicity of stock price movements. Upon a dataset made up by 
weekly stock returns for a cross section of 40 countries over the period 1990-2001, 
the authors document strong significant relations between R
2
, which is the measure 
used to proxy for the stock market synchronicity (see also Roll, 1988; and Morck, 
Yeung and Yu (2000)), and several measures of information opaqueness among 
whom the kurtosis or residual returns; 
- Return Star_D, which takes value one in the presence of both negative skewness and 
positive kurtosis, i.e. if the stock return skewness and kurtosis are below and above 
the yearly cross-sectional median respectively, and zero otherwise. The variable is 
computed as the product of Return Skewness_D and Return Kurtosis_D. 
These proxies follow Jin and Myers (2006) who discuss the link between firm information 
released and its stock market returns properties. In this sense, beyond the “saintly” managers 
who report everything promptly and credibly, and for which opaqueness should be 
considered zero and returns are not affected, there are managers that hide news until the gap 
between fair value and stock market price touches a critical value. At this point, the authors 
go on and note: 
“The news would be released all at once, like a “pressure vessel letting off steam”.[..] 
we would see long tails in the distribution of stock returns. (We will control for 
kurtosis in our tests.)” (Jin and Myers (2006), page 260).  
The third and the fourth moments of each firm are computed using raw weekly returns 
instead of daily returns in order to avoid a kurtosis inflation bias for lightly traded stocks. For 
robustness purposes, I also use the third and the fourth moments of the residuals of an 
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augmented market model risk-adjusted specification. However, results are not significantly 
affected by this choice. 
With regard to the opacity measured from an accounting viewpoint, following the 
pertinent financial literature, I consider: 
- Abs DiscAccruals_D, a dummy variable which takes value one if the absolute value 
of the firm’s abnormal accruals (Abs DiscAccruals) is greater than the yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise (see Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009));  
- Ms3 DiscAccruals_D, a dummy which takes value one if the prior three years sum of 
the firm’s absolute abnormal accruals (Ms3DiscAccruals) is greater than the yearly 
cross-sectional median and zero otherwise (see Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian 
(2009)). 
In detail, abnormal accruals (Abnormal Accruals), which are the yearly value of absolute 
abnormal accruals, for firm i in year t (AAi,t) are given by: 
tiNA
tiA
tiACC
tiAA ,
,
,
,   
where: 
ACCi,t is the accruals for firm i in year t. ACCi,t is given by: 
Net Income Before Extraordinary Items/Preferred Dividends (WC01551) - Net Cash Flow 
From Operating Activities (WC01551); 
Ai,t is the Firm Size for firm i in year t, and 
NAi,t is the firm-specific normal accruals for firm i in year t. NAi,t is obtained by the 
following: 
NAi,t= ACCi,t/Ai,t-1 – [a0 + b1*(∆REVi,t/Ai,t-1 - ∆RECi,t/Ai,t-1) + b2*(PPEi,t/Ai,t-1)], 
where: 
∆REVi,t is the change in Sales for firm i in year t, 
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Ai,t-1 is the Firm Size for firm i in year t-1, 
∆RECi,t is the Change in Net Receivables (WC02051) for firm i in year t, 
PPEi,t is the Gross Property, Plant and Equipment for firm i in year t. PPEi,t is given by: 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment (WC02501) – Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization 
(WC01151) 
a0, b1, and b2 are the estimates of α0, β1, and β2 from the following cross-sectional regression 
for each of the industry-year combinations: 
ACCi,t/Ai,t-1=α0 + β1*(∆REVi,t/ Ai,t-1) + β2(PPEi,t/ Ai,t-1) +εi,t 
where: 
ɛi,t is the error term for ACCi,t. The model is estimated within each industry upon a minimum 
of 30 firm-year observations (Source: Worldscope - datatype above reported); 
Following their definition, both Abs DiscAccruals_D and Ms3DiscAccruals_D indicate the 
presence of earnings managements in the firm, thus representing a proxy for opacity 
measures at accounting level. 
 
3.2.5. Control variables 
Beyond the variables above described, I added to the analysis a series of control 
variables, which are necessary in order to confer robustness to the analysis and to exclude 
that the results about the phenomenon under observation might be driven by other element 
not considered in the study. Indeed, the omission of relevant variables results in biased 
coefficient estimates for the remaining explanatory variables: the model would be, in fact, 
misspecified. As control variables, the study considers: 
- ROE, a measure of equity’s profitability, computed as the ratio of firm’s net profit 
income to the Equity Book Value (Source: Datastream – datatype: DWRE) (see 
among the others Campbell and Thompson (2008)); 
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- R&D_D, a dummy variable which equal to one if the firm does not report research 
and development expense, and zero otherwise (see Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 
(2001)) (Source: Worldscope – datatype: WC01201); 
- R&D to Sales, which measures firm’s future growth opportunities, and is computed as 
the ratio of firm’s research and developments expense to the value of sales (Xing 
(2008)); 
- Firm Size, defined as the (log of the) value of firm total asset (Source: Worldscope – 
datatype: WC02999) (see among the others Fama and French ((1992), (1993)); 
- Firm Age, defined as the number of years since firm’s foundation (Source: “Il 
Calepino dell'Azionista”) (Keloharju and Kulp (1996)). In the analysis the variable is 
employed as the log of the sum between the constant one and Firm Age; 
- Press Coverage, defined as the yearly number of newspaper’s articles concerning the 
firm in the year from time to time considered (Source: Il Sole 24 Ore)(see Dyck and 
Zingales (2004)).The variable is employed in the analysis as the log of the sum 
between the constant one and Press Coverage; 
For Press Coverage, Firm Age, and Firm Size, I take logs because of the high skewness of 
their distributions. According to financial literature, ROE, R&D to Sales and Press Coverage 
are expected to positively impact on firms’ Market-to-Book Ratio (see among others 
Campbell and Thompson (2008); Xing (2008), Dyck and Zingales (2004) respectively), while 
Firm Size and Firm Age are expected to negatively impact on the variable (see among the 
others Banz (1981); Evans (1987); Fama and French (1993); and Keloharju and Kulp (1996)). 
 
All the above mentioned variables of visibility, profitability, opacity, such as the 
Market-to-Book Ratio, the RATIO and the control variables employed in the analysis are 
summarized in Table 16, along with a brief description of their meaning and derivation.  
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Table 16 - Variables definition 
The table defines the variables – alphabetically listed – used in the study. The sample has been obtained from 
Consob’s database. Data on firm location are taken from Osiris (Bureau Van Dijk’s database) and Annual 
Reports (provided by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.). Italian territory’s sub-areas have been indentified according to 
NUTS codes, with the exception of the region Trentino Alto Adige, here composed by the aggregation of the 
two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano-Bozen. Datastream and Worldscope data are defined by the 
corresponding datatype. 
Variable Description 
  Abnormal Accruals The yearly value of absolute abnormal accruals.  
Absolute abnormal accruals for firm i in year t (AAi,t) are given by: 
 
tiNA
tiA
tiACC
tiAA ,
,
,
, 
 
 
where: 
ACCi,t is the accruals for firm i in year t. ACCi,t is given by: 
Net Income Before Extraordinary Items/Preferred Dividends (WC01551) - Net 
Cash Flow From Operating Activities (WC01551) 
Ai,t is the Firm Size for firm i in year t, and 
NAi,t is the firm-specific normal accruals for firm i in year t. NAi,t is obtained by the 
following: 
NAi,t  = ACCi,t/Ai,t-1 – [a0 + b1*(REVi,t/Ai,t-1 - RECi,t/Ai,t-1) + b2*(PPEi,t/Ai,t-1)] 
where: 
REVi,t is the change in Sales for firm i in year t, 
Ai,t-1 is the Firm Size for firm i in year t-1. 
RECi,t is the Change in Net Receivables (WC02051) for firm i in year t. 
PPEi,t is the Gross Property, Plant and Equipment for firm i in year t. PPEi,t is given 
by: 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment (WC02501) – Depreciation, Depletion, and 
Amortization (WC01151) 
a0, b1, and b2 are the estimates of 0, 1, and 2 from the following cross-sectional 
regression for each of the industry-year combinations: 
ACCi,t/Ai,t-1=0 + 1*(REVi,t/ Ai,t-1) + 2(PPEi,t/ Ai,t-1) +εi,t 
where: 
ɛi,t is the error term for ACCi,t.  
The model is estimated within each industry upon a minimum of 30 firm-year 
observations.  
Source: Worldscope (datatype above reported). 
Abs DiscAccruals The absolute value of Abnormal Accruals 
Abs DiscAccruals_D Equal to one if Abs DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median 
and zero otherwise.  
Alpha The yearly 1-factor Jensen’s alpha.  
It is computed as the αi,w, t of the following model (augmented market model): 
Ri,w,t = αi,w,t + β1*Rm,w,t + β2*Rm,w-1,t + ɛi,w,t 
where:  
Ri,w,t is the stock return of the firm i at week w in year t,  
Rm,w,t is the market index return at week w in year t, and 
ɛi,w,t is the error term for Ri,w,t.  
For each firm i in a given year t, the model is estimated upon a minimum of 25 
weekly observations.  
Source: Datastream (datatype: RI) 
Alphat+1 Good_D Equal to one if Alpha in the forthcoming year is bigger than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  
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Table 16 (continued) 
Disposable Income The household’ disposable income.  
It is computed as follow:  
Disposable Income = Primary Income- Current Taxes - Social Contributions + 
Social Benefits + Other Net Transfers 
where: 
Primary Income = Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income + Income from 
Employment + Financials Income (Equity Income + Non-Equity Income). 
Source: Eurostat. 
Equity Book Value Book value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC03501) 
Equity Market Value Market value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC08001).  
Firm Age The number of years of firm’s life since foundation. Source: “Il Calepino 
dell'Azionista”. 
Firm Size Total asset. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC02999). 
FTSE_D Equal to one if the firm is included in the Italian equity market’s primary index 
(S&P MIB Index, MIB30 Index), and zero otherwise. Source: Borsa Italiana S.p.A. 
IPO_D Equal to one if the firm did listed in the stock market within the past two years, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Mediobanca's "Indici e Dati" 
Market-to-Book Ratio The ratio of Equity Market Value to Equity Book Value. 
Ms3 DiscAccruals The prior three years moving sum of Abnormal Accruals 
Ms3 DiscAccruals_D Equal to one if Ms3 DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, 
and zero otherwise.  
No of Employees The number of both full and part time employees of the company. It excludes: 
Seasonal employees; Emergency employees. Source: Datastream (datatype: 
DWEN). 
No of Employees_D Equal to one if No of Employees is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, 
and zero otherwise. 
Press Coverage The yearly number of articles concerning the considered firm. Source: Il Sole 24 
Ore. 
Press Coverage_D Equal to one if Press Coverage is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, 
and zero otherwise.  
Press Coverage Lag The number of articles concerning the considered firm in the previous year. Source: 
Il Sole 24 Ore. 
Press Coverage Lag_D Equal to one if Press Coverage Lag is greater than the correspondent yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise. 
Press Coverage Star_D The product of Press Coverage_D and Press Coverage Lag_D.  
RATIO The ratio of the aggregate Equity Book Value of the firms headquartered in a given 
geographical area to the aggregate Disposable Income (less Equity Income) of the 
households living in the same geographical area. Formally, considering at year t an 
economy where I listed firms and K households are located in the region j, the 
RATIO for region j can be computed as: 
 



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where:  
BVi,j,t is the Equity Book Value of the listed firm i headquartered in the region j in 
the year t, and  
DIk,j is the Disposable Income of the household k living in the region j in the year t. 
R&D Research and development expense. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01201)  
R&D_D Equal to one if the firm does not report R&D, and zero otherwise 
R&D to Sales The ratio of R&D to Sales. 
Return Skewness The yearly skewness of weekly stock returns’ distribution. The statistic has been 
estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly observations. Source: Datastream 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Return Skewness_D Equal to one if Return Skewness is less than the yearly cross-sectional median, and 
zero otherwise. 
Return Kurtosis The yearly kurtosis of weekly stock returns’ distribution. The statistic has been 
estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly observations. Source: Datastream 
Return Kurtosis_D Equal to one if Return Kurtosis is greater the yearly cross-sectional median, and 
zero otherwise. Source: Datastream. 
Return Star_D The product of Return Skewness_D and Return Kurtosis_D. 
ROE The ratio of firm’s net profit income to the Equity Book Value. Source: Datastream 
(datatype: DWRE) 
Sales Net sales or revenues. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01001) 
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4. Methods  
4.1. Multivariate regressions 
The evidence that firms’ market price is affected by the local market conditions of the 
area in which the company is headquartered would confirm the existence of the local home 
bias. Indeed, following HKS2008, it is possible to state that if actually traders invest mainly 
on nearby companies, in regions with a scarcity of stocks supply the excess of local demand 
over the few securities locally available should push their price up. Therefore, a higher 
evaluation of securities in areas characterized by the unbalance between (low) local supply 
and (high) local demand would confirm the existence of locally segmented markets. As 
already stated, once highlighted the existence of the local home bias, this research main goal 
is to analyze the causes driving the phenomenon under observation by analyzing which firms 
this effect is more relevant for. 
In order to conduct this study it is first of all fundamental to build a Base Model able 
to relate the under- or overvaluation of the stocks from time to time considered with the local 
market conditions (i.e. the unbalance between local demand and supply of stocks) which 
would impact on stock prices. Given that, as stated in Section 3, the variable able to express 
the under- or overvaluation of securities has been identified in the (natural logarithm) of the 
Market-to-Book Ratio, and the unbalance between local demand and supply of stocks is 
proxied by HKS2008 RATIO, the primary specification that I test is the following  
 
Ln(Market-to-Book Ratio)i,t=α + β1*RATIOi,t + control variablesi,t + εi,t 
 
where the control variables are represented by ROE, R&D_D, R&D to Sales, (the natural 
logarithm of) Firm Size, (the natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) 
Firm Age, and (the natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) Press 
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Coverage. Though not reported for sake of simplicity, regression also includes a set of four-
digit SIC industry dummies (Fertuck (1975)), a set of dummies for exchange segment listing 
(Kadlec and McConnell (1994)), and a set of year dummies. This study’s Base Model differs 
from the model presented by HKS2008 (see Model 10 of Table 6), that did not present (the 
natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) Press Coverage and (the natural 
logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) Firm Age as control variables. I 
introduced anyway these two variables in light of Dyck and Zingales (2004) (for Press 
Coverage), and in light of Banz (1981), Evans (1987), Fama and French (1993), and 
Keloharju and Kulp (1996) (with regard to Firm Age). Supporting this methodological 
approach, results presented in Section 5 show that in the model with the additional control 
variables both estimates are more significant and the adjusted R-squared is higher (in this 
sense, adjusted R-squared equals to 0.447 and to 0.358 in the Base Model and in the 
HKS2008 model respectively). 
In order to study the factors which the local home bias depends from, and to 
discriminate and assess the cross-sectional local rarity/abundance effect among firms, I 
introduce in the Base Model a set of interaction terms with the main exogenous RATIO, 
which are calculated as RATIO*dummy variable, where RATIO is the RATIO variable as 
described in Section 3.2.2, and dummy variable assumes value one for the firms with the 
characteristics proxied by the dummy from time to time considered, and zero otherwise. 
Thus, the second specification that I test is the following 
 
Ln(Market-to-Book Ratio)i,t =α + β1*RATIOi,t + β2*RATIOi,t *dummy variablei,t + control 
variablesi,t + εi,t 
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In such a framework, while the coefficient of the interaction term (β2) estimates the additional 
rarity/abundance effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio due to the firm’s 
characteristic proxied by the dummy variable, the coefficient of the RATIO (β1) estimates the 
average rarity/abundance effect for the entire sample once eliminated the effect proxied by 
the dummy. It follows that the overall rarity/abundance effect attributable to the firm’s 
characteristics identified by the dichotomous variable is given by the sum of the two 
coefficients β1 and β2. To provide a more explicit example of the meaning of these 
coefficients, let us consider the impact on the local home bias effect of firms’ visibility 
(assuming that visibility is proxied by the Press Coverage_D variable as defined in Section 
3.2.3.), through the regression: 
 
Ln(Market-to-Book Ratio)i,t =α + β1*RATIOi,t + β2*RATIOi,t*Press Coverage_Di,t + control 
variablesi,t + εi,t 
 
In this case, the coefficient (β2) of the variable RATIO*Press Coverage_D estimates the 
additional rarity/abundance effect for firms for which the yearly number of articles 
concerning the company is higher than the yearly cross-sectional median, i.e. visible firms. 
Again, the coefficient of RATIO (β1) estimates the average rarity/abundance effect for the 
entire sample but firms whose dummy Press Coverage_D equals one: it follows that the 
overall rarity/abundance effect attributable to firm’s visibility is given by the sum of the two 
coefficients β1 and β2. 
Similarly, in order to estimate the additional and overall local rarity/abundance effect 
attributable to firm’s opacity given the firm’s profitability, i.e. for both profitable and opaque 
firms, I introduced in the Base Model more than one interaction term. In this sense, I test a 
third specification equal to  
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Ln(Market-to-Book Ratio)i,t=α + β1*RATIOi,t + β2*RATIOi,t*profitability dummyi,t + 
β3*RATIOi,t*profitability dummyi,t*opacity dummyi,t + control variablesi,t + εi,t 
 
where RATIO*profitability dummy represents the interaction term associated to profitable 
firms, and RATIO*profitability dummy*opacity dummy is a second interaction term 
accounting for the effect of RATIO on the market-to-book value of both profitable and 
opaque firms. As already mentioned, RATIO is the RATIO variable as described in Section 
3.2.2., while profitability dummy and opacity dummy, assume value one for profitable and 
opaque firms respectively, and zero otherwise (see Section 3.2.4.). In this case, the coefficient 
of the RATIO (β1) estimates the average rarity/abundance effect for non-profitable and non-
opaque firms, the coefficient of the first interaction term (β2) estimates the additional effect of 
the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio attributable to profitable but non-opaque firms, and 
the coefficient of the second interaction term (β3) assess the further additional effect 
attributable to both profitable and opaque firms. Finally, following this line of reasoning, the 
overall rarity/abundance effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio for each class of 
firms is given by the sum of β1, β2, and/or β3 suitably selected. Therefore, the overall effect 
attributable to profitable and non opaque companies will be defined as the sum of β1 and β2, 
while the total effect referred to both profitable and opaque firms is computed as the sum of 
β1, β2, and β3. 
For control purposes, along with each interaction term, I introduced in the Base 
Model, when not collinear with the other exogenous already included (e.g. in Model 4, but 
not in Model 5 of Table 21), the corresponding interacting dummy. The introduction of the 
dummy variables themselves allows to exclude that the effect highlighted from time to time 
by the interaction terms is driven by the interacting dummy itself (whose effect is represented 
by the corresponding estimator), being actually the additional rarity/abundance effect 
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generated by the local market conditions (i.e. RATIO variable) for firms for which the 
dummy is equal to one. In this sense, exception is represented by the interacting dummies 
Press Coverage_D, Press Coverage Lag_D, and Press Coverage Star_D. Indeed, as (the 
natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) Press Coverage is by construction 
already included in all regressions (see Dyck and Zingales (2004)), the further introduction in 
the model of a dummy (i.e. either Press Coverage_D or Press Coverage Lag_D or Press 
Coverage Star_D) derived by the control variable would generate multicollinearity the among 
the two factors. For this reason, as (the natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one 
and) Press Coverage presents an higher explanatory power, already taking in the informations 
of the dummy variable itself, this latter variable has not been introduced in the model. 
Multivariate analysis is carried on at regional level (NUTS2), once I have observed 
the descriptive statistics reported and discussed later on in the following section. However, 
for descriptive purposes, I include in the summary statistics also the RATIO calculated at 
macro-area (NUTS1) and country (NUTS0) level. Beyond the statistics, the regional level 
(NUTS2) has two main advantages if compared to the NUTS3 (provinces) and NUTS1 
(macro-areas). First, the average (median) surface of the Italian regions corresponds to the 
4.97 (5.79) percent of the whole Italian territory, which is approximately the same critical 
area (cf. the 5.28 percent of the U.S. surface) that Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find 
effective in distinguishing local (and they find better informed) investors from the non-local 
(and they find worse informed) ones. Second, the regional sub-division of the Italian territory 
is the one that closely represents its historical and cultural pre-unification division. Therefore, 
according to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Morse and Shive (2011)’s arguments, it’s 
the more likely to capture an eventual persistent cultural equity-market segmentation which 
should exacerbate behavioral dynamics underlying the local home bias phenomenon. Finally, 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) with specific reference to the Italian context, give 
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proofs of the positive effects of the regional financial development on the economic success 
of the same geographical area. Hence, a priori, the regional sub-division of the Italian 
territory allows to indirectly control also for the eventual credit market segmentation. Taken 
together, these evidences suggest that the regional sub-division is likely to be the more 
effective in capturing the eventual equity-market segmentations caused by information 
advantages and/or perceived familiarity. Finally, in light of Petersen’s (2009) argument, I 
cluster standard errors at regional level. 
In light both of the variables used (see Section 3.) and of the methodology followed in 
the study, Table 17 reports summary statistics on firms, stock returns, and abnormal accruals 
characteristics (Panel A), as well as the correlation matrix of the variables involved in the 
multivariate analysis (Panel B). In detail, Panel B groups the different sets of variables (i.e. 
visibility dummies, profitability dummy, opacity dummies and control variables as well as 
RATIO and Market-to-Book Ratio) and highlights the high correlation among the dummies 
belonging to the same group. In this sense, the inclusion in the multivariate regressions of 
highly correlated variables would cause multicollinearity in the model, and would generate 
several problems which can be summarized as: 
- large standard errors of the affected coefficients. In this case the test of the hypothesis 
that the coefficient is equal to zero leads to reject the null hypothesis, thus leading to 
the conclusion that there is no relationship between dependent and independent 
variable even when actually a relationship exists; 
- estimates are not able to distinguish the specific effects of the correlated regressors. 
This evidence basically highlights the impossibility to build a regression model able to 
contain simultaneously all the visibility (or opacity) specifications involved in the analysis, as 
well as the difficulty to simultaneously consider the effect of RATIO on Market-to-Book 
Ratio for both visible and profitable and opaque companies by choosing only one variable 
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representative for the characteristic of interest. These observations increase the interest in the 
methodology of the principal component analysis (thereafter also PCA), whose procedure is 
reported in the following section. 
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Table 17 – Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A reports summary statistics on firm, stock returns and abnormal accruals characteristics, while Panel B 
reports the correlation matrix of the variables involved in multivariate analysis. The sample consists of 2,463 
observations on firms issuing ordinary shares at Milan Stock Exchange from 1999 to 2007and headquartered 
within the Italian territory. Observations on financial firms, whose one-digit SIC Codes of 6, are here excluded 
from the sample. Market-to-Book Ratio is the ratio of Equity Market Value to Equity Book Value. RATIO is the 
ratio of the aggregate Equity Book Value of firms headquartered in a given Italian region to the aggregate 
Disposable Income (less Equity Income) of the households living in the same region. Press Coverage is the 
yearly number of newspaper articles concerning the correspondent firm. Firm Age is the number of years since 
the firm’s foundation. R&D to Sales is the ratio of R&D to Sales. ROE is the ratio of net profit income to the 
Equity Book Value. Firm Size is the value of total asset. FTSE_D equals one if the firm is included in the Italian 
equity-market primary index, and zero otherwise. No of Employee is the number of both full and part time 
employees of the company. IPO_D equals one if the firm did the IPO within the past two years, and zero 
otherwise. Alpha is the 1-factor Jensen’s alpha. Return Skewness is the yearly skewness of the distribution of 
the weekly stock returns. Return Kurtosis is the yearly kurtosis of the distribution of the weekly stock returns. 
Abs DiscAccruals is the absolute value of Abnormal Accruals. Ms3 DiscAccruals is the prior three years’ sum 
of Abnormal Accruals. No of Employees_D equals one if No of Employees is greater than the yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise. Press Coverage_D equals one if Press Coverage is greater than the yearly 
cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Press Coverage Lag_D equals one if Press Coverage Lag is greater 
than the correspondent yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Press Coverage Star_D is equal to 
Press Coverage_D*Press Coverage Lag_D. Alphat+1 Good_D equals one if Alpha in the following year is 
greater than zero, and zero otherwise. Return Skewness_D equals one if Return Skewness is less than the yearly 
cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Return Kurtosis_D equals one if Return Kurtosis is greater than the 
yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Return Star_D is equal to Return Skewness_D*Return 
Kurtosis_D. Abs DiscAccruals_D equals one if Abs DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional 
median, and zero otherwise. Ms3 DiscAccruals_D equals one if Ms3 DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly 
cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A – Summary statistics 
    Mean   Median   25th Percentile   75th Percentile 
Firm characteristic 
        
Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
2.36 
 
1.73 
 
1.14 
 
2.66 
RATIO 
 
0.19 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
 
0.26 
Press Coverage 
 
28.81 
 
13.00 
 
7.00 
 
23.00 
Firm Age (Years) 
 
39.00 
 
24.00 
 
12.00 
 
56.00 
R&D to Sales 
 
3.10% 
 
1.65% 
 
0.34% 
 
4.55% 
ROE 
 
4.01% 
 
6.68% 
 
0.09% 
 
13.47% 
Firm Size (Millions of Euro) 
 
3,129 
 
363 
 
137 
 
1,410 
FTSE_D 
 
0.10 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
No of Employees 
 
6,157 
 
1,142 
 
353 
 
3,271 
IPO_D 
 
0.16 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
         
Stock Return characteristic 
        
Alpha 
 
0.12% 
 
0.06% 
 
-0.30% 
 
0.47% 
Return Skewness 
 
0.543 
 
0.399 
 
-0.044 
 
0.992 
Return Kurtosis 
 
5.710 
 
4.438 
 
3.382 
 
6.470 
         
Abnormal Accruals characteristic 
        
Abs DiscAccruals 
 
0.075 
 
0.044 
 
0.021 
 
0.085 
Ms3 DiscAccruals 
 
0.209 
 
0.150 
 
0.094 
 
0.254 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Panel B – Correlation Matrix: Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient 
                    
  
Log(Marke
t-to-Book 
Ratio) 
RATIO FTSE_D 
No of 
Employees_
D 
Press 
Coverage_
D 
Press 
Coverage 
Lag_D 
Press 
Coverage 
Star_D 
IPO_D 
Alphat+1 
Good_D 
Return 
Skewness_
D 
Return 
Kurtosis_D 
Return 
Star_D 
Abs 
DiscAccrua
ls_D 
Ms3 
DiscAccrua
ls_D 
Log(Press 
Coverage) 
Log(Firm 
Age) 
R&D to 
Sales 
ROE 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
                    
Dependent Variable       
    
      
   
  
     
Log(Market-to-Book 
Ratio) 
1     
    
      
   
  
     
Independent Variables       
    
      
   
  
     
RATIO -0.0089 1                                   
Visibility Dummies       
    
      
   
  
     
FTSE_D 0.2129*** 0.1966*** 1 
    
      
   
  
     
No of Employees_D 0.0552** -0.0106 0.3152*** 1 
   
      
   
  
     
Press Coverage_D 0.2602*** 0.0459* 0.3334*** 0.4221*** 1 
  
      
   
  
     
Press Coverage Lag_D 0.2242*** 0.0367 0.3136*** 0.4222*** 0.6033*** 1 
 
      
   
  
     
Press Coverage Star_D 0.2501*** 0.0616** 0.3857*** 0.4585*** 0.8355*** 0.7985*** 1       
   
  
     
IPO_D 0.1794*** -0.0390 -0.0723*** -0.1282*** 0.1070*** -0.0579** -0.0391 1                       
Profitability Dummy       
    
      
   
  
     
Alphat+1 Good_D -0.1197*** -0.0177 -0.0088 0.0085 -0.0271 -0.0232 -0.0208 -0.0252 1                     
Opacity Dummies       
    
      
   
  
     
Return Skewness_D -0.0242 0.0473* 0.1696*** 0.2247*** 0.1393*** 0.1340*** 0.1434*** -0.0460* 0.0151 1 
   
  
     
Return Kurtosis_D -0.0372 -0.0298 -0.1270*** -0.1786*** -0.1172*** -0.1213*** -0.1416*** 0.0403 -0.0012 -0.3198*** 1 
  
  
     
Return Star_D -0.0735*** -0.0039 0.0109 0.0923*** 0.0346 0.0346 0.0189 -0.0120 0.0180 0.4705*** 0.4292*** 1 
 
  
     
Abs DiscAccruals_D -0.0345 -0.0062 -0.0490* 0.0302 -0.0284 -0.0118 -0.0431 0.0369 -0.0005 0.0322 -0.0504** 0.0131 1   
     
Ms3 DiscAccruals_D -0.0576* 0.0075 -0.0093 0.0653*** 0.0043 0.0227 0.0036 0.0139 0.0116 0.0480* -0.0533** 0.0046 0.6696*** 1           
Control Variables       
    
      
   
  
     
Log(Press Coverage) 0.3025*** 0.0668*** 0.4565*** 0.4859*** 0.8658*** 0.6600*** 0.7919*** 0.0797*** -0.0212 0.1564*** -0.1334*** 0.0410 -0.0063  0.0093 1 
    
Log(Firm Age) -0.2440*** 0.1056*** 0.0381 0.1585*** -0.1564*** -0.1024*** -0.0931*** -0.3046*** 0.0655*** 0.0671*** -0.0269 0.0498** 0.0766*** 0.0737*** -0.1602*** 1 
   
R&D to Sales -0.0014 0.0117 0.2178*** 0.1341*** 0.0678*** 0.0856*** 0.0785*** -0.0300 0.0258 0.0868*** -0.0514** 0.0440* -0.0124  -0.0067 0.1147*** 0.1068*** 1 
  
ROE 0.3098*** 0.0439* 0.2043*** 0.2171*** 0.1539*** 0.1185*** 0.1660*** 0.0217 0.1181*** 0.1602*** -0.1928*** -0.0069 0.0041  -0.0036 0.1713*** 0.0562** 0.0564** 1 
 
Log(Firm Size) 0.0278 0.1058*** 0.4856*** 0.7489*** 0.5407*** 0.5194*** 0.5900*** -0.1173*** 0.0328 0.2675*** -0.2444*** 0.0630** -0.0043  0.0182 0.6418*** 0.1498*** 0.1483*** 0.2829*** 1 
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4.2. PCA – Principal Component Analysis 
In order to provide comprehensive evidence of the role exerted by firm’s visibility, 
profitability and opacity in determining the investors’ preference for local, and therefore to 
simultaneously capture the rational and the behavioral root of local bias, I merged the analysis 
before described by applying the principal component analysis (PCA) to visibility (PCA_Visibility) 
and opacity (PCA_Opacity) variables. In this sense, PCA is an ideal tool since allows to reduce the 
number of visibility and opacity proxies implicitly preserving the information content in each set of 
variables, and allows to remove the possible correlation among them (see Table 17, Panel B). In this 
sense, PCA is often used to convert a set of correlated variables (where a few sources of 
information in data are common to many variables) into a set of uncorrelated ones (named principal 
components), allowing to extract the most important sources of variation in a multivariate system, 
and reducing the dimension of the system itself. Indeed, the number of original variables is more 
than or at least equal to the number of principal components emerging from the PCA, which are 
defined in a way that the first principal component has the highest possible variance (i.e. accounts 
for the greatest possible variability of the data), while the second and the following principal 
component explain the greatest amount of the remaining variation under the constraint to be 
uncorrelated (i.e. orthogonal) with the previous ones. This approach increases the computational 
efficiency resulting from the lack of correlation among the principal components, and reduces the 
dimension of the system by taking only the principal components with the greatest explanatory 
power.  
Computationally, PCA is a mathematical rather than statistical technique, as its application 
is deterministic and it is possible to find only one solution for each set of variables. Indeed, in a 
system with p variables and n statistical units, PCA equation corresponds to: 
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where C is a is a nxp matrix of principal components scores, with a column for each principal 
component (i.e. p columns) and one row for each statistical unit (i.e. n rows), X is the nxp data 
matrix and A is the pxp matrix of component loadings. As mentioned above, PCA needs that the 
component scores are uncorrelated across components, thus implying  
         , which equals to             ,     , and                  
PCA goal is to compute A. Following Krzanowski (2000), for each component holds the following 
relationship 
          
            
        
that explains the relationship between data variability and the variability of the components. Thus, 
the objective of the procedure is to find the    vectors that maximize the right side of the last 
equation under the constraints on C and A, by starting from the component with the largest variance 
(i.e. the first principal component) and concluding with the one whose variability is lower (i.e. the 
last principal component). Vectors    are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, while    are the 
corresponding eigenvalues. Both eigenvalues and eigenvectors can be defined algebraically and are 
unique. The sum of the eigenvalues equals to the total variance of the original set of variables. 
According to this procedure, the overall variability of the p principal components is equal to the 
total variability of the original variables. Thus, PCAs start by identifying p principal components 
which are a linear combination of the original p variables, and that are uncorrelated (i.e. orthogonal) 
among each other. In a second step, the procedure allows to identify a sub-set of principal 
component. At this regard, the issue is to choose principal components without losing too many 
information as compared to the original variability. In this sense, eigenvalues can be used as a 
criterion to define the number of principal components to use in the analysis. However, literature so 
far identified rules of thumb rather than objective techniques (see Kaiser (1960); Jolliffe (1972)); a 
common approach (Kaiser’s rule on eigenvalues, Kaiser (1960)) for instance is to retain only those 
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components with an eigenvalue larger than the average, i.e. larger than one. This is also the 
approach used in this study. 
In the present work, multivariate analysis shows that all the proxies for visibility and opacity 
involved in the study and singularly considered effectively have an impact on the phenomenon 
under observation (i.e. the pattern exists for all the proxies of visibility/opacity). PCA overcomes 
the difficulty to choose only one variable for both visibility and opacity to simultaneously capture 
the informational and the irrational root of local home bias. Indeed, in line with what argued so far, 
it synthesizes the single dummies proxy for firm visibility (opacity) in a unique principal 
component accounting for the greatest possible variability of the data. To provide a more intuitive 
and explanatory example, let’s consider the high correlation existing among the dummies proxy for 
firms’ visibility (see Table 17 – Panel B). Their correlation implies, in row words, that they tend to 
go in the same direction: for instance, a firm included in the primary Italian equity-market index 
(whose FTSE_D equals one) will hardly have a low level of press coverage (thus having, for 
instance, also Press Coverage_D equal to one). Starting from these evidences, PCA captures the few 
sources of information that are common to the many variables by synthesizing all the dummies 
proxy for visibility in a unique variable, that may be considered as an optimal proxy for visibility.  
Using PCAs, I isolated three significant principal components: PC1_Visibility which 
increases with the degree of firm’s visibility, PC1_Opacity which increases with the degree of 
firm’s opacity measured on the basis of the accounting variables, and PC2_Opacity which increases 
with the degree of firm’s opacity measured on the basis of market variables. Table 18 provides 
results from the principal component analysis on the original variables used to proxy firm’s 
visibility (Table 18 - Panel A - PCA Visibility) and firm’s opacity (Table 18 - Panel B - PCA 
Opacity). Entries of Table 18 in both Panel A and Panel B are the value of eigenvectors from the 
regression of each visibility (opacity) variable on each principal component (PC). In addition, for 
each principal component, the correspondent eigenvalue and the percentage of the total variation 
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implicit in each set of variables explained are reported (see next-to-last and last row of each table 
respectively). In PCA – Visibility (Table 18 - Panel A), IPO_D has been dropped since, once 
introduced, make it harder the identification of PC1_Visibility: the eigenvectors’ pattern of 
PC1_visibility was non-monotonic, as might be expected given the negative and significant 
correlation of IPO_D with FTSE_D and Press Coverage Lag (see Table 17 – Panel B). No of 
Employees, Press Coverage and Press Coverage Lag are taken with logs; results of PCA-Visibility 
still hold with the row version of these variables. In light of Kaiser’s rule on eigenvalues (see 
Kaiser, 1960), the first principal component (PC1_Visibility) is the only significant (correspondent 
eigenvalue greater than one, and equal to 2.8998). Indeed, PC1_Visibility alone accounts for about 
the 72.50 percent of the overall variation implicit in the visibility variables (equal to the ratio of the 
eigenvalue corresponding to PC1_Visibility component to the sum of the eigenvalues referred to 
each principal component). PC1_Visibility shows positive eigenvectors, therefore it directly proxies 
for the firm’s visibility. As can be observed from Table 18 - Panel B, for PCA – Opacity, both the 
first (PC1_Opacity) and the second (PC2_Opacity) principal component are significant 
(correspondent eigenvalue greater than one and equal to 1.7669 and 1.6632 respectively). In detail, 
PC1_Opacity accounts for about the 44.17 percent and PC2_Opacity for the 41.58 percent of the 
overall variation implicit in the opacity’s variables. Since PC1_Opacity shows highest eigenvectors 
for Abs DiscAccruals and Ms3 DiscAccruals, it directly proxies for the firm’s opacity measured by 
accounting information. Similarly, since PC2_Opacity shows highest eigenvectors for Return 
Skewness and Return Kurtosis, it directly proxies for the firm’s opacity measured by market returns 
information, and against accounting opacity. 
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Table 18 – Firm’s Visibility and Firm’s Opacity: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
Table 18 provides results from the principal component analysis (PCA) of the original variables used to proxy firm’s 
visibility (Panel A - PCA Visibility) and firm’s opacity (Panel B - PCA Opacity). 
 
Panel A – PCA Visibility  
Variable   PC1_Visibility PC2_Visibility PC3_Visibility PC4_Visibility 
      
FTSE_D 
 
0.4298 0.7504 -0.5022 . 
Log(No of Employees) 
 
0.4524 0.3023 0.8390 . 
Log(Press Coverage) 
 
0.5525 -0.4157 -0.1482 . 
Log(Press Coverage Lag) 
 
0.5525 -0.4157 -0.1482 . 
      
            
Eigenvalue 
 
2.8998 0.6008 0.4994 0.0000 
Percentage of total variance explained 
 
72.50% 15.02% 12.49% 0.00% 
 
 
Panel B – PCA  Opacity 
Variable   PC1_Opacity PC2_Opacity PC3_Opacity PC4_Opacity 
     
 Return Skewness 
 
-0.0250 0.7068 0.7055 -0.0466 
Return Kurtosis 
 
0.0051 0.7073 -0.7046 0.0576 
Abs DiscAccruals 
 
0.7069 0.0155 -0.0371 -0.7062 
Ms3 DiscAccruals 
 
0.7069 0.0045 0.0671 0.7041 
     
            
Eigenvalue 
 
1.7669 1.6632 0.3368 0.2331 
Percentage of total variance explained 
 
44.17% 41.58% 8.42% 5.83% 
 
After the application of the Principal Component Analysis, I defined the following dummy 
variables: Visible_D (Non-Visible_D) which takes on the value one if PC1_Visibility is greater 
(smaller) than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise; Opaque Acc_D which takes 
value one if PC1_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise, and 
Opaque Mrk_D, which takes on the value one if PC2_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise. I then substituted in the Base Model the variable RATIO with 
two interaction terms calculated as RATIO*Visible_D and RATIO*Non-Visible_D (Modified Base 
Model). This allows to explicitly distinguish the effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio 
(β1) for visible and non-visible firms respectively. I decided here to separate the two subsamples 
just for sake of simplicity. Finally, I progressively included in the Modified Base Model two 
interaction terms, i.e. RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D; RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1 
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Good_D, where Alphat+1 Good_D equals to one if Alpha in the forthcoming year is bigger than 
zero, and zero otherwise These additional interaction terms are designed to capture the incremental 
effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio (β2) due to firm’s profitability for visible and 
non-visible firms respectively. Following the same logic, with respect to this latter model I added 
two further interaction terms (i.e. RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D*Opaque_D; RATIO*Non-
Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D*Opaque_D) designed to capture the additive effect of the RATIO on 
the Market-to-Book Ratio due to firm’s opacity given its firm’s profitability (β3), for visible and 
non-visible firms respectively. In this case, Opaque_D represents Opaque Acc_D or Opaque Mrk_D 
alternatively. Once again, in line with the methodology of the study, the overall rarity/abundance 
effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio for each class of firms is given by sum of β1, β2, 
and/or β3 suitably selected.  
The inclusion in the same regression of both the dummy corresponding to the variable 
PC1_Visibility and the dummy corresponding to the variable PC1_Opacity (or PC2_Opacity) 
allows to exclude that the effect previously highlighted for instance for non-visible firms (i.e. the 
non-informative component of local home bias) is in part due to the opacity characteristic that non-
visible firms may have. Indeed, firms not included in the FTSE MIB Index very likely are also more 
opaque than those included in the index; therefore, the effect which in the multivariate regressions 
separately accounting for firm visibility and opacity may seems to be driven by company’s non-
visibility, might be actually generated by the firm’s opacity. In this sense, the inclusion of both the 
visibility and opacity variables derived by the PCA allows to control for the possible correlation 
that might exist among firm’s visibility, profitability and opacity, and – conferring robustness to the 
previous analysis’ findings – further confirms the research hypotheses. Moreover, the 
contemporaneous presence of both visibility and opacity proxies in the same model allows to 
compare the effects of the interactions among these dummy variables to estimate the relative 
importance of the single effects (i.e. of firm’s visibility, profitability, and opacity). Indeed, the 
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overall effect of local home bias due to firm’s (non-)visibility, profitability and opacity will be 
defined as sum of β1, β2, and β3, while the effect related solely to firm non-visibility is determined 
by the coefficient β1 referred to the interacting term RATIO*Non-Visible_D. In this sense, I am 
able to decompose the aggregate results obtained through this last regression, thus splitting the local 
bias effect in its rational and irrational component. Table 19 reports more detailed definitions of the 
PCA variables included in the study. 
 
Table 19 – PCA variables definition 
Table 19 defines the PCA variables used in the study, alphabetically listed.  
Variable Description 
  Non-Visible_D Equal to one if PC1_Visibility is less than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise 
Opaque Acc_D Equal to one if PC1_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise 
Opaque Mrk_D Equal to one if PC2_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise 
PC1_Opacity The first principal component from PCA of Return Skewness, Return Kurtosis, Abs 
DiscAccruals, Ms3 DiscAccruals 
PC1_Visibility The first principal component from PCA of FTSE_D, Log(No of Employees), Log(Press 
Coverage), and Log(Press Coverage Lag) 
PC2_Opacity The second principal component from PCA of Return Skewness, Return Kurtosis, Abs 
DiscAccruals, Ms3 DiscAccruals 
Visible_D Equal to one if PC1_Visibility is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise 
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics: The geographical distribution of Italian listed firms and RATIO 
The underlying intuition of the paper can be drawn from Table 20 and Figure 2, which 
respectively report and depict data on the demand and supply of stocks in the Italian equity-
market. In detail, Table 20 provides summary statistics about the geographical characteristics 
of the Italian equity-market over the period 1999-2007. Panel A reports summary statistics on 
the yearly regional distribution of Italian listed firms (N by Region), the local supply for 
stocks (Equity Book Value by Region), the local demand for stocks (Disposable Income by 
Region), and the ratio between the last two variables (RATIO). Panel B displays the value 
over time of RATIO at country level (NUTS0), macro-area level (NUTS1), and regional level 
(NUTS2) along with both the cross-sectional and the time-series means and standard 
deviations, while Panel C reports the geographic distribution of visible, profitable and opaque 
firms for the same NUTS levels. Moreover, Figure 2 reports the value of the endogenous 
variable RATIO at regional level, and gives an overview of the geographical distribution of 
the non-financial firms included in the sample, by distinguishing among visible (I quadrant), 
profitable (II quadrant), and both opaque and profitable firms (III quadrant).  
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Table 20 – The regional demand and supply for stocks and RATIO 
Panel A reports summary statistics on the regional distribution of Italian listed firms and Disposable Income. 
Panel B reports the yearly values of RATIO calculated at region (NUTS2), macro-area (NUTS1), and country 
(NUTS0) levels over the period 1999-2007, as wells as the time-series and cross-sectional means and standard 
deviations. Panel C report the headquarter location of Italian listed firms according to their visibility, 
profitability and opacity at region (NUTS2), macro-area (NUTS1), and country level (NUTS0).  The sample 
consists of 2,463 observations on firms issuing ordinary shares traded at MSE over the period 1999-2007 and 
headquartered within the Italian territory. Financial firms are defined as those companies whose SIC code first 
digit equals 6. Visible firms are defined on the subsample of non-financial firms. Profitable and opaque firms 
are defined on the subsample non-financial firms accounting for at least 25 weekly return observations. CV 
stands for Coefficient of Variation. N by Region is the number of listed firms located in each Italian region. 
Equity Book Value by Region is the sum of Equity Book Value of the firms located in each Italian region. 
Disposable Income by Region is the sum of Disposable Income (less Equity Income) of the households resident 
in each Italian region. RATIO is the ratio of Equity Book Value by Region to Disposable Income by Region. 
FTSE_D equals one if the firm is included in the Italian equity-market’s primary index, and zero otherwise. No 
of Employees_D equals one if No of Employees is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise. Press Coverage_D equals one if Press Coverage is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and 
zero otherwise. Press Coverage Lag_D equals one if Press Coverage Lag is greater than the correspondent 
yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Press Coverage Star_D is equal to Press Coverage_D*Press 
Coverage Lag_D. IPO_D equals one if the firm did the IPO within the past two years, and zero otherwise. 
Visible_D equals one if PC1_Visibility is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. 
Alphat+1Good_D equals one if Alpha in the following year is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. Return 
Skewness_D equals one if Return Skewness is less than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. 
Return Kurtosis_D equals one if Return Kurtosis is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise. Return Star_D is equal to Return Skewness_D*Return Kurtosis_D. Opaque Acc_D equals one if 
PC1_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Abs DiscAccruals_D equals 
one if Abs DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise. Ms3 
DiscAccruals_D equals one if Ms3 DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise. Opaque Mrk_D equals one if PC2_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise. Italian territory’s sub-areas have been indentified according to NUTS codes. Exception is represented 
by the region Trentino Alto Adige whose data are obtained by aggregating the data on the two autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano-Bozen. NUTS stands for Nomenclature for the Statistics Territorial Units.  
 
Panel A: Italian listed Firm and Income Regional Distribution 
Year   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1999-2007 
            
N of listed firms 255 285 284 284 261 258 265 277 294 2463 
N by Region 
 
Mean 12.75 14.25 14.20 14.20 13.05 12.90 13.25 13.85 14.70 13.68 
 
Median 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.00 1.83 
 
25th Percentile 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
 
75th Percentile 12.75 16.25 16.25 18.00 16.75 16.50 16.75 16.50 18.00 16.53 
 
CV 1.94 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.97 1.92 1.93 1.90 1.97 1.94 
Equity Book Value by Region (/000,000€) 
 
Mean 12,062 13,350 13,545 12,926 13,287 13,789 17,549 18,069 20,692 15,030 
 
Median 306 499 674 431 296 237 275 900 962 604 
 
25th Percentile 67 56 64 0 20 17 0 0 0 74 
 
75th Percentile 7,865 9,746 10,299 8,911 10,488 11,372 14,852 15,859 16,495 11,573 
 
CV 2.01  1.95  2.00  1.98  2.04  2.02  1.93  1.89  2.00  1.93  
Disposable Income by Region (/000,000€) 
 
Mean 38,754 40,691 42,724 45,023 46,350 47,885 49,226 50,714 52,672 46,004 
 
Median 22,541 23,458 24,809 26,487 26,991 27,604 28,583 29,262 30,391 26,681 
 
25th Percentile 15,327 16,382 16,785 17,507 17,680 18,216 18,656 19,352 20,207 17,779 
 
75th Percentile 57,430 60,144 63,221 67,425 68,757 70,490 72,327 74,254 76,794 67,863 
 
CV 0.91  0.91  0.92  0.91  0.91  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  
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Table 20 (continued) 
RATIO 
 
Mean 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.19 
 
Median 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
25th Percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
75th Percentile 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.26 
 
CV 1.73 1.58 1.52 1.52 1.50 1.50 1.61 1.60 1.69 1.49 
            
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for RATIO, 1999-2007 
Year   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   1999-2007 
           
Time-series Mean S.D. 
NUTS0 - Country                           
Italy 
 
0.311 0.328 0.317 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.357 0.356 0.393 
 
0.325 0.037 
                            
NUTS1 - Macro-Area 
Centre 
 
0.424 0.462 0.471 0.449 0.445 0.461 0.522 0.513 0.724 
 
0.497 0.091 
Islands 
 
0.004 0.034 0.018 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.018 0.019 
 
0.013 0.010 
North East 
 
0.127 0.143 0.145 0.133 0.136 0.140 0.185 0.189 0.222 
 
0.158 0.033 
North West 
 
0.619 0.636 0.597 0.530 0.528 0.513 0.661 0.659 0.610 
 
0.595 0.057 
South 
 
0.012 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
0.003 0.003 
Cross-Sectional Mean 
 
0.237 0.255 0.246 0.225 0.224 0.224 0.275 0.277 0.316 
   
Cross-Sectional S.D. 
 
0.273 0.280 0.272 0.249 0.248 0.247 0.302 0.297 0.335 
   
 
NUTS2 - Region 
Abruzzo 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.001 
Aosta Valley 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Apulia 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
0.002 0.003 
Basilicata 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Calabria 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Campania 
 
0.027 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
0.005 0.008 
Emilia-Romagna 
 
0.126 0.140 0.142 0.094 0.102 0.098 0.179 0.198 0.215 
 
0.144 0.045 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
 
0.436 0.521 0.525 0.402 0.425 0.458 0.533 0.584 0.584 
 
0.496 0.068 
Lazio 
 
0.812 0.856 0.874 0.861 0.815 0.834 0.948 0.918 1.360 
 
0.920 0.171 
Liguria 
 
0.387 0.409 0.421 0.494 0.518 0.539 1.259 1.343 0.105 
 
0.608 0.413 
Lombardy 
 
0.431 0.500 0.578 0.515 0.572 0.552 0.664 0.645 0.569 
 
0.559 0.071 
Marche 
 
0.023 0.040 0.050 0.049 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.062 0.063 
 
0.045 0.012 
Molise 
 
0.037 0.035 0.032 0.061 0.042 0.039 0.030 0.025 0.036 
 
0.037 0.010 
Piedmont 
 
1.147 1.049 0.722 0.594 0.449 0.430 0.457 0.466 0.903 
 
0.691 0.279 
Sardinia 
 
0.008 0.121 0.058 0.030 0.020 0.014 0.014 0.066 0.068 
 
0.044 0.037 
Sicily 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.002 0.002 
Trentino Alto Adige 
 
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.002 0.003 
Tuscany 
 
0.116 0.162 0.160 0.132 0.180 0.194 0.216 0.220 0.225 
 
0.178 0.039 
Umbria 
 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 
0.009 0.002 
Veneto 
 
0.073 0.077 0.080 0.129 0.123 0.128 0.140 0.120 0.182 
 
0.117 0.035 
Cross-Sectional Mean 
 
0.182 0.196 0.183 0.169 0.165 0.167 0.225 0.233 0.216 
   
Cross-Sectional S.D. 
 
0.314 0.309 0.277 0.256 0.247 0.251 0.363 0.373 0.366 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Panel C: Visible, Profitable and Opaque Firms by Region, 1999-2007 
Year 1999-2007 
 
Listed Firms 
 
Visible Firms 
 
Profitable Firms 
 
Opaque Firms 
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NUTS0 - Country 
                     
Italy 
 
2463 1809   168 913 861 866 676 310 1003   912   782 915 276 1242 972 1150 1006 
NUTS1 - Macro-Area                                           
Centre 
 
494 373 
 
55 186 201 204 170 54 220 
 
191 
 
162 181 53 224 185 217 201 
Islands 
 
20 17 
 
1 9 13 10 9 6 13 
 
7 
 
4 7 1 10 9 12 13 
North East 
 
510 431 
 
2 230 191 188 141 103 245 
 
225 
 
189 215 76 329 239 278 245 
North West 
 
1400 954 
 
110 472 447 453 349 147 512 
 
475 
 
415 489 141 652 518 621 523 
South 
 
39 34 
 
0 16 9 11 7 0 13 
 
14 
 
12 23 5 27 21 22 24 
NUTS2 - Region                                           
Abruzzo 
 
2 2 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
1 
 
0 2 0 2 0 0 2 
Aosta Valley 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Apulia 
 
5 2 
 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
2 
 
0 2 0 1 1 1 2 
Basilicata 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Calabria 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Campania 
 
22 20 
 
0 6 2 3 0 0 5 
 
9 
 
10 11 4 15 16 16 11 
Emilia-Romagna 
 
281 241 
 
2 112 96 90 69 67 117 
 
123 
 
101 118 39 178 145 164 127 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
 
54 43 
 
0 18 16 15 10 8 25 
 
26 
 
21 22 7 40 22 24 35 
Lazio 
 
300 243 
 
55 143 148 147 131 29 166 
 
131 
 
114 109 33 136 126 150 116 
Liguria 
 
63 34 
 
0 4 9 8 7 2 10 
 
22 
 
12 19 4 31 26 27 22 
Lombardy 
 
1033 692 
 
78 355 331 340 262 110 373 
 
337 
 
294 374 108 466 358 438 372 
Marche 
 
44 32 
 
0 25 20 18 17 6 22 
 
16 
 
15 16 9 20 12 14 14 
Molise 
 
10 10 
 
0 9 7 7 7 0 8 
 
2 
 
2 8 1 9 4 5 9 
Piedmont 
 
304 228 
 
32 113 107 105 80 35 129 
 
116 
 
109 96 29 155 134 156 129 
Sardinia 
 
11 11 
 
1 9 11 9 9 4 11 
 
5 
 
3 2 0 4 8 10 7 
Sicily 
 
9 6 
 
0 0 2 1 0 2 2 
 
2 
 
1 5 1 6 1 2 6 
Trentino Alto Adige 
 
3 3 
 
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
1 
 
1 1 0 2 3 3 0 
Tuscany 
 
141 98 
 
0 18 33 39 22 19 32 
 
44 
 
33 56 11 68 47 53 71 
Umbria 
 
9 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veneto 
 
172 144 
 
0 97 79 83 62 28 103 
 
75 
 
66 74 30 109 69 87 83 
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Figure 2 – Geographic distribution of visible, profitable and opaque (and profitable) firms 
Figure 2 reports the headquarters’ location of Visible vs. Non-Visible Firms (I Quadrant), Profitable vs. Non-Profitable Firms (II Quadrant), and Profitable and Opaque vs. 
Profitable and Non-Opaque Firms (II Quadrant). Each Italian region has been more intensely stained according to the quintiles of the average value of the RATIO over the 
period 1999 – 2007.The sample consists of 1,668 observations on non-financial firms issuing ordinary shares at Milan Stock Exchange and headquartered within the Italian 
territory over the period 1999-2007. Visible (Non-Visible) firms have been defined according to FTSE_D. Profitable (Non-Profitable) firms have been defined according to 
Alphat+1 Good_D. Opaque (Non-Opaque) firms have been defined according to Return Star_D. RATIO is the ratio of the aggregate Equity Book Value of firms 
headquartered in a given Italian region to the aggregate Disposable Income (less Equity Income) of the households living in the same region. FTSE_D equals one if the firm 
is included in the Italian equity-market primary index and zero otherwise. Alphat+1 Good_D equals one if Alpha in the following year is greater than zero and zero otherwise. 
Return Star_D is equal to Return Skewness_D*Return Kurtosis_D. Return Skewness_D equals one if Return Skewness is less than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero 
otherwise. Return Kurtosis_D equals one if Return Kurtosis is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. Italian territory’s sub-areas have been 
indentified according to NUTS codes. Exception is represented by the region Trentino Alto Adige whose data are obtained by aggregating the data on the two autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano-Bozen. NUTS stands for Nomenclature for the Statistics Territorial Units. 
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As Table 20 - Panel A highlights, Italian listed firms are highly clustered in a few 
regions. Indeed, both the yearly and the average distribution over time of the regional number 
of listed firms is extremely positively skewed: compared to an average value of almost 14 
(13.68, standard deviation equal to 0.71) firms by region over the period 1999-2007, the 
median is less than 2 (1.83, standard deviation equal to 0.61). This result suggests that the 
frequency distribution of the variable is highly positively skewed, and signals the extreme 
geographical concentration of Italian firms in a few regions. Moreover, this evidence is 
irrespective of the time period considered. A similar pattern emerges also by looking at the 
aggregate equity book value by region, that I consider as proxy for the local supply for 
stocks. Although both average and median tend to grow as time goes by, the average value 
remains over time significantly higher than the median, suggesting the cluster of the supply 
for stocks in a few areas of the country. On the other side, the regional disposable income by 
region, that proxies for the regional demand for stocks, presents average values (1999-2007 
period equal 46,004 millions of Euro) consistently similar to the median values (1999-2007 
period equal 26,681 millions of Euro) signaling a higher dispersion of the variable throughout 
the country. To statistically compare and corroborate these conclusions, I compute and report 
in the last row of each variable the coefficient of variation CV, defined as the ratio of 
standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. CV is a useful statistic to measure the 
dispersion of data points when data with means that dramatically diverge among each other 
are compared. Throughout the period, the measure remains similar with reference to both the 
number of firms and the equity book value by region (on average 1.94 and 1.93, 
respectively), while it is less than half when referred to the disposable income (on average 
0.92). In short, these evidences imply a significant right tail in the distribution of the variable 
RATIO, whose CV ranks, as expected, between those of its components (on average 1.49). 
As long as households’ disposable income and firms’ equity book value are unbiased proxies 
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for the demand and supply for stocks respectively, this evidence itself is sufficient to 
corroborate the existence of a significant geographical unbalance between the former and the 
latter in the Italian equity-market. This inequality represents the necessary pre-condition for a 
profitable application of the framework proposed by HKS2008, and the structural reason that 
makes Italy and ideal scene to test the local home bias and its asset-pricing implications.  
The detailed pattern of the RATIO variable, which expresses the above mentioned 
unbalance, is reported in Table 20 – Panel B for different NUTS levels (i.e. NUTS0 – country 
level, NUTS1 – macro-area level, and NUTS2 – region level), and with reference to each 
year of the sample period. Moreover, the variable is graphically reported at NUTS2 level in 
Figure 2, where different regions are painted with a color darkening as RATIO increases. At 
NUTS1 level, the variable presents higher values in the North West (average RATIO equal to 
0.595) and in the Centre (average RATIO equal to 0.497) of the country, where the inequality 
between demand and supply for stocks is lower with respect to the other areas such as the 
South (average RATIO equal to 0.003) and the Islands (average RATIO equal to 0.013), 
where the imbalance become manifest. These figures can be compared to the value of 0.325 
that represents the country average (NUTS0). At NUTS2 level, Lazio presents the highest 
values of the variable, averaging 0.920 over the sample period. All the regions belonging to 
the North West, such as Piedmont (0.691), Liguria (0.608), and Lombardy (0.559) contribute 
to the highest results previously reported. At the other extreme, excluding regions without 
listed firms for which RATIO obviously equals zero, Abruzzo (South) has the lowest average 
value (0.0003). Apulia (South), Sicily (Islands) and Trentino-Alto Adige (North East) follow, 
with an average RATIO equal to 0.002. Consistently with the data above reported and with 
the analysis of Section 3.2.2., as it was expected given the much more uniform territorial 
distribution of the disposable income, the pattern of the RATIO at macro-area level is stable 
over the sample period and almost entirely driven by the supply of stocks. Exception in this 
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sense is constituted by the increasing gap over time between the Centre (average RATIO 
equal to 0.497) and North East (0.158). In this case, indeed, it is worthy of note the relevant 
role played on the supply-side by the region Lazio (0.920), as a consequence of the inclusion 
of Rome, Italian capital city. On the demand side, instead, it's determinant the extremely high 
wealth that characterizes the North East which is, in fact, the richest Italian area (e.g. North 
East is the first macro-area in terms of disposable income per capita with 19,017 euro on 
yearly average over the sample period; North West come second with on average 18,940 
Euros per year). Finally, as in HKS2008, the variability of the RATIO increases as the 
analysis deepens (i.e. moving from NUTS1 to NUTS2). For robustness purposes I checked 
positively that this is not due to anomalies, as the presence of few large firms or an abnormal 
M&A’s activity, as shown in HKS2008. 
The significant imbalance between the demand and supply of stocks within the Italian 
context, as shown by the values of the RATIO variable, appears lower in the northern areas of 
the country and higher in the South and in the Islands. This result is further confirmed by the 
analysis of column 1 and 2 of Table 20 – Panel C, which provides the detailed distribution of 
Italian listed companies by considering total sample and non-financial firms for different 
NUTS levels (i.e. NUTS0 – country level, NUTS1 – macro-area level, and NUTS2 – region 
level). In detail, more than 75 percent of the whole sample (77.5 percent, corresponding to 
1910 firm-year observations), and the 76.6 percent of non-financial firms (corresponding to 
1385 firm-year observations) is headquartered in the north of the country. Specifically, the 
56.84 percent of total and the 52.74 percent of non-financial firms are in the North Western 
macro-area, while the 20.71 and the 23.83 percent respectively is in the North East. The 
southern and central Italy, excluding Lazio and including Islands, count solely for the 10.27 
percent of listed firms (10.01 percent of non-financials). The strong difference in terms of 
presence of firms’ headquarters among the north and the south of the country further 
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highlights the existence of a strong imbalance in the geographical distribution of listed firms 
within the Italian stock market, and confers robustness to previous evidences. At NUTS2 
level, the region most populated by listed firms is Lombardy (North West), which accounts 
for 1033 observations over the sample period, 692 of which are non-financials, corresponding 
to the 38.25 percent of the peers’ sample. Piedmont (North West) and Lazio (Centre) rank 
second with the 12.34 percent (the 12.60 percent of non-financials’ subsample) and the 12.18 
percent (13.43 percent) of listed firms over the sample period respectively. On the opposite, 
Aosta Valley (North West), Basilicata (South) and Calabria (South) register zero 
observations. The presence of a significant cluster in Lazio, and therefore in the Centre (the 
20.06 and the 20.62 percent of listed and non-financial firms respectively), appears mere 
consequence of the presence in this region of the Italian capital, Rome. Indeed, as far as the 
province is concerned, Rome ranks second, accounting for more than the 12 (12.10) percent 
of sampled firms, and over the 13 (13.32) percent of the non-financial ones. In this sense, the 
maximum is reached by the province of Milan (Lombardy) in which is headquartered the 
31.87 and the 28.63 percent of listed and non-financial companies respectively. 
The analysis of the distribution of listed firms helps to define the magnitude and the 
location of the imbalance between the demand and supply for stocks within Italian borders, 
and allows to prefigure the possible presence of local home bias effects on companies’ 
market price, but does not help to clarify the eventual origin of this effect. According to the 
hypothesis of the study, in this sense Figure 2 graphically represents visible, profitable and 
both opaque and profitable companies over the Italian territory, while Table 20 – Panel C 
provides a numerical representation of firms’ distribution on the basis of their visibility, 
profitability, and opacity for the different NUTS levels investigated. On one side, in order to 
classify firms with regard to their visibility, I considered the total sample made of the 1809 
observations related to non-financial companies headquartered within Italian borders, and 
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actively traded at the Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1999-2007. On the other side, 
when considering profitability and opacity, in light of the variables definition reported in 
Section 3, the non-financial sample has been restricted to those companies accounting for at 
least 25 observations of weekly returns, therefore computing a total of 1714 firm-year 
observations. Specifically, on one side in Figure 2 visible (non-visible) firms have been 
defined according to the FTSE_D variable, profitable (non-profitable) companies are those 
whose Alphat+1 Good_D equals to one (zero), while the opaque (non-opaque) ones are those 
for which the variable Return Star_D (i.e. Return Skewness_D*Return Kurtosis_D) is equal 
to one (zero). On the other side, Table 20 – Panel C reports the detail of the geographic 
location of visible, profitable, and opaque companies by considering all the variables used in 
the study as proxies for the above mentioned firms’ characteristics. In this sense are 
considered FTSE_D, No of Employees_D, Press Coverage_D, Press Coverage Lag_D, Press 
Coverage Star_D, and IPO_D for visibility (column 3 to 8), Alphat+1 Good_D for profitability 
(column 10), and Return Skewness_D, Return Kurtosis_D, Return Star_D, Abs 
DiscAccruals_D and Ms3 DiscAccruals_D for opacity (column 11 to 13, and column 15 to 
16). Moreover, Panel C distinguishes companies also by taking into account the final output 
of the PCAs for every category, thus considering variables that summarize firms’ visibility 
(Visible_D, column 9), and both accounting (Opaque Acc_D, column 14) and market 
(Opaque Mrk_D, column 17) opacity.  
In light of previous evidences, the distribution of visible companies appears similar to 
that of the whole sample of listed firms. Indeed, according to the Visible_D variable, highly 
visible companies are mainly clustered in the northern areas of the country, where more than 
75 percent (75.47) of them is headquartered (corresponding to 757 firm-year observations 
over a total of 1003 visible firms). Consistently with the pattern of the total sample, the 51.04 
percent is in the North West, while the 24.43 is located in the North East. In the central and 
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southern areas of Italy, including islands, is headquartered solely the 24.53 percent of visible 
firms corresponding to 246 observations. In this sense, more than the 60 percent (61.76) of 
non-financial companies headquartered in the South is non-visible, thus defining the area as 
the relatively more densely populated by non-widely known firms. In line with this evidence, 
Abruzzo and Apulia register the 100 percent of non-visible observations, which represent the 
75 and the 66.67 percent of the firms headquartered in Campania and Sicily respectively. 
Moreover, excluding the north of the country, the only region that attracts a relevant number 
of visible companies is Lazio, which alone counts for more the 15 percent (16.55) of the 
subsample of firms whose Visible_D equals one, with 166 observations. As far as the region 
is concerned, it is worthy of note the fact that Lombardy alone accounts for the 37.19 percent 
of the subsample of visible companies, a value more than double with respect to that of the 
other more populated regions. Visible firms appear therefore clustered mainly in a few areas, 
and in particular around Lazio and Lombardy, where the principal financial centers of the 
country (i.e. Rome and Milan respectively) are headquartered. On the contrary, non-visible 
firms, albeit concentrated in the South, appear widespread all over the country with no 
specific criteria, both in the most and less developed economic and financial centers of Italy.  
Considering firms’ performance, more than the 50 percent (53.21) of the total sample 
of non-financial firms with at least 25 observations of weekly returns is identified as 
profitable (corresponding to 912 observations). These companies appear clustered as well as 
the visible ones, being geographically concentrated in the north of the country (where the 
76.75 percent is headquartered), and specifically in Lombardy (36.95 percent), Emilia-
Romagna (13.49 percent), and Piedmont (12.72 percent), and in Lazio, where is located 
almost the 15 percent (14.36) of companies whose Alphat+1 Good_D equals to one. Excluding 
the latter region, less than 9 percent (8.88) of profitable firms is located in the southern and 
central Italy, including Islands.  
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Going further, and considering opacity from the accounting standpoint (see Table 20 – 
Panel C, Opaque Acc_D), it is possible to state that opaque firms follow a pattern similar to 
the profitable and visible ones, being located mainly in the northern areas of Italy (where the 
75.28 percent is headquartered), and particularly in Lombardy (37.52 percent), Emilia-
Romagna (14.33 percent), and Piedmont (12.48 percent). With the 18.03 percent of opaque 
companies (corresponding to 224 observations) Centre, where Lazio alone accounts for more 
than 10 percent (10.95) of observations, ranks second. As the so fare highlighted firms’ 
concentration in northern Italy and Lazio for visible, profitable and opaque companies might 
be driven by the relevant number of listed companies in these areas, I considered the 
percentage of visible, profitable and opaque firms over the total number of non-financial 
companies in each region. In this perspective, only with reference to opaque companies, 
results change. Indeed, Abruzzo, Molise and Sicily (South), as well as Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
(North East), and Liguria (North West) present a percentage of opaque companies higher than 
90 percent. Campania (South), Emilia-Romagna and Veneto (North East) follow, with a 
percentage around 75 percent. Results don’t differ when opacity is considered according to 
market variables (i.e. Opaque Mrk_D, not reported for shortness) or conditionally to firms’ 
profitability (see Figure 2, not reported for shortness).  
Taken together, overall these findings suggest that Italy appears characterized by 
significant clusters in the supply for stocks together with a more widespread demand for 
securities. This generates a significant imbalance within the equity market and creates an 
ideal setting to test the local home bias. Moreover, the north of the country tend to be 
characterized by an higher presence of visible and profitable firms with respect to the south, 
while opaque firms appear more widespread throughout the country. This leads to expect that 
the local home bias, whether existing, is more likely driven in the North by an informational 
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advantage owned by local traders toward profitable companies, and in the South by investors’ 
irrational behavior toward the non-visible ones. 
 
5.2. The Italian equity-market segmentation due to local home bias 
Previous evidences reported in Section 5.1. suggest the presence of relevant local 
unbalances between the demand and the supply for securities within the Italian equity market. 
In this section, I test whether the regional segmented equity-market conditions, as proxied by 
the RATIO variable, are actually able to affect corporate market evaluation. In Table 21, I 
first report the results of multivariate analysis by using the HKS2008’s specification (which 
refers to Model 10 of Table 6 in HKS2008) applied to the Italian context (Model 1). In this 
sense, the difference between the model used in HKS2008 and Model 1 of Table 21 is the use 
in this latter specification of (the log of) Total Assets instead of (the log of) Sales, as proxy 
for firm’s size. Given the dataset this study is based on, I made this choice in order to save 
observations. However, results don’t change when the log of Sales is adopted. In light of 
Dyck and Zingales (2004), and Keloharju and Kulp (1996), in Model 2 I propose an 
additional augmented version by introducing as control variables both the natural logarithm 
of the sum between the constant one and the yearly number of articles concerning the firm 
from time to time considered (i.e. Log(1+Press Coverage)), and the natural logarithm of the 
sum between the constant one and the number of years of firm’s life since foundation (i.e. 
Log(1+Firm Age)). This specification will represent the base model (Base Model) for 
comparison purposes. As can be seen from both Model 1 and Model 2, the effect of RATIO 
on the Market-to-Book Ratio is negative and statistically significant. Indeed, in Model 1 
RATIO’s coefficient equals to -0.197 and is significant at 5 percent level (t-stat: -2.31), while 
in Model 2, the coefficient equals to -0.114, being statistically significant at 10 percent level 
(t-stat: -1.91).  
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Table 21 – The regional rarity/abundance effect and the effect of firm’s visibility 
The dependent variable is the log of Market-to-Book Ratio. RATIO is the ratio of the aggregate Equity Book 
Value of firms headquartered in a given Italian region to the aggregate Disposable Income (less Equity Income) 
of the households living in the same region. Press Coverage is the yearly number of newspaper articles 
concerning the correspondent firm. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm’s foundation. R&D to Sales 
is the ratio of R&D to Sales. ROE is the ratio of net profit income to the Equity Book Value. Firm Size is the 
value of total asset. FTSE_D equals one if the firm is included in the Italian equity-market’s primary index and 
zero otherwise. No of Employees_D equals one if No of Employees is greater than the yearly cross-sectional 
median and zero otherwise. Press Coverage_D equals one if Press Coverage is greater than the yearly cross-
sectional median and zero otherwise. Press Coverage Lag_D equals one if Press Coverage Lag is greater than 
the correspondent yearly cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. Press Coverage Star_D is equal to Press 
Coverage_D*Press Coverage Lag_D. IPO_D equals one if the firm did the IPO within the past two years and 
zero otherwise. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a dummy variable which equals to one if 
the firm does not report R&D (R&D_D), a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, 
and year dummies. t-statistics based on clustered standard errors by region are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
                    
  
Dependent Variable: Log(Market-to-Book Ratio) 
  
                
  
HKS2008 
Base 
Model 
FTSE Employees Press Coverage IPO 
Independent Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
          Constant 
 
0.102 1.053*** 1.334*** 1.365*** 1.163*** 1.181*** 1.249*** 0.960*** 
  
(0.34) (4.32) (5.95) (4.49) (4.61) (4.71) (4.99) (3.93) 
RATIO β1 -0.197** -0.114* -0.170** -0.223*** -0.197*** -0.181** -0.201*** -0.154*** 
  
(-2.31) (-1.91) (-2.75) (-4.20) (-2.97) (-2.89) (-3.27) (-3.00) 
RATIO*FTSE_D β2 
  
0.369*** 
     
    
(3.25) 
     
RATIO*No of Employees_D β2 
   
0.243** 
    
     
(2.25) 
    
RATIO*Press Coverage_D β2 
    
0.188** 
   
      
(2.43) 
   
RATIO*Press Coverage Lag_D β2 
     
0.155*** 
  
       
(3.69) 
  
RATIO*Press Coverage Star_D β2 
      
0.248*** 
 
        
(4.51) 
 
RATIO*IPO_D β2 
       
0.223*** 
         
(3.70) 
Log(1+Press Coverage) 
  
0.263*** 0.242*** 0.255*** 0.233*** 0.248*** 0.232*** 0.258*** 
   
(10.31) (11.18) (11.67) (10.60) (10.53) (10.25) (10.21) 
Log(1+Firm Age) 
  
-0.115*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.112** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.100** 
   
(-3.02) (-3.47) (-3.25) (-2.88) (-3.13) (-3.24) (-2.48) 
R&D to Sales 
 
0.713 1.076 1.415** 1.002 0.945 0.958 0.912 1.060 
  
(0.84) (1.35) (2.17) (1.10) (1.06) (1.18) (1.08) (1.32) 
ROE 
 
0.457*** 0.426*** 0.406*** 0.430*** 0.421*** 0.427*** 0.422*** 0.411*** 
  
(3.94) (4.39) (4.11) (4.35) (4.26) (4.34) (4.28) (4.20) 
Log(Firm Size) 
 
0.031 -0.063** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.066** -0.070** -0.071** -0.059** 
  
(1.33) (-2.58) (-3.45) (-2.98) (-2.65) (-2.85) (-2.91) (-2.47) 
 
         
                    
Number of Observations 
 
1666 1652 1652 1652 1652 1652 1652 1652 
R2 - Adjusted 
 
0.358 0.447 0.458 0.452 0.450 0.449 0.452 0.450 
 
         
Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1 + β2   
0.199 0.020 -0.009 -0.026 0.047 0.069 
for Visible Firms (F-test) 
   
(2.66) (0.04) (0.01) (0.16) (0.41) (0.48) 
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As far as concerns the remaining control variables, as predicted I find a positive and 
statistically significant ROE coefficient in both Model 1 and Model 2 (t-stat equal to 3.94 and 
4.39 respectively) , while the coefficient of Log(Firm Size) is significant (and negative) only 
in Model 2. On the other hand, R&D to Sales tends to be not significant in both 
specifications, and this is not unexpected considering the higher opaqueness of the 
accounting reporting in Italy compared to that of the US standard (see for instance, Mengoli, 
Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2011). The fit of the specifications, as measured by the adjusted R-
squared
 
is quite good, being at least equals to 35 (35.8) percent (Model 1). However, the 
improvement of this statistic indicator when moving from Model 1 to Model 2 (adjusted R-
squared=44.7 percent) leads to consider the latter as the benchmark model for Italy. 
From these preliminary results, similarly to what HKS2008 documented with 
reference to the American equity-market, the local home bias effect appears to be in place 
also within the Italian context. Specifically, an increase of the unbalance between the local 
supply and the local demand for stocks of one percent translates into a not trivial reduction of 
the Market-to-Book Ratio of about 0.197 and 0.114 depending on the control variables used. 
As expected, given the features of the Italian equity-market, the magnitude of the local 
rarity/abundance effect is about 44 (44.08) percent stronger than that documented by 
HKS2008 with reference to the American stock market (see HKS2008, Model 10 of Table 6). 
In light of the so far mentioned results, borrowing HKS2008 line of reasoning and using 
HKS2008’s model (Model 1) for sake of comparison, a firm headquartered in a less 
developed Italian region (e.g. Abruzzo, RATIO=0) when compared to another located in a 
more economically advanced one (e.g. Lombardy, RATIO=0.559, thus implying a different 
RATIO of about 0.56, the same used by HKS2008) would face, ceteris paribus, an implied 
appreciation by investors of about 11.66 percent in terms of Market-to-Book Ratio. Estimates 
are as follow: 0.197 x 0.56 = 0.11, where 0.56 represents the difference of the RATIO 
Giulia Baschieri – Ph.D. Thesis 
Local Home Bias: Theory and New Empirical Evidence from Italy 
 
 
131 
• Results • 
variable between the two regions, and 0.197 is the absolute value of coefficient of the RATIO 
variable. Consequently, the geographical component of the firm’s market-to-book value 
would be e
(0.11) – 1 = 0.1166. When compared to the HKS2008 estimation of 8.09 percent, the 
measure in the Italian context is about 44 percent higher (0.1166/0.0809=1.44). Controlling 
for firm’s press coverage and firm’s age (Model 2), the magnitude of this effect decreases (to 
6.59 percent) as does its statistical significance (p-value<0.10). Since press covered firms as 
well as older firms are more likely to be well-known by common (non local) investors, this 
evidence corroborates the idea that firm’s visibility affects investor’s preference for local. 
Overall these evidences strongly support the consistency of the local home bias in 
Italy. Investors’ tendency to prefer the geographically closest stocks seems indeed to be able 
to generate an equity-market (regional) segmentation which significantly affects firm’s 
market value. This effect is appreciably stronger than that recorded in the US. In the light of 
the evidences so far highlighted and on the basis of the hypothesis of the research, in the 
following sections I study the roots of the regional rarity/abundance effect above 
documented, by testing whether it is attributable to the firm’s (non-) visibility (cf. Model 3 – 
8, Table 21) (Section 5.3.) and\or to firm’s future profitability (cf. Model 3, Table 22) 
(Section 5.4.). As already mentioned, while the first element is expected to capture the 
behavioral root of local bias, the second one should catch the rational one (i.e. the presence of 
an informational advantage owned by local investors). In this sense, the latter effect should be 
more pronounced in relation to those future-profitable companies that manipulate earnings to 
mask their true performance, and for which informational asymmetries among local and non-
local investors are likely to be larger, thus increasing with the degree of firm’s opacity (cf. 
Model 4 -– Model 8, Table 22). 
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5.3. The role of firm’s visibility 
Table 21 (Model 3 – Model 8) reports the results obtained once the interaction terms 
between the variable RATIO and the different dummies used as proxy for firm’s visibility are 
introduced in the Base Model (Model 2). The expectation is that well-known firms show a 
lower local home bias effect when compared to the rest of the sample since they are not 
purchased solely by local investors: the high and widespread demand for the securities issued 
by visible firms should lead local traders not to be able to generate a price pressure on stocks, 
pushing their market price up. In econometric terms, as this work’s hypothesis implies a 
negative RATIO coefficient (β1), this would translate into a positive coefficient of the 
interaction term (β2) as discussed in the methodology section, meaning that the equity-market 
segmentation induced by investors’ preference for local is less (more) pronounced for widely 
(local) known firms. Moreover, when removed from the smoothed effect enhanced by visible 
firms, β1 should become even more negative. As already stated, several specifications of 
visibility dummy are considered, and in particular:  
- FTSE_D, which takes value one if the firm is included in the Italian equity market’s 
primary index (S&P MIB Index, MIB30 Index), and zero otherwise (Model 3); 
- No of Employees_D, which equals one if the firm’s number of employees is greater 
than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise (Model 4); 
- Press Coverage_D, which equals one if the firm’s press coverage is greater than the 
yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise (Model 5); 
- Press Coverage Lag_D, which takes value one if the firm’s press coverage in the 
previous year is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero otherwise 
(Model 6); 
Giulia Baschieri – Ph.D. Thesis 
Local Home Bias: Theory and New Empirical Evidence from Italy 
 
 
133 
• Results • 
- Press Coverage Star_D, which equals one if the firm’s press coverage both in the 
previous and in the current year is greater than the correspondent yearly cross-
sectional median, and zero otherwise (Model 7); 
- IPO_D, which takes value one if the firm listed in the stock market within the two 
previous years, and zero otherwise (Model 8). 
Irrespective of the proxy used, in all models (Model 3 to 8) the interaction terms (β2) 
are, as expected, positive and highly significant, thus suggesting an attenuating effect on the 
local home bias generated by visible firms. Indeed, the coefficient of the interaction term (β2) 
varies from the minimum of 0.155, significant at one percent level in Model 6, to the 
maximum of 0.369, significant at one percent level in Model 3. This implies that the negative 
effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio is at least in part offset for the more visible 
companies. In fact, once their influence is removed, the RATIO coefficients (β1) for the 
remaining sample increase both in magnitude and in statistical significance whether 
compared to the benchmark model (i.e. Model 2, where benchmark β1 is recorded equal to -
0.114 and statistical at ten percent level). As expected, the coefficients shrink, at least at the 
value of -0.154 (significant at one percent level) as recorded for Model 8, which identifies as 
visible firms those that made an initial public offering within the last two years. In light of 
these results, for instance being part of the primary Italian equity-market index, or being 
much cited by financial newspapers, would significantly reduce the local home bias 
phenomena. More specifically, as shown in the last row of Table 21 for Model 4 – Model 8, 
the overall effect of RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio for visible firms (β1+β2) dissolves 
in all specifications and is never significant (F-test): while non-visible firms are characterized 
by an actual local rarity/abundance effect, for the visible ones the same effect does not seem 
to exist since theirs Market-to-Book Ratio is independent from the local market conditions. 
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Therefore, the local inequality between demand and supply for stocks appear to influence 
non-visible firms only.  
In this sense, a sensitivity analysis carried out using the results of Model 3 and again 
comparing two firms headquartered in different regions with a divergent RATIO of 0.56, 
shows that for both companies the market-to-book value would, ceteris paribus, be the same 
whether the firms were included in the stock market index (see dummy FTSE_D), as β1+β2 is 
not statistically significant, but different of about 10 percent whether they were not 
(e
(0.56x0.17)
-1≈0.10). Again, considering the other proxies for visibility, the difference between 
the market-to-book value of the two above mentioned companies would differ, ceteris 
paribus, of about 
- 13.30 percent (e(0.56x0.223)-1≈0.13) for firms with a number of employees lower than 
the yearly cross-sectional median (Model 4);  
- 11.66, 10.67, and 11.91 percent (e(0.56x0.197)-1≈0.12; e(0.56x0.181)-1≈0.11; and (e(0.56x0.201)-
1≈0.12) for firms reviewed in a number of newspaper’s articles lower than the yearly 
cross-sectional median during the current, the previous, and both last two years 
respectively (Model 5, Model 6 and Model 7 respectively); and 
- 9.01 percent (e(0.56x0.154)-1≈0.09) for firms which did not go public in the last 24 
months (Model 8).  
Finally, once introduced the interaction terms, the pattern observed for the other 
explanatory variables is, as expected, in line with previous evidences (see Model 2). Indeed, 
the coefficients of both (the log of the sum between the constant one and) Press Coverage and 
ROE are always positive and significant at 1 percent level, those of both (the log of the sum 
between the constant one and) Firm Age and (the log of) Firm Size are negative and 
significant at least at five percent level, while R&D to Sales is in most models not significant. 
Exception in this case is constituted by Model 3, in which the R&D to Sales variable 
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becomes, as expected, significantly positively correlated with the Market-to-Book Ratio 
(coefficient equal to 1.415, significant at five percent level).  
In line with this study hypothesis, overall these results provide evidence of the 
positive role exerted by the firm’s visibility in affecting investors’ choices. While more 
visible firms are traded regardless theirs location, the non-visible ones tend to be traded 
mainly locally. Indeed, investors are found to be willing to pay more only for local non-
visible firms, signaling that the local home bias effect is not indistinctly widespread. 
 
5.4. The role of firm’s profitability 
Model 3 of Table 22 reports the results of the multivariate analysis once the influence 
of firm’s performance on the local home bias effect is taken into account. To this purpose, in 
the Base Model is introduced the interaction term between the variable RATIO and the 
dummy which identifies those firms with (Jensen’s) Alpha above the median 
(RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D), which are the ones that best perform in the following year. In 
line with the hypothesis of the study, the expectation is that this interaction term attracts a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient, thus implying that the equity-market 
segmentation induced by investors’ preference for local is more (less) pronounced for 
over(under)-performing firms.  
On one hand, as expected, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and 
significant, signaling the presence of the local home bias effect for those firms that best 
perform in the following year (β2 = -0.120, significant at five percent level). On the other 
hand, the equity-market segmentation induced by the investors’ preference for local vanishes 
for the remaining (worst performing) companies (β1 = -0.061, p-value greater than ten 
percent). In figures, the overall effect of the local inequality between demand and supply for 
stocks on Market-to-Book Ratio becomes negative and significant for the future profitable 
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firms (bottom of Table 22; β1 + β2 = -0.181, significant at five percent level). For the other 
exogenous variables, signs are all as predicted and the pattern is similar to the previously 
documented one (Model 2).  
Thus, when comparing two future profitable companies assuming that are 
headquartered in different regions with a divergent RATIO of 0.56, this effect translates into 
a divergence of the market-to-book value of 10.67 percent (e
(0.56x0.181)
-1≈0.11). Overall these 
results support the role exerted by the firm’s profitability in affecting investors’ choices. 
While non-profitable firms are traded regardless their location, the profitable ones tend to be 
traded locally, according to the local home bias phenomenon. Furthermore, since under the 
null that all investors have the same information profitable firms should be traded uniformly 
over the whole national territory, this evidence is consistent with the presence of an actual 
informational advantage owned by local investors. More simply, neighboring investors 
appear to be more skilled in selecting the most profitable firms. These evidences are also 
strongly consistent with that strand of literature showing that the closer are the players 
(analysts and banks) to the issuing firms, the better is their forecasting ability on firm’s 
profitability (see among the others Malloy (2005), Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008), Degryse and 
Ongena (2005), and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)). 
 
5.5. The role of firm’s opacity 
Model 4 to 8 of Table 22 reports the results of the multivariate analysis once is taken 
into account the influence of firm’s opacity conditionally to firm profitability on the local 
home bias effect. In this sense, I introduced in Model 3 of Table 22 a set of further interaction 
terms generically computed as RATIO*Alphat+1 Good_D*opacity dummy. By construction, 
as already mentioned in the methodological section, in this case the coefficient (β2) of the 
interaction term RATIO*Alphat+1 Good_D estimates the effect of RATIO on the Market-to-
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Book Ratio attributable to profitable but non-opaque firms, while the coefficient (β3) of 
RATIO*Alphat+1 Good_D*opacity dummy estimates the additional rarity/abundance effect 
attributable to both profitable and opaque companies. Again, the coefficient (β1) of the 
RATIO variable considers the effect of the average rarity/abundance effect for non-profitable 
and non-opaque firms. In light of the hypothesis of the study, the expectation is that β3 will 
attract a negative coefficient, meaning that the equity-market segmentation induced by 
investors’ preference for local is more (less) pronounced for profitable (as previously 
documented) and opaque (non-opaque) firms. This because local investors should prefer good 
local firms when they are opaque and therefore not well-identifiable by other (non-local) 
investors, rather than the well performing but non-opaque ones, that traders can detect 
regardless their location. Several specifications of opacity dummy are considered, and in 
particular:  
- Return Skewness_D, which equals one if the yearly skewness of weekly stock 
returns’ distribution (estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly observations) is lower 
than the yearly cross-sectional median (signaling left tail asymmetry returns), and 
zero otherwise (Model 4); 
- Return Kurtosis_D, which takes value one if the yearly kurtosis of weekly stock 
returns’ distribution (estimated upon a minimum of 25 weekly observations) is greater 
than the yearly cross-sectional median (signaling high frequency of extremely 
high/low returns compared to the bell-curve), and zero otherwise (Model 5); 
- Return Star_D, which equals one in presence of both negative skewness and positive 
kurtosis, i.e. if the stock return skewness and kurtosis are below and above the yearly 
cross-sectional median respectively, and zero otherwise (Model 6); 
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- Abs DiscAccruals_D, which takes value one if the absolute value of the firm’s 
abnormal accruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, and zero 
otherwise (Model 7) 
- Ms3DiscAccruals_D, which equals one if the prior three years moving sum of the 
firm’s absolute abnormal accruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median, 
and zero otherwise (Model 8). 
As already mentioned in Section 3, the first three variables are able to capture the market 
opacity, while the last two variables consider the accounting opacity.  
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Table 22 – The regional rarity/abundance effect and the effect of firm’s profitability and 
opacity 
The dependent variable is the log of Market-to-Book Ratio. RATIO is the ratio of the aggregate Equity Book 
Value of firms headquartered in a given Italian region to the aggregate Disposable Income (less Equity Income) 
of the households living in the same region. Press Coverage is the yearly number of newspaper articles 
concerning the firm. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm’s foundation. R&D to Sales is the ratio of 
R&D to Sales. ROE is the ratio of net profit income to the Equity Book Value. Firm Size is the value of total 
asset.αt+1Good_D equals one if α in the following year is greater than zero and zero otherwise. Return 
Skewness_D equals one if Return Skewness is less than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. 
Return Kurtosis_D equals one if Return Kurtosis is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero 
otherwise. Return Star_D is equal to Return Skewness_D*Return Kurtosis_D. Abs DiscAccruals_D equals one 
if Abs DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. Ms3DiscAccruals_D 
equals one if Ms3 DiscAccruals is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. Also 
included in the regressions (but not shown) are a dummy variable which equals to one if the firm does not report 
R&D (R&D_D), a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, and year dummies. t-
statistics based on clustered standard errors by region are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                    
  Dependent Variable: Log(Market-to-Book Ratio) 
             
  HKS2008 
Base 
Model 
Future 
Performance 
Opacity|  High Future Performance 
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
          
Constant  0.102 1.053*** 1.022*** 0.991*** 1.040*** 1.015*** 1.018*** 1.018*** 
  (0.34) (4.32) (4.96) (4.57) (4.95) (4.75) (5.01) (4.99) 
RATIO β1 -0.197** -0.114* -0.061 -0.065 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 
  (-2.31) (-1.91) (-1.19) (-1.28) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.22) 
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D β2   -0.120** -0.058* -0.086* -0.085** -0.053** -0.062** 
    (-2.84) (-1.99) (-1.85) (-2.83) (-2.21) (-2.54) 
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D*Return Skewness_D β3    -0.133*     
     (-1.80)     
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D*Return Kurtosis_D β3     -0.066*    
      (-1.92)    
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D*Return Star_D β3      -0.224**   
       (-2.66)   
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D*Abs DiscAccruals_D β3       -0.119**  
        (-2.44)  
RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D*Ms3 DiscAccruals_D β3        -0.088** 
         (-2.23) 
Log(1+Press Coverage)   0.263*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 
   (10.31) (9.09) (9.24) (9.16) (9.11) (9.28) (9.13) 
Log(1+Firm Age)   -0.115*** -0.114** -0.115** -0.113** -0.113** -0.113** -0.113** 
   (-3.02) (-2.80) (-2.82) (-2.75) (-2.82) (-2.76) (-2.77) 
R&D to Sales  0.713 1.076 0.871 0.858 0.894 0.877 0.905 0.887 
  (0.84) (1.35) (0.95) (1.04) (0.98) (1.03) (0.98) (0.98) 
ROE  0.457*** 0.426*** 0.391*** 0.394*** 0.388*** 0.391*** 0.387*** 0.389*** 
  (3.94) (4.39) (4.10) (4.13) (4.04) (4.18) (4.05) (4.06) 
Log(Firm Size)  0.031 -0.063** -0.060** -0.058** -0.062** -0.060** -0.061** -0.060** 
  (1.33) (-2.58) (-2.78) (-2.51) (-2.80) (-2.76) (-2.87) (-2.82) 
Number of Observations  1666 1652 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 
R2 - Adjusted  0.358 0.447 0.451 0.452 0.451 0.453 0.452 0.452 
          
F-test: Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1 + β2   -0.181** -0.123* -0.147* -0.147** -0.115* -0.124* 
for Profitable (and Non-Opaque) Firms    (5.96) (3.19) (3.82) (4.78) (3.88) (4.23) 
          
F-test: Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1 + β2 + β3    -0.256** -0.213** -0.371** -0.234** -0.212** 
for Profitable and Opaque Firms     (6.87) (7.95) (8.26) (6.63) (6.37) 
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In this framework, I find that the local home bias phenomenon is significantly 
exacerbated for opaque firms. Indeed, with respect to Model 3 of Table 22, for all the adopted 
specifications the coefficient of the RATIO variable remains negative but not-significant 
while the one of the first interaction term (RATIO*Alphat+1Good_D) is negative and 
significant. However, the magnitude of β2 substantially decreased (β2 varies from the 
minimum of -0.086 in Model 5 to the maximum of -0.053 in Model 7 and is always 
significant at least at ten percent level), implying that the negative effect of the RATIO on the 
Market-to-Book Ratio is in part offset for profitable and non-opaque firms. In this sense, 
opaque firms appear able to capture the additional statistically significant effect enhanced by 
the local inequality in the market for stocks. Indeed, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
accounting for opacity are, as expected, always negative and significant (β3 varies from the 
minimum of -0.224 in Model 6 to the maximum of -0.066 in Model 5, and is always 
significant at least at ten percent level) implying that the negative effect of the RATIO on the 
Market-to-Book Ratio is more pronounced for both profitable and opaque firms. In this 
context, previous results about the impact of firms’ profitability on local home bias persist, 
but appear more relevant for those companies characterized by higher information 
asymmetries. Once more, for the other exogenous, signs are as predicted and the patterns are 
similar to those previously discussed (Model 2). 
Running the usual sensitivity analysis and referring to e.g. Model 6, on one hand I 
record an effect of local market inequality on the Market-to-Book Ratio for profitable and 
non-opaque firms which is always significant but less strong than that previously estimated 
(see Model 3). Indeed, β1 + β2 equals -0.147 significant at five percent level, which translates 
– ceteris paribus – into a divergence of the market-to-book value of 8.6 percent (e(0.56x0.147)-
1≈0.086) when comparing the two usual firms headquartered in different developed areas of 
the country (with a difference in RATIO of 0.56), whether profitable and whose variable 
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Return Star_D equal to zero. The effect is similar when comparing profitable and non-opaque 
companies headquartered in regions whose RATIO differs of 0.56 whose returns’ skewness is 
above the yearly cross-sectional median (i.e. Return Skewness_D equal to zero; Model 4 – 
e
(0.56x0.123)
-1≈0.071), whose returns’ kurtosis is lower than the yearly cross-sectional median 
(i.e. Return Kurtosis_D equal to zero; Model 5 – e(0.56x0.147)-1≈0.086), whose absolute value 
of abnormal accruals is lower than the yearly cross-sectional median (i.e. Abs 
DiscAccruals_D equal to zero; Model 7 – e(0.56x0.115)-1≈0.067), and whose the prior three 
years moving sum of the abnormal accruals is lower than the yearly cross-sectional median 
(i.e. Ms3 DiscAccruals_D; Model 8 – e(0.56x0.124)-1≈0.072). 
On the other hand, this reduction reflects the highest effect of the imbalance between 
local demand and supply for stocks on both opaque and profitable firms. Indeed, when 
comparing companies headquartered in regions whose RATIO differs of 0.56, profitable and 
with returns’ skewness and kurtosis respectively lower and above than the yearly cross-
sectional median (i.e. Return Star_D equal to one, see Model 6), the impact of local market 
conditions on Market-to-Book Ratio is associated to a coefficient (β1 + β2+ β3) equal to -
0.371 which translates, ceteris paribus, into a 23 percent divergence in the market-to-book 
value (e
(0.56x0.371)
-1≈0.23). According to this perspective, firms that present left (negative 
skewness) fat (positive kurtosis) tail returns are likely to be more prone to show the local 
home bias phenomena. Similarly, the implied difference in the firm’s stock price for the 
above mentioned companies whose RATIO diverges of 0.56 is, ceteris paribus, estimated 
equal to  
- 15.41 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.256)-1≈0.15) for profitable firms with a returns’ skewness 
lower than the yearly cross-sectional median (Model 4),  
- 12.67 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.213)-1≈0.12) for profitable firms with returns’ kurtosis above 
the yearly cross-sectional median (Model 5), 
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- 14 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.234)-1≈0.14) for profitable firms with the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals above the yearly cross-sectional median (Model 7), and  
- 12.61 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.212)-1≈0.12) for profitable firms with the prior three years 
moving sum of abnormal accruals above the yearly cross-sectional median (Model 8). 
Overall these findings provide evidence of the role exerted by firm’s opacity in 
determining investor choices. Indeed, the effect of local market conditions on market-to-book 
value is more than double (8.6 percent vs. 23 percent) for (profitable) opaque firms than for 
the (profitable) non-opaque ones. According to these results, I record that investors are 
willing to exploit local information advantage mainly when information asymmetry is 
actually in place, giving a hint of rationality to the local home bias, as based on a (successful) 
attempt to take advantage from local information not widespread in the market. Looking at 
the single characteristics proxied for firms’ opacity, results on stock skewness are conflicting 
with contributes of Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) who show 
that more under- diversified portfolios tend to overweight specific stocks and industries with 
higher skewness. In this sense, the local preference for opaque securities characterized by low 
skewness may be explained only with local traders knowledge of the stocks’ future good 
performance. Again, given the well-known investors’ aversion for kurtosis (see among the 
others Dittmar (2002)), the evidence that stocks with high kurtosis are significantly more 
intensively locally traded suggests that, similarly to skewness, local investors may 
consciously choose these stocks only when aware of their future profitability, thus more 
likely exploiting only the chance of extreme positive returns. The pattern observed for 
profitable stock with low skewness and high kurtosis strongly supports this arguments. 
Furthermore, evidences that local equity-market conditions are found to increasingly affect 
corporate market value also with the firm’s tendency to make earnings management, suggest 
that informed investors are characterized by a rather high level of sophistication. 
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5.6. PCA - The local bias as irrational behavior vs. informational advantage 
To provide a comprehensive framework capable to simultaneously capture the rational 
and/or behavioral nature of the local home bias, I report in Table 23 results controlled for 
multicollinearity problems that might come out using simultaneously the proxies for 
visibility, profitability and opacity. With this intent in mind, I use a two-step procedure that 
starts running PCAs which are able to reduce useless information at the same time keeping 
into account the useful one. As already mentioned in the methodological section (see Section 
4.2.), on the basis of PCAs’ factor scores, I construct dummy variables which are able to 
distinguish visible (Visible_D) from non-visible (Non-Visible_D), and opaque from non-
opaque firms considering both accounting and market opacity (Opaque Acc_D and Opaque 
Mrt_D respectively), depending on whether the factors loading are above or below the 
median values. Subsequently, in the second step I compare the effects of the interactions 
among these dummy variables to estimate the relative importance of the single effects (i.e. of 
firm’s visibility, profitability, and opacity).  
More specifically, in Model 3 of Table 23 I substitute the variable RATIO with two 
distinct interaction terms calculated as RATIO*Visible_D and RATIO*Non-Visible_D. This 
is done to explicitly distinguish the effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio for 
visible and non-visible firms respectively, and to allow a simpler interpretation of the 
following models. With respect to Model 3, in Model 4 I introduce two further interaction 
terms (i.e. RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D; RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D) 
designed to capture the additive effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio due to 
firm’s profitability for visible and non-visible firms respectively. Following the same logic, 
with respect to Model 4, in Model 5 and Model 6 I include two additional interaction terms 
(i.e. RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1 Good_D*Opaque_D; RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1 
Good_D*Opaque_D) designed to capture the additive effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-
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Book Ratio due to a firm’s opacity given its profitability for visible and non visible firms 
respectively. In this sense, Model 5 considers accounting opacity (Opaque Acc_D), while 
Model 6 takes into account firms’ market opacity (Opaque Mrk_D).  
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Table 23 – The regional rarity/abundance effect and the effect of firm’s visibility, 
profitability and opacity 
The dependent variable is the log of Market-to-Book Ratio. RATIO is the ratio of the aggregate Equity Book 
Value of firms headquartered in a given Italian region to the aggregate Disposable Income (less Equity Income) 
of the households living in the same region. Press Coverage is the yearly number of newspaper articles 
concerning the firm. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm’s foundation. R&D to Sales is the ratio of 
R&D to Sales. ROE is the ratio of net profit income to the Equity Book Value. Firm Size is the value of total 
asset. Visible (Non-Visible) equals one if PC1_Visibility is greater (less) than the yearly cross-sectional median 
and zero otherwise. Alphat+1Good_D equals one if Alpha in the following year is greater than zero and zero 
otherwise. Opaque Acc_D equals one if PC1_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero 
otherwise. Opaque Mrk_D equals one if PC2_Opacity is greater than the yearly cross-sectional median and zero 
otherwise. Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a dummy variable which equals to one if the 
firm does not report R&D (R&D_D), a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, dummies for segment listing, 
and year dummies. t-statistics based on clustered standard errors by region are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                
  Dependent Variable: Log(Market-to-Book Ratio) 
             
  HKS2008 
Base 
Model 
Visibility 
Visibility & 
Future 
Performance 
Visibility & Future 
Performance & 
Opacity 
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
        
Constant  0.102 1.053*** 1.331*** 1.298*** 1.283*** 1.304*** 
  (0.34) (4.32) (5.71) (6.43) (6.33) (6.24) 
RATIO  -0.197** -0.114*     
  (-2.31) (-1.91)     
RATIO*Visible_D β1   0.029 0.060 0.058 0.060 
    (0.41) (0.88) (0.84) (0.84) 
RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D β2    -0.087** -0.115** 0.071 
     (-2.22) (-2.17) (0.78) 
RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D*Opaque Acc_D β3     0.056  
      (0.80)  
RATIO*Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D*Opaque Mrk_D β3      -0.234*** 
       (-2.58) 
RATIO*Non-Visible_D β1   -0.270*** -0.183** -0.183** -0.185** 
    (-4.63) (-2.79) (-2.81) (-2.36) 
RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D β2    -0.128* -0.138** -0.083 
     (-2.04) (-2.38) (-1.04) 
RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D*Opaque Acc_D β3     0.028  
      (0.25)  
RATIO*Non-Visible_D*Alphat+1Good_D*Opaque Mrk_D β3      -0.169** 
       (-1.97) 
Log(1+Press Coverage)   0.263*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 
   (10.31) (10.17) (8.68) (8.71) (8.59) 
Log(1+Firm Age)   -0.115*** -0.110** -0.111** -0.110** -0.113*** 
   (-3.02) (-2.83) (-2.71) (-2.70) (-6.72) 
R&D to Sales  0.713 1.076 0.891 0.745 0.718 0.820 
  (0.84) (1.35) (1.01) (0.76) (0.71) (1.12) 
ROE  0.457*** 0.426*** 0.420*** 0.392*** 0.389*** 0.406*** 
  (3.94) (4.39) (4.25) (3.99) (3.96) (3.84) 
Log(Firm Size)  0.031 -0.063** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.076*** 
  (1.33) (-2.58) (-3.32) (-3.51) (-3.57) (-4.34) 
Number of Observations  1666 1652 1652 1576 1576 1576 
R2 - Adjusted  0.358 0.447 0.455 0.457 0.456 0.459 
     Model (5)  Model (6) 
     Visible Non-Visible  Visible Non-Visible 
        
Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1  0.058 -0.183**  0.060 -0.185** 
for Non-Profitable and Non-Opaque Firms (F-test)   (0.84) (-2.81)  (0.84) (-2.36) 
        
Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1 + β2  -0.057 -0.321**  0.131 -0.268*** 
for Profitable and Non-Opaque Firms (F-test)   (0.42) (13.24)  (1.78) (11.50) 
        
Effect of RATIO on MB Ratio β1 + β2 + β3  -0.001 -0.293**  -0.103 -0.437*** 
for Profitable and Opaque Firms (F-test)   (0.00) (9.38)  (1.94) (29.13) 
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Model 3 of Table 23 shows that, while the variable RATIO does not significantly 
affect the Market-to-Book Ratio when visible firms are taken into consideration (β1 equals to 
0.029 and is statistically non-significant), it becomes negative and highly significant for non-
visible firms (β1 is equal to -0.270, significant at one percent level). This evidence 
corroborates previous results about the importance of firm’s visibility in affecting investor 
behavior. Indeed, also considering the new proxy for visibility as emerges from PCA, visible 
firms tend to be traded regardless their location, while the non-visible ones appear more 
intensively locally traded, according to the local home bias phenomenon and to the existence 
of a behavioral and irrational root of this latter. 
Once introduced the interaction term for firm’s profitability (Model 4), previous 
results still hold. Indeed, on one side the effect of the RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio 
remains not significant for both visible and non-profitable firms (β1 equals to 0.060, and is 
significant at one percent level), and visible and profitable firms (β1 + β2 equals to -0.027, and 
is not significant; not reported for shortness). On the other side, local market conditions on 
average always impact on the market evaluation of non-visible companies, being the RATIO 
negative and significant for both non-visible and non-profitable firms (β1 is equal to -0.183, 
significant at five percent level), and non-visible and profitable firms (β1 + β2 is equal to -
0.311, significant at one percent level; not reported for shortness). However, for both visible 
and non-visible firms the additional effect of RATIO on the Market-to-Book Ratio due to 
firm’s profitability is negative and significant (β2 for visible companies equals to 0.087, 
significant at five percent level, while β2 for to the non-visible ones is equal to -0.128, 
significant at ten percent level). This evidence suggests that profitable firms, regardless their 
visibility, tend to be more intensively traded locally according to the local home bias 
phenomenon and, above all, to the existence of an informational advantage owned by local 
investors. 
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These results are confirmed also once the interaction term for firm’s opacity is 
introduced (see Model 5 and Model 6). Indeed, on one hand both in Model 5 and Model 6, 
the effect of the RATIO on firms’ Market-to-Book Ratio remains not significant for visible, 
non-profitable, and non-opaque firms (β1 equals to 0.058 and to 0.060, and is never 
significant in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively), for visible, profitable, and non-opaque 
firms (β1 + β2 is equal to -0.057 and to 0.131, in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively, and is 
never significant; see next-to-last row of Table 23), and for visible, profitable and opaque 
firms (β1 + β2 + β3 equals to -0.001 and to -0.103, in Model 5 and 6 respectively, and is never 
significant; see last row of Table 23). On the other hand, it’s negative and significant for non-
visible, non-profitable, and non-opaque firms (β1 is equal to -0.183 and to -0.185, significant 
at five percent level in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively), for non-visible, profitable, and 
non-opaque firms (β1 + β2 equals to -0.321 and to -0.268, significant at five percent and one 
percent level in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively; see next-to-last row of Table 25), and for 
non-visible, profitable and opaque firms (β1 + β2 + β3 is equal to -0.293 and to -0.437, 
significant at five percent and one percent level in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively; see last 
row of Table 25).  
On the basis of these results, considering the usual difference of 56 basis points of the 
RATIO variable for distinct regions, the implied difference in the firm’s stock price for 
company headquartered in these areas, ceteris paribus, would be estimated equal to  
- 10.92 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.185)-1≈0.11) for non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque 
firms; 
- 16.19 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.268)-1≈0.16) for non-visible, but profitable and non-opaque 
firms; and  
- 27.73  percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.437)-1≈0.28)for non-visible, but profitable and opaque firms, 
when market opacity is considered, and to 
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- 10.79 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.183)-1≈0.11) for non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque 
firms; 
- 19.69 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.321)-1≈0.20) for non-visible, but profitable and non-opaque 
firms; and  
- 17.83 percent (i.e. e(0.56x0.293)-1≈0.18) for non-visible, but profitable and opaque firms, 
when opacity is defined from the accounting standpoint. 
On one side, according to these results, once opacity is introduced in the model, the 
overall market evaluation of visible firms, regardless their profitability and opacity, appears 
never to be affected by local market conditions, while the one of non-visible companies 
always is. On the other side, in light of the overall effects above reported, the additional 
rarity/abundance effect due to opacity emerges only with reference to opaqueness measured 
in market terms rather than accounting terms. Indeed, Model 6 shows that the coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant both for visible and non-visible firms when opacity is 
defined on the basis of the market variables (β3 equals to -0.234, significant at one percent 
level and to -0.169, significant at five percent level for visible and non-visible firms 
respectively), while they are found not-significant in Model 5, when opacity is defined on the 
basis of accounting variables (β3 equals to 0.056, and to 0.028, and is never significant both 
for visible and non-visible firms respectively). This pattern could be reasonably attributed to 
the greater effectiveness in capturing the degree of opacity from marginal investors of the 
market variables with respect to the accounting variables. This hypothesis seems consistent 
considering that, once the interaction term for firm’s opacity is introduced, the additional 
effect of profitable firms becomes insignificant for non-opaque firms in Model 6 (β2  equals 
to 0.071, and to -0.083, for visible and non-visible firms, respectively, and is never 
significant), while it is even more significantly negative for non-opaque but profitable firms 
in Model 5 (β2 is equal to -0.115, and to -0.138, significant at five percent level for both 
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visible and non-visible firms respectively). Moreover, the adjusted R-squared increases 
moving from Model 4 to Model 6, but it decreases moving from Model 4 to Model 5. These 
evidences indicate that profitable and opaque firms, regardless their visibility, tend to be 
more intensively traded locally according to the local home bias phenomenon and, above all, 
to the existence of an informational advantage owned by local investors.  
Once more, as far as concern the other exogenous variables, signs are all as predicted 
and the pattern is similar to the previously documented one (Model 2). More specifically, on 
one side the coefficients of (the natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) 
Press Coverage and ROE are always positive and statistically significant at one percent level, 
thus positively affecting (the natural logarithm of) the Market-to-Book Ratio. Again, as 
expected both (the natural logarithm of the sum between the constant one and) Firm Age and 
(the natural logarithm of) Firm Size negatively and significantly affect (the natural logarithm 
of) the Market-to-Book Ratio. On the other hand, R&D to Sales tends to be not significant in 
all specifications and this is not unexpected considering the higher opaqueness of the 
accounting reporting in Italy compared, for instance, to the US one (see at this regard, 
Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2011). 
Overall, these evidences support the existence of both a rational and irrational root of 
the local bias. Indeed, consistently with the latter, I find that less visible firms are locally 
more intensively traded even after controlling for the presence of an eventual investors’ 
informational advantage. At the same time, consistently with the rational or informational 
root of the local bias, I find a tendency to prefer local non-visible firms if they are profitable 
and opaque, at least if the latter is measured on the basis of market variables. Moreover, 
consistently with the presence of an informational advantage due to proximity, I find also that 
more visible firms, for which the information asymmetries are likely to be lower, tend to be 
locally traded more intensively if profitable. Since the local rarity/abundance effect for non-
Giulia Baschieri – Ph.D. Thesis 
Local Home Bias: Theory and New Empirical Evidence from Italy 
 
 
150 
• Results • 
visible, non-profitable and non-opaque firms is likely to be linked to the simple irrational 
factor of familiarity with the issuing firm, and since an informational advantage implying an 
increase in a firms’ valuation is likely to exist and to be exploited just with reference to 
profitable and opaque companies, I am able to decompose the aggregate results so far 
obtained, thus splitting the local bias effect in its rational and irrational component. In this 
sense, considering the impact of local home bias on firms’ market price when a variation of 
the RATIO is considered as equal to 0.56, I can roughly but reasonably argue that the overall 
local home bias effect which incorporate both the informational and behavioral aspect equals 
to 27.73 percent (i.e. the market price component attributable to non-visible, but profitable 
and opaque firms, when market opacity is considered). Similarly, the local home bias effect 
which considers solely the irrational root of the phenomenon not accounting for the rational 
one is equal to 10.92 percent (i.e. the market price component attributable to non-visible, 
non-profitable and non-opaque firms, when market opacity is considered). In light of these 
results, it is possible to state that investors’ preference for local is determined for about 60 
(60.63 = (27.73 – 10.92)/27.73) percent by an informational advantage and for the remaining 
40 (39.37) percent by the simple factor of familiarity with the issuing firms. 
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6. Conclusions 
Investors’ preference toward geographically proximate assets has been widely 
documented by financial literature. The phenomenon emerges not only in cross-country 
studies (home bias), where domestic stocks are preferred to the foreign ones (French and 
Poterba (1991); Cooper and Kaplanis (1994); Tesar and Werner (1995)), but also within the 
borders of single countries (local home bias), where securities are preferred as a consequence 
of an investor’s geographical closeness to the firm’s headquarters (Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999)). Such behavior is at least curios after considering the overall higher risk of the non-
well diversified portfolio implied by the overweighting of domestic or local stocks (Grubel 
(1968); Levy and Sarnat (1970); Solnik (1974); Eldor, Pines, and Schwartz (1988); DeSantis 
and Gerard (1997); Lau, Ng, Zhang (2010)). At present, even if financial literature seems far 
from agree about its causes, the existence of the local home bias seems indisputable (see 
among the first Coval and Moskowitz (1999)). However, little empirical evidences have been 
provided regarding its implications on asset pricing equilibrium. In this context, previous 
studies showed that this preference generates locally segmented markets (Loughran and 
Schultz (2004), (2005); Pirinsky and Wang (2006)), and impacts on firms’ market prices 
(HKS2008). In this sense, in areas characterized by reduced supply of securities (i.e. in areas 
where are headquartered a few listed firms with respect to the demand for stocks), the local 
unsatisfied demand for nearby assets would be concentrated over the few stocks locally 
available, pushing their price up (HKS2008). In particular HKS2008 in US, and Baschieri, 
Carosi and Mengoli (2010) in Italy find a direct proportionality between the level of "rarity" 
of a firm and its market evaluation: ceteris paribus, non-financial firms defined as Rare 
because located in geographical areas characterized by low ratio between local supply and 
local demand for securities are found to show higher Market-to-Book Ratios. These findings 
bring out the importance of spatial proximity as a peculiar element in investment decisions: 
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investors would prefer to pay a premium to invest in local securities in order to reduce the 
actual or merely perceived information asymmetries or, more simply, to include in portfolio 
stocks perceived as familiar. This premium is expected to be as big (small) as higher is the 
rarity (abundance) effect for local firms, and would be generated by the concentration of the 
demand of local investors over the few local stocks available, confirming the existence of 
locally segmented markets. 
The existence of a significant and non-homogeneous local imbalance between 
potential demand for securities, fairly widespread on the national territory, and potential 
supply of stocks, mainly concentrated in a few districts, together with the cultural and 
institutional environment, makes Italy an ideal setting for analysis to investigate phenomena 
linked to locality in general, and in particular to the local home bias. This Ph.D. thesis draws 
on recent approaches to test the local home bias (see HKS2008), and presents evidence of the 
effect of geographical equity-market segmentation on firms’ value in the Italian context, with 
a specific focus on the causes of phenomenon. In fact, considering the RATIO variable 
introduced by HKS2008 (i.e. the ratio of the local supply of stocks – computed as the 
regional aggregated equity book value of all listed firms headquartered in a given area – to 
the local demand for securities – calculated as the aggregated disposable income of the 
households living in the same area), I firstly test the existence of a geographical market 
fragmentation in the stock market triggered by investors’ preference to invest locally through 
the analysis on whether local market conditions are able to affect firms’ market value. 
Secondly, once investigated the existence of local home bias, I get light its causes by 
examining whether an irrational feeling of familiarity with the issuing firm (behavioral root) 
rather than the successful attempt by local investors to exploit an informational advantage not 
widely available to the public (informational or rational cause) drive the preference for local. 
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I run this analysis using a panel of 2,463 firm-year (end) observations over the period 
1999-2007 - where each observation is a firm headquartered within Italian borders and listed 
on the Milan Stock Exchange. According to HKS2008 and to the well documented investors’ 
preference towards local assets, after controlling for firm’s size, future growth opportunity 
and profitability, I find that isolated firms benefit from the effect of a regional stock supply 
scarcity which translates into higher market value. As expected, given the characteristic of 
the Italian equity-market, the magnitude of this effect is about 45 (44.08) percent stronger 
than documented by HKS2008 with reference to the US stock market, suggesting that country 
features may play a crucial role in the local home bias phenomenon. In this sense, if 
hypothetically a firm moves from a region to another facing a decrease in the RATIO equal to 
56 basis points, holding else equal, the implied increase in the firm’s stock price would be 
about 11.66 percent. Once controlled also for firm’s press coverage and age, the magnitude of 
this effect decreases up to 6.59 percent. The same reasoning might be done to confront the 
market evaluation of comparables companies headquartered in areas of the country which 
present different local market conditions (RATIO).  
It is likely that the reasons for this magnitude with respect to HKS2008 results’ in the 
US could be found in the lower enforcement of the insider trading rule (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002)), the lower corporate information disclosure (Mengoli, Pazzaglia and Sapienza 
(2011)) and the greater degree of cultural regional segmentation (see at this regard for 
instance Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)), factors that apply specifically to Italy. In this sense, 
on one side the low effectiveness of Italian insider trading law (Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002)) makes highly realistic the eventual illegal exploitation of an information advantage 
that might be acquired locally, “feeding” the informed component of local bias (see among 
others Meulbroek (1992)). On the other side, the political history of Italy, which for centuries 
before its unification hosted numerous and hostile kingdoms, makes extremely likely the 
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persistence of a cultural geographic segmentation that could eventually enhance the local 
home bias effect by exacerbating its behavioral component.  
Once tested the existence of the local home bias in the Italian context, this research 
goes further by studying the nature of this effect. At this regard, although the wide number of 
studies which claim informational asymmetries as the cause of the phenomenon  mainly by 
documenting the outperformance of locally biased portfolios (Shukla and Van Inwegen 
(1995); Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Hau (2001); Zhu (2003); Feng and Seasholes (2005); 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005); Massa and Simonov (2006); Bodnaruk (2009); Teo (2009)), 
a different strand of literature states that a mere and irrational feeling of “familiarity” may be 
the driver of investors’ choices toward local assets (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); 
Huberman (2001); Doskeland and Hvide (2011)). As results of the researches on the causes 
of the preference for local are far to be conclusive, this study contributes to the existing 
literature being able to discriminate between the possible drivers of the phenomenon by 
analyzing which firms this effect is more relevant for. To this end, I investigate the effect 
exerted on corporate market value by local equity market conditions for the subsamples of 
firms that are more likely to be known by investors, that are called “visible firms”, that in the 
forthcoming year will experience extra-performance, that I called “profitable firms”, and that, 
within these latter, are more likely to manipulate accounting results, and are therefore 
characterized by substantial information asymmetries, that I called (profitable and) “opaque 
firms”. Following this study’s hypothesis, an information-driven explanation would require 
not all firms to be exposed to the local home bias, but mainly those where a valuable 
informational advantage between local and non-local investors exists and can be exploited 
(i.e. opaque companies). In addition, when using this approach to distinguish between 
alternatives, an additional key role should be held by profitability. Detecting the local home 
bias mainly in future profitable firms would suggest that local information is exploitable as 
Giulia Baschieri – Ph.D. Thesis 
Local Home Bias: Theory and New Empirical Evidence from Italy 
 
 
156 
• Conclusions • 
being potentially profitable. In fact, also assuming that a local information advantage effect is 
in place, a local inadequate supply for stocks would not be able to enhance a firm’s value if 
there is a poor prospect of future profitability. The same finding should not be enhanced by a 
mere behavioral explanation, such as a feeling of familiarity with the local firm, as this 
should be widespread independently of a firm’s characteristics. In this sense, as long as the 
local home bias relies on the simple familiarity with the issuing firm, while firms just locally 
perceived somehow familiar would be, ceteris paribus, more intensively picked by local 
investors, the nationally-known ones would not experience the same phenomenon.  
Within this framework, I find that the local home bias effect is not indiscriminately 
widespread among firms, being significantly stronger for less visible, more profitable and 
more opaque firms, in line with the hypotheses of this study. Indeed, I find that the local 
rarity/abundance effect is on average about the 70 percent stronger for less visible firms while 
not significant for the more visible ones (i.e. for the companies that are more likely known in 
all the country’s territory and not just locally), that it’s more than the 60 percent stronger for 
profitable firms and not significant for the non-profitable ones, and that it’s on average more 
than twice stronger for profitable and opaque firms while only about the 15 percent stronger 
for the profitable but non-opaque ones.  
Finally, once merged the analysis of visibility, profitability and opacity - consistently 
with previous findings - I find that the local rarity/abundance effect is inversely driven by 
firm’s visibility and that it increases with firm’s profitability and opacity. More specifically, I 
find that for the usual negative variation of the RATIO equal to 56 basis points, holding else 
equal, the implied increase in the firm’s stock price is estimated equal to 10.92 percent for 
non-visible, non-profitable and non-opaque firms, to 16.19 percent for non-visible, but 
profitable and non-opaque firms, and to 27.73 percent for non-visible, but profitable and 
opaque firms. At the same time, although the same effects are found to be not significantly 
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different from zero with respect to visible firms, I find that the additional effect of the RATIO 
on the Market-to-Book Ratio moving from visible, non-profitable and non-opaque firms to 
the visible, profitable and opaque ones is negative and significant. Since an information 
advantage implying an increase both in trading and price is likely to exist and to be exploited 
with reference to profitable and opaque firms, I roughly but reasonably argue that the 
preference for local is determined for about the 60 (60.63 = (27.73 – 10.92)/27.73) percent by 
an informational advantage and for the remaining 40 (39.37) percent by the simple factor of 
familiarity with the issuing firms. 
This research’s findings add to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, from 
an academic standpoint, the first basic results on the effect exerted by local equity-market 
conditions on corporate market value extend out of sample HKS2008 results, thus providing 
further robustness to their findings. Moreover, in light of the peculiarities of the research 
context, the greater magnitude of the RATIO’s effect documented with respect to the 
American equity-market is consistent with previous findings suggesting that the local home 
bias phenomenon is significantly influenced by cultural (cf. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), 
and Morse and Shive (2011)) as well as institutional factors (cf. Bhattacharya & Daouk 
(2002)). In this sense, the relation among insider trading law and investors’ preference for 
local has not been addressed yet by financial literature, but represents a promising field of 
investigation.  
Analyzing the single causes driving the phenomenon, this study’s findings on 
dynamics related to firm’s future profitability are new in literature. Notably, I find that firms 
that will outperform in the following year are more intensively traded within the region they 
are headquartered in than elsewhere. More simply, neighboring investors appear to be more 
skilled in selecting the most profitable firms. Overall these evidences, besides supporting the 
existence of an informational advantage held by local investors, are also strongly consistent 
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with that strand of literature showing that the closer are the players (analysts and banks) to 
the issuing firms, the better is their forecasting ability on firm’s profitability (see among the 
others Malloy (2005), Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Agarwal 
and Hauswald (2010)).  
Again, besides findings related to the role exerted by firm’s profitability, also those 
referred to the influence of opacity on investors’ choices are new in financial literature. At 
this regard, I find that the effect of local equity-markets conditions on corporate market value 
is leveraged by firm’s opacity. These evidences are consistent and complement results of 
Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) and Kumar (2009). In detail, Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find that 
local analysts’ informational advantage is closely tied to the quality of information 
disclosure, while Kumar (2009) shows that investors exhibit a positive bias-uncertainty 
relation, i.e. investors exhibit stronger bias when stocks are more difficult to evaluate, and 
that informed trading intensity is higher among stocks where individual investors exhibit 
stronger behavioral biases. The recently demonstrated significance of local social interactions 
(cf. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)) and neighborhood word-of-mouth (cf. Hong, Kubik, and 
Stein (2005)) on investment decisions appears highly consistent with these arguments. Going 
further, also findings related to the single opacity measures considered in the study contribute 
to the existing literature. Specifically, results on stock skewness are conflicting with 
contributes of Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) who show that 
more under- diversified portfolios tend to overweight specific stocks and industries with 
higher skewness. In this sense, the local preference for opaque securities characterized by low 
skewness may be explained only with local traders knowledge of the stocks’ future good 
performance. Nevertheless, I complement this evidence showing that stocks with high 
kurtosis are significantly more intensively locally traded. Given the well-known investors’ 
aversion for kurtosis (see among the others Dittmar (2002)), this evidence suggests that, 
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similarly to skewness, local investors may consciously choose high-kurtosis stocks only when 
aware of their future profitability, thus more likely exploiting only the chance of extreme 
positive returns. The pattern observed for profitable stock with low skewness and high 
kurtosis strongly supports this arguments. Furthermore, evidences that local equity-market 
conditions are found to increasingly affect the corporate market value also with the firm’s 
tendency to make earnings management, suggest that informed investors are characterized by 
a rather high level of sophistication.  
Finally, results on visibility are strongly consistent with a behavioral origin of the 
phenomenon, and in particular with previous evidences showing that the local home bias is 
stronger toward stocks issued by companies visible to investors (Huberman (2001)), and 
weaker with reference to the more nationally known firms and for the more sophisticated 
investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)).  
In general terms, the simultaneous evidence of the double nature, rational and 
behavioral, of the local home bias is new in financial literature. What’s more, it helps to settle 
the so-called home bias puzzle by providing a link between so far conflicting evidences. 
Thus, while some investors tend to trade local stocks because somehow familiar, many other 
select nearby securities because better informed. In light of these results, solely in context 
with the predominance of informed traders with respect to the biased ones, locally biased 
portfolios will generate extra-performances (see among the others Ivkovic and Weisbenner 
(2005)). In this sense indeed, local information works to be exploitable as really profitable 
and not indiscriminately public, assuming the nature of a sort of “insider information”. 
Conversely, in the opposite situation, the same result is likely to not hold anymore (see 
among the others Seasholes and Zhu (2010)). In this line, this research results show that the 
general tendency to trade in local stocks, as well the probability to get outperformance from 
this strategy, strongly increases with the uncertainty. This results support findings of Kumar 
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(2009), which pointed out that “uncertainty at both stock and market levels amplifies 
individual investors’ behavioral biases and that relatively better informed investors attempt 
to exploit those biases”. In this framework, the proportion (of the trading activity) of the 
actually better informed investors on (the one of) those driven by a feeling of familiarity 
toward local firms becomes essential in determining and interpreting evidences on local home 
bias (as well as others portfolios distortions).  
To future researches the task to understand which factors are able to move the balance 
between the rational and the behavioral component of local bias. Beyond the central role that 
with respect to the former is surely played by the enforcement of the insider trading law and 
the practices of corporate information disclosure, I believe that the degree of cultural 
integration is a key-factor. People tend to share beliefs and perceptions or, in other words, to 
interact with similar (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007); 
Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008)). The greater is the cultural segmentation, the 
greater is likely to be the equity-market segmentation and the persistence of a bias, and 
ultimately the profitable exploitation of such market disturbances. In this perspective the fact 
that the local rarity/abundance effect observed in Italy, the “country of a hundred common”, 
is on average the 50 percent stronger than in the US (almost 2.5 times if restricted to non-
visible, profitable and opaque firms) could be explained. 
From a practical point of view, this work’s results suggest several policy implications 
for both companies and institutions called upon to promote the economic and financial 
development of our country. Regarding the former, an untapped potential would emerge for 
those firms headquartered in those areas usually considered depressed but characterized by 
high level of private savings. These firms could exploit the contextual effect to be rare goods 
together with the preference and willingness of a large audience of local investors: both 
factors could profitably converge in order to obtain new equity at a lower cost. In other 
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words, in case of IPO or SEO, these firms could exploit an exogenous feature that originates 
from their territoriality and which could significantly lower their cost of capital. Moreover, 
the local context could for instance represent a sort of poison pill against hostile takeovers 
because of the overestimation of these securities due to their territorial feature. From these 
considerations a second implication follows directly whose recipient are policy makers: since 
the companies headquartered in depressed areas of the country would gain from market 
segmentation, the disclosure of such evidence could feed various mechanisms addressed to 
their listing. 
Moreover, this research results not only give useful directions in terms of pricing, 
highlighting the so far unexplored role of firms’ location as a determinant of firms’ market 
evaluation and the presence of a geographic component in firms’ market price, but also help 
to discriminate among the companies that may actually exploit the rarity effect and benefit 
from the evaluation that derives from their territoriality. In this sense, in context with the 
predominance of informed traders with respect to the biased ones, the presence of a stock 
supply scarcity would not be sufficient to enhance opaque firms’ market evaluation if these 
companies are not expected to be profitable in the future. In fact, as already stated, firms’ 
could not exploit the territoriality effect just because they are located in areas of the county 
not populated by other companies, but necessarily need to be characterized by specific 
features that may help them to catch the informed (i.e. profitability and opacity features) or 
behavioral (i.e. non-visibility or, better, local-visibility feature) component of local home 
bias. To conclude, in general and academic terms, the results of this study bring out the 
importance in finance of companies’ territoriality, an aspect only recently investigated and 
appreciated in the international economic-financial literature which nonetheless appears to be 
determinant not only for researchers but also for practitioners and financial market in general. 
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